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In the wake of the 2007-09 financial crisis and growing economic inequality 
fueled by financial activity, it cannot be left to mainstream economists to define and 
explain finance. This dissertation reexamines finance and the political, social and 
cultural foundations ignored by economists. In the first chapter, I argue for the 
importance of arbitrage, a trading strategy defined by buying low priced securities and 
selling the same securities for higher prices in two different markets. Arbitrage is the 
conceptual linchpin of modern financial economics but that discipline fails to explain the 
source of arbitrage profit. In the second chapter, I explore whether Marxist economics 
can offer a theorization of arbitrage profit. While much of Marxist scholarship too quickly 
dismisses the significance of finance, there is room for considering arbitrage to be a 
form of exploitation. In line with innovative Marxist work on finance, I apply a new 
framework for understanding value to arbitrage in the third chapter. I suggest that 
arbitrage can be understood as an apparatus of capture in which value founded on 
social mattering is captured in uneven relations of power.  
In the fourth chapter, I review the history of arbitrage and suggest that arbitrage 
is most successful when arbitrageurs can use advantageous differentials in 
communication networks and/or price stabilizing derivatives contracts to simulate 
 	   iv 
instantaneous trading. A special form of arbitrage I call money machine arbitrage takes 
place when structural inequalities of price allow for continuous profit making.  
In the fifth chapter, I offer a final concept necessary for understanding arbitrage 
as an apparatus of capture: the axiomatic. The axiomatic is the complex system of 
regulative statements and social relations that enable capture. In the final substantive 
chapter, I detail the arbitrage in subprime mortgage backed securities in the run up to 
the 2007-09 financial crisis and sketch some aspects of the axiomatic that can be 
gleaned from that story. I conclude that the taken-for-granted notion of “risk,” as a 
necessary way of making wealth and the correlate of return in financial economics, is 
central to the axiomatic of finance and thus financial profit making.  
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In 2012, as the resonances of the global financial crisis that unfolded between 
2007 and 2009 were beginning to fade, Richard Gere starred in Arbitrage, a film about 
the morally ambiguous decisions of a hedge fund manager whose mistakes harm his 
investors and his family and friends.1 Although the plot includes fraud, infidelity and 
death, there is not a single mention, much less depiction, of the financial strategy for 
which the film is named.  
This omission mirrors the attention given to arbitrage by outside observers of 
finance. Particularly, work on finance in the critical humanities and social sciences, 
which was reinvigorated by the financial crisis, scarcely mentions the term. Important 
critiques of finance such as David Harvey’s A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Christian 
Marazzi’s The Violence of Financial Capitalism, and Karen Ho’s Liquidated: An 
Ethnography of Wall Street leave out the term altogether.2 I began my own 
investigations of finance with this literature, and so was bewildered by the pervasive use 
of the term when I took a number of graduate finance courses between 2010 and 2012. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Arbitrage, directed by Nicholas Jarecki (2012; Santa Monica, CA: Lionsgate, 2012), 
DVD. 
2 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005). Christian Marazzi, The Violence of Financial Capitalism, trans. Kristina Lebedeva 
and Jason Francis McGimsey (Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2011). Karen Ho, 
Liquidated: An Ethnography of Wall Street (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009). 
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It became immediately clear that, at least within financial economics, arbitrage was a 
very important concept; its absence in the critical literature on finance appeared a 
considerable oversight.  
Arbitrage is not completely neglected outside of financial economics. In the early-
to-mid 2000s, a handful of scholars in anthropology and the subfield of sociology termed 
social studies of finance (SSF) began to pay special attention to arbitrage.3 Beunza et 
al. acknowledged that arbitrage was a “form of trading crucial both to the modern theory 
of finance and to market practice.”4 However, in accordance with much of SSF, these 
investigations did not submit arbitrage to critical scrutiny by, for example, radically 
questioning the financial economic definition of the term. Instead, this work sought to 
amend that definition by paying attention to the material and social aspects of arbitrage 
practice. Beunza et al. hoped that “the study of arbitrage could be a productive area of 
collaboration [with] financial economics.”5  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Daniel Beunza, Iain Hardie and Donald MacKenzie, “A Price is a Social Thing: 
Towards a Material Sociology of Arbitrage,” Organization Studies 27, no. 5 (2006): 721-
745. Daniel Beunza and David Stark, “Tools of the Trade: The Socio-technology of 
Arbitrage in a Wall Street Trading Room,” Industrial and Corporate Change 13, no. 2 
(2004): 369-400. Iain Hardie, “’The Sociology of Arbitrage’: A Comment on MacKenzie,” 
Economy and Society 33, no. 2 (2004): 239-254. Donald MacKenzie, “Long-Term 
Capital Management and the Sociology of Arbitrage,” Economy and Society 32, no. 3 
(2003): 349-380. Hirokazu Miyazaki, “Between Arbitrage and Speculation: An Economy 
of Belief and Doubt,” Economy and Society 36, no. 3 (2007): 396-415. Caitlin Zaloom, 
Out of the Pits: Traders and Technology From Chicago to London (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2006). 
4 Beunza et al., “A Price,” 721.  
5 Ibid., 741.  
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Anthropologist Hirokazu Miyazaki contributed to the arbitrage moment in the 
2000s and has since published a full-length book on his study of arbitrageurs in Japan.6 
He also notes that arbitrage is “a central category of financial economics and a widely 
deployed trading strategy.”7 His study gives important indications of just how central 
arbitrage is when he claims that, “For the arbitrageurs I knew, arbitrage was both their 
individual action and the market mechanism itself.”8 Miyazaki pushes past the SSF 
capitulation to financial economics by questioning the strict financial economic 
distinction between speculation and arbitrage.9 However, rather than examine the broad 
political and economic effects of arbitrage trading, his study focuses on reframing 
financial market professionals as philosophers rather than rational or irrational actors. 
For Miyazaki, arbitrage is a metaphor for the “daily comparative work of Japanese 
financial professionals” in seeking arbitrage opportunities and also defining their own 
identities and personal goals.10  
This dissertation began as an examination of the term that was obviously of 
serious import to financial economics but neglected by those who would submit finance 
to critical scrutiny. It quickly became evident that arbitrage was a difficult research 
subject. Arbitrage, as it is discussed in financial economics texts and courses, involves 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Hirokazu Miyazaki, Arbitraging Japan: Dreams of Capitalism at the End of Finance 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013).  
7 Ibid., 8. 
8 Ibid., 21.  
9 See, in particular, Miyazaki, “Between Arbitrage and Speculation.” 
10 Ibid., 13.  
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buying and selling two sets of securities that are judged to be similar in someway, often 
in terms of their riskiness according to some model of financial risk, but that are trading 
at two different prices. In the act of buying the low priced security and selling the high 
priced security, a profit is gained. But the official definitions of arbitrage offered by 
financial textbooks—consider, e.g., “A trading strategy that takes advantage of two or 
more securities being mispriced relative to each other”—do nothing to explain its 
importance within finance.11 Additionally, the etymology of the term doesn’t give much 
insight. According to finance professor and economic historian Geoffrey Poitras, the 
word “arbitrage” derives from the Latin arbitrari, “to give judgment,” and may have been 
used in the Italian, arbitrio, as early as the 12th century to describe “arbitration of 
exchange rates” at medieval fairs in Europe.12 Traders from multiple regions attended. 
Edited body of merchant bankers at each fair would calculate and set the exchanges 
rates that would be used for transactions. According to Poitras, the term arbitrio may 
have been used to describe the act of judging what the rates should be and not the act 
of trading upon them to make a profit.13  
Although arbitrage is now a common topic in financial economic journals and the 
financial press, these treatments are largely theoretical.14 The “no-arbitrage” condition—	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 John C. Hull, Fundamentals of Futures and Options Markets, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle 
River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2008), 521. 
12 Geoffrey Poitras, “Arbitrage: Historical Perspectives,” July 23, 2009, 20, 
http://www.sfu.ca/~poitras/EQF_ARB$$.pdf.   
13 Ibid. 
14 Interestingly, the term has crept out of finance obliquely into other disciplines where it 
is taken up uncritically and applied to non-financial contexts. For example, in a 
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in which financial securities are said to be at their correct prices if and when no arbitrage 
is possible—is used as a theoretical proof of financial pricing models, a topic I take up in 
chapter one, but actually occurring arbitrage trades are rarely discussed. No one reports 
arbitrage profit statistics for banks or hedge funds and the specific mechanism of 
arbitrage trading only comes out when something goes wrong, as in the case of the 
failed Long Term Capital Management fund15, or in the rare ethnographic studies of 
sociologists and anthropologists.16 There is a vague sense that arbitrage matters, but no 
one is going to tell you why.17 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“Personal History” feature in the New Yorker, André Aciman discusses Wordsworth’s 
penchant for “mnemonic arbitrage” as he moves back and forth between Time and 
Place. André Aciman, “Arbitrage,” Personal History, The New Yorker, July 10, 2000, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2000/07/10/arbitrage. Amitai Aviram’s article “Bias 
Arbitrage” claims that politicians engage in bias arbitrage by “identifying a risk that is 
either over- or under-estimated by a segment of the public and reaping a private profit 
from an action that mitigates the discrepancy between the actual and the perceived 
risk.” Amitai Aviram, “Bias Arbitrage,” Washington and Lee Law Review 64, no. 3 
(Summer 2007): 792. He gives the example of enacting a law to increase airport 
security in order to gain political favor, despite the extremely low probability of hijacking. 
Robert J. Rhee’s article “Tort Arbitrage” applies the term to the context of the legal 
standard of negligence, arguing that corporate defendants benefit from arbitrage 
between tort law and civil litigation. Robert J. Rhee, “Tort Arbitrage,” Florida Law Review 
60, no. 1 (2008): 125.  
15 Donald MacKenzie, An Engine Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006). 
16 Beunza and Stark, “Tools of the Trade.” Miyazaki, Arbitraging Japan. 
17 In 1931, a student of arbitrage wrote: “There was a time when the word ‘arbitrage’ 
brought to my mind a picture of a mysterious realm in finance which few people seemed 
to be inclined or at least to have the knowledge to discuss.” Although those within 
finance may now discuss arbitrage freely, those outside of it still regard it as a 
mysterious realm, if they regard it at all. Meyer H. Weinstein, Arbitrage in Securities 
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1931). 
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 My investigations soon led me to understand that this derived in part from the 
way arbitrage profit is secured. Arbitrage is a self-limiting trading strategy. In most 
cases, putting on an arbitrage trade eventually causes the apparent mispricing between 
two securities to disappear through the mechanism of supply and demand. If financial 
firms shared the details of their arbitrage activities, they wouldn’t be able to profit from 
them as much if at all, as other firms would immediately put on the same trades and 
cause the potential profit to dry up. In addition, as I discuss in chapter four, arbitrage 
has often been viewed as unfair or gaming the system. Keeping arbitrage activities quiet 
is thus a logical way to avoid criticism. 
However, rarely someone does let slip the prevalence of arbitrage in financial 
markets, and it is clear that it has been important for a long time. An 1892 article in the 
New York Times declared, “it is alleged that probably three-fourths of all the business 
done at the Exchange is transacted through arbitrage houses.”18 In 2014, Mark Blyth, a 
professor of political economy at Brown University, quoted an eerily similar statistic to a 
reporter, “A funny thing about these very big banks… they make 70% of their profits 
through trading, basically swapping bits of paper with each other for arbitrage gains, 
none of which arguably adds to anything except global liquidity and doesn’t really do 
much for real investment.”19 These claims, vague though they may be, point to the 
significance of arbitrage and its possibly dubious role within finance.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 "Arbitrage Business," New York Times (1857-1922), Sep 20, 1892, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/94916898?accountid=14244. 
19 “Credit Suisse Pleads Guilty to Tax Crime Charges. But Is Anyone Going to Jail?,” 
produced by Christopher Woolf, PRI’s The World, May 20, 2014, radio, 
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The research presented in this dissertation uncovers the importance of arbitrage. 
Two hypotheses guide the project: first, that finance plays a its central role in 
contemporary capitalism and has contributed significantly to the economic and political 
inequality that has been increasing in the U.S. and the world for decades; and second, 
that arbitrage is of central importance to the functioning of finance. I take up the task of 
investigating arbitrage by drawing on three traditions of scholarly inquiry. First, the study 
of communication, particularly of the way that communication processes and 
technologies condition the possibilities of knowledge and sociality, offers a frame for 
redefining arbitrage. In chapters three and four, I argue against the vague and unhelpful 
economic definitions of arbitrage and suggest instead that arbitrage is a creative 
process in which communication networks often provide the basis of success or failure. 
In addition, historical changes in arbitrage trading have been largely determined by 
transformations of communication technologies.  
Second, cultural studies, exemplified in the work of Stuart Hall, Lawrence 
Grossberg, Angela McRobbie and others, is defined by its commitment to 
contextualism, to using theory as a  “contingent strategic resource,” and to producing 
knowledge with the potential not only to describe but to change the articulations that 
make up a context.20 Cultural studies has a long history of engaging political economy, 
particularly through Marxism. As Stuart Hall explains, the engagement with political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-05-20/credit-suisse-pleads-guilty-tax-crime-charges-
anyone-going-jail. 
20 Lawrence Grossberg, Cultural Studies in the Future Tense (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2010), 27. 
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economy was one of the primary theoretical legacies of cultural studies; cultural studies 
was “from the beginning, profoundly influenced by the questions that Marxism as a 
theoretical project put on the agenda.”21 As I discuss in more detail in chapter one, 
cultural studies is well suited to developing a critique of finance through an examination 
of arbitrage. I also draw on cultural studies when, in chapter five I suggest a way to 
critique the political economy of finance. Finally, the cultural studies commitment to 
contextualism is a constant feature of this work. 
Finally, the relatively new interdisciplinary discussion between scholars in 
multiple disciplines gathered under the label “cultural economy” provides the greatest 
source of interlocutors for the current study. Cultural economy scholars from 
sociology,22 communication studies, anthropology, geography, business, economics 
and history pay careful attention to the day-to-day practices and motivations of financial 
markets, and investigate taken-for-granted aspects of finance. Importantly, many within 
cultural economy argue against the separation of economy and culture that is assumed 
by financial economics. Unlike financial economics, cultural economy of finance does 
not rely on economic models to draw conclusions about the function of financial 
markets, but instead critiques these models and engages in empirical investigation of 
the social, technical, and discursive practice of finance. I draw upon this work for my 
own investigations, and also hope that this dissertation will be an important contribution 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Stuart Hall, "Cultural Studies and Its Theoretical Legacies," in Cultural Studies, eds. 
Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula A. Treichler (New York: Routledge, 
1992), 279. 
22 Cultural economy broadens the project of SSF and the two subfields now overlap to a 
great degree.  
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to cultural economy by demonstrating that arbitrage is only possible as an articulation of 
social relations, technological infrastructures and taken-for-granted notions of what 
constitutes economic calculation.  
The following study of arbitrage is divided into six chapters. The first five each 
examine arbitrage from a different perspective and progressively build a framework for 
understanding arbitrage that is quite distinct from the financial economic definition. The 
sixth chapter offers a case study of an actual arbitrage trade and interprets it within that 
framework. 
In chapter one, I explain the role of the concept of arbitrage within financial 
economics. Just as it appeared to be in the finance courses I took, arbitrage is central to 
the edifice of theoretical finance. In particular, the “no-arbitrage” condition is the 
conceptual linchpin of the economist’s vision of finance as a closed and consistent 
mathematical system of prices. However, economists acknowledge that arbitrage does 
occur. They square the importance of the no-arbitrage condition with the existence of 
arbitrage by claiming that arbitrage is the practice that pushes markets towards 
efficiency, framing it as a sort of public service. However, since the no-arbitrage 
condition is the basis of contemporary pricing models, financial economics cannot 
account for the profit gained by arbitrageurs, i.e. it contains no theory of arbitrage profit. 
In the second chapter, I ask whether Marxian economics can provide such a 
theory within its own theory of profit as surplus value. Although many Marxists 
characterize finance as unproductive of value and the realm of fictitious capital, some 
leave open the possibility that arbitrage can be viewed as a form of exploitation and that 
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the productive/unproductive and real/fictitious distinctions are no longer useful in the 
context of contemporary finance. Based on this work, I offer the first central claim of this 
dissertation: Arbitrage is the form of surplus value appropriation unique to finance. 
To support this claim, I draw on the work of Grossberg et al., and Deleuze and 
Guattari in chapter three to propose an alternative framework for understanding surplus 
value.23 The Marxist definition of surplus value as that which is produced by labor in 
industrial capitalism is too narrow. Instead, industrial capitalist appropriation of surplus 
value must be understood as one of many possible apparatuses of capture. Just as 
surplus labor time appropriation is the apparatus of capture in industrial capitalism, 
arbitrage is the apparatus of capture that defines financial capitalism. Using this 
alternative framework, I challenge financial economic definitions of arbitrage. Rather 
than a trading strategy based on discovering mispricings, arbitrage is a creative process 
that proceeds in three steps: proposing equivalence, calculating profit and actualizing 
capture. This reformulation foregrounds profit rather than efficiency as the driving force 
of arbitrage. It also challenges the notion that “true” arbitrage is riskless. 
In the fourth chapter, I focus on the issue of risklessness with regard to arbitrage. 
I argue that, rather than being riskless, arbitrage is a strategy that can succeed or fail. 
The likelihood of its success is best understood not with reference to risk, but to the 
notion of time contingency. Successful arbitrage is that which best manages the 
uncertainty of unfolding time by simulating instantaneity. I discuss the two main ways 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Lawrence Grossberg, Carolyn Hardin and Michael Palm, “Contributions to a 
Conjunctural Theory of Valuation,” Rethinking Marxism 26, no. 3 (2014): 306-35. Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, M.N.: Minnesota Press, 2007).  
 	   11 
that arbitrageurs simulate instantaneity: by configuring advantageous communication 
networks and by artificially stabilizing prices. The latter is often achieved with derivatives 
contracts but in some cases, price stabilization is structural and lasting, leading to what I 
term money machines. Money machine arbitrage continually pumps out profits because 
the disparity in prices does not close as the arbitrage is performed. This chapter begins 
to demonstrate some of the social relations that are necessary for capture to take place 
through arbitrage. Specifically, arbitrage differentially delivers profits to some and not 
others and is often characterized as cheating or gaming the system.  
In the fifth chapter, I revisit the notion that arbitrage is exploitative in the Marxist 
sense by explaining another aspect of Grossberg et al.’s framework: the axiomatic. The 
axiomatic refers to the organization of finance as a set of social relations and taken-for-
granted rules or axioms that allow capture to take place. The notion of the axiomatic 
prompts the second central claim of this dissertation: arbitrage profit is the result of the 
organization of the system of finance, not the activities of individual arbitrageurs. 
Understanding arbitrage as capture, therefore, requires more than a calculation of 
surplus value. Instead, one must examine the axiomatic. 
In chapter six, I offer a case study that illustrates the functioning of arbitrage as 
an apparatus of capture. The arbitrage trade that I examine was at the center of the 
subprime mortgage securitization machine that failed spectacularly in the 2007-09 
financial crisis. I explain that a particular kind of financial security derived from subprime 
mortgages known as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) allowed a massive money 
machine arbitrage that netted billions in the run up to the crisis. After describing the 
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trade, I lay out the historical context in which it developed and find two axioms evident in 
that context. I reach the surprising conclusion that the relationship of risk and return, a 
fundamental tenet of finance that is built into all the major theories of financial 
economics, is actually one of the axioms that enables arbitrage capture. Risk as a 
correlate of financial return is an utterly taken-for-granted notion, one that is 
unproblematically taken up by critics of finance. Reframing this notion as an axiom of 
the financial apparatus of capture leaves open the possibility that confronting and 



















CHAPTER 1: ARBITRAGE AND THE EMBEDDED DISEMBEDDEDNESS OF 
FINANCE 
 
The goal of this dissertation is to rethink contemporary finance in order to 
account for its political and economic significance in the contemporary conjuncture and 
to explain the importance of arbitrage within finance. Lawrence Grossberg has called for 
a cultural studies of economics in general, of which cultural studies of finance must 
necessarily be a part.24 Grossberg argues that a cultural studies of economics will 
require a very specific form of conjunctural analysis that moves between the poles of the 
“embeddedness” and “disembeddedness” of the economy, terms he derives from the 
work of Karl Polanyi and Fernand Braudel.25 Unlike other economic historians who carry 
their categories with them back into history, each of these authors carefully traces social 
history and explains the constitution of the economic “per se” only within that history. 
Emerging from this history is a tension between the rootedness of economies in and 
their impact upon social context (its embeddedness) and the seeming autonomy of the 
economic from its basis in social context (its disembeddedness). For Grossberg, this 
tension is precisely what cultural studies of economics must unpack.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Grossberg, Cultural Studies. 
25 Ibid., 146. 
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Grossberg explains that some critics attempt to disprove the autonomy of the 
economic by “denaturalizing” or “socializing” economic phenomena, for example 
showing the cultural basis for certain economic behaviors or the historical and social 
construction of economic practices.26 However, these critiques of the disembeddedness 
of the economic discount or gloss over the importance of the autonomous functioning of 
economic processes, which “is not illusory, since it has real effects.”27 Grossberg calls 
for a different kind of analysis; he writes, “The paradox of the economic is precisely that 
it is continuously produced as self-producing, or if one prefers, the nature of its relational 
existence is such that it is made to operate… independently of that relationality.”28 Thus, 
the challenge for a cultural studies of economics “is to consider the different and 
changing forms of both the embeddedness and the disembeddedness of the economic, 
as well as the forms of the articulations between the two “modes of being” which 
actually constitute the economic.”29  
Using the embedded disembeddedness frame to analyze contemporary finance 
reveals important new insights about the functioning of finance. Financial markets 
appear to be disembedded in two, connected ways; they appear to be based on certain 
universal and ahistorical imperatives and laws that deny the contingent social and 
cultural construction of markets (profit maximization, the remuneration of greater risk 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ibid., 107. 
27 Ibid., 149. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 150. 
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with greater return, market self-regulation, etc.); and the also seem to operate on a 
plane removed from the productive activities of the broader economy. In the latter 
condition, financial markets seem to be self-contained. For example, in response to 
possible regulation of over-the-counter derivatives, then Federal Reserve Chairman 
Alan Greenspan argued in 1999 that derivatives markets were self-regulating and that 
“diversity within the financial sector provides insurance against a financial problem 
turning into economy-wide distress.”30 Greenspan implied that finance is something 
separate from the “economy” and won’t impact that economy even if it becomes 
embroiled in crisis. He turned out to be spectacularly wrong, as the recession that 
followed the financial crisis of 2007-9 showed. However, even in the aftermath of that 
crisis, the disembeddedness of finance from the broader economy seems evident in, for 
example, the rise of the stock market during the depths of the recession. Finance can 
be understood as experiencing a sort of double disembeddedness in some ways more 
substantial than that of the economic, since it seems to function apart from social 
context on the one hand and the machinations of the banal, productive economy on the 
other.  
Some scholarly critiques of finance can be read as attempting to reembed it, that 
is, to show the ways that financial markets and practices are in fact embedded in and 
constructed by social context and the broader economy. The sub-discipline of social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Alan Greenspan, “Financial Derivatives” (remarks before the Futures Industry 
Association, Boca Raton, Florida, March 19, 1999) quoted in Taylor Lincoln, “Forgotten 
Lessons of Deregulation, ” Public Citizen, May 2012, 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/forgotten-lessons-of-deregulation-derivatives-
report.pdf.  
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studies of finance (SSF) approaches this project by describing “the role played in 
[financial] markets by technologies and by systematic forms of knowledge, the concrete 
material practices of trading, risk management and regulation.”31 It examines, for 
example, the way the ticker tape and financial visualization software shape financial 
trading, the way the spatial organization of trading spaces influences the deals that can 
be made, and the role of financial theory in shaping financial practice.32 This work tends 
to critique claims of the disembeddedness of finance from its physical, technological and 
social context but does not address the relationship of finance to the broader political 
and economic context, instead often accepting mainstream financial economic 
explanations of what financial markets do. Social studies of finance has recently been 
criticized for overlooking issues of power and profit in their accounts of financial 
markets. According to Philip Mirowski, sociologists of finance all too often repeat and 
recapitulate “economists own stories… never challenging their accounts. They don’t 
report exactly what they do; they report what they say they do.”33 As a result, social 
studies of finance, according to Erturk et al., “reinforce[s] the separation of the economic 
and political spheres latent in the neoclassical economic tradition, and so downplay the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Beunza et al., “A Price,” 721. 
32 Karin Knorr Cetina and Alex Preda, “The Temporalization of Financial Markets: From 
Network to Flow,” Theory, Culture and Society 24, no. 7-8 (2007): 116-138. Zaloom, Out 
of the Pits. MacKenzie, An Engine. 
33 Philip Mirowski, interview by Tomás Undurraga, Estudios de la Economia, 2013, 
https://estudiosdelaeconomia.wordpress.com/2013/07/22/facebook-teaches-you-how-
to-be-a-neoliberal-agent-an-interview-with-philip-mirowski/.  
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important political connections that support the financial interests that lie within 
particular assemblages.”34  
Some Marxist analyses can also be framed as seeking to reembed finance by 
describing its embeddedness in a broader political economic context but neglect the 
social and cultural context. For example, Foster and Magdoff claim that what they call 
“monopoly-finance-capitalism,” characterized by increasing debt and speculative 
bubbles, is a response to the stagnation of the previous iteration of monopoly 
capitalism. Finance-monopoly-capitalism is merely the addition of financial market 
activities designed to prolong capitalist accumulation.35 Similarly, David Harvey 
suggests that finance is the new center of redistributive activity through “accumulation 
by dispossession.”36 According to these critiques, finance is not autonomous but 
actually a handmaiden to the industrial capitalist accumulation process. Christian 
Marazzi makes a parallel but different claim, that “financialization is… the form of capital 
accumulation symmetrical with new processes of value production.”37 For Marazzi, 
value production is an autonomous activity that encompasses, in the contemporary 
moment, all of life. Finance, then extracts “surplus-value by pursuing citizen-laborers in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Ismail Erturk, Julie Froud, Sukhdev Johal, Adam Leaver and Karel Williams, “(How) 
Do Devices Matter in Finance?,” Journal of Cultural Economy 6, no. 3 (2013): 339. 
35 John Bellamy Foster and Fred Magdoff, The Great Financial Crisis: Causes and 
Consequences (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009).  
36 Harvey, Brief History, 178. 
37 Marazzi, Violence, 48. 
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every moment of their lives.”38 This reversal, characteristic of autonomous Marxism, 
subjugates finance to the autonomous value production of citizen-laborers, but suffers 
the consequence of then rendering all the activities of citizen-laborers as value 
producing and thus collapsing what could be social and cultural domains into the 
economic. Despite its apparent difference from other Marxist critiques, in the end, 
Marazzi’s argument also suggests that finance is the handmaiden of the dominant 
capitalist economic process. Thus, many Marxist critiques of finance focus solely on the 
economic construction of finance.  
Finally, cultural economy of finance, a relatively new subfield closely aligned with 
social studies of finance, at its best describes the embeddedness of finance in its 
cultural and economic context and goes some distance towards critiquing the politics of 
finance as well. Paul Langley’s work on financial subjectivity connects the everyday 
financial practices of individuals, such as borrowing and investing, to broader cultural 
changes.39 For example, Langley dates the shift from personal saving to everyday 
investing in the 1980s when the rise of neoliberal government was privileging personal 
responsibility. In his work with Adam Leaver, Langley also describes the way that 
behavioral economists depoliticize the crisis of retirement investing by constructing 
individual investors as problems to be solved and thereby erasing the political problem 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ibid., 55. 
39 Paul Langley, The Everyday Life of Global Finance: Saving and Borrowing in Anglo-
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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of declining public welfare provisions.40 Karen Ho’s ethnography Liquidated describes 
the institutional culture of Wall Street and shows how recruitment practices, narratives 
surrounding the identity of financial workers, and the discourse of shareholder value 
combine to promote a particular kind of investment practice with devastating effects on 
the broader economy.41 For example, Ho connects the discourse of shareholder value 
to the leveraged buyout movement of the 1980s, showing the way layoffs, downsizing 
and outsourcing in the productive economy were tied to a historically specific cultural 
shift among financial traders and analysts during this period. Ho thus begins to describe 
the way that finance as a rational (disembedded) system, i.e. one that appears to follow 
a consistent internal logic free from outside influences, is produced precisely from its 
cultural construction, although she focuses only on the culture of Wall Street itself.  
However, showing that finance is constructed is not enough. Bryan and Rafferty 
have decried the “name and shame” approach to analyzing finance.42 They claim that 
critiques focused on “outing” the social and technological construction of finance neglect 
questions of what financial tools actually do.43 While financial economics denies the 
social conditions of the making of markets, simply reasserting that context or “outing” its 
social construction doesn’t tell us what finance does. Finance works; traders, analysts, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Paul Langley and Adam Leaver, “Remaking Retirement Investors: Behavioral 
Economics and Defined-Contribution Occupational Pensions,” Journal of Cultural 
Economy 5, no. 4 (November 2012): 475. 
41 Ho, Liquidated. 
42 Dick Bryan and Michael Rafferty, “Fundamental Value: A Category in 
Transformation,” Economy and Society 42, no. 1 (2013): 135. 
43 Ibid. 
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salespeople, managers, ratings agencies and regulators carry out their tasks everyday 
in the production and continuation of what we understand to be financial practices, but 
to what end? Profit? Certainly not for everyone. Then for whom? Who profits? Do they 
profit at the expense of others? Cultural economists and sociologists of finance describe 
the social and cultural conditions of this work, but financial economics is the discipline 
that supposedly describes the rationality of system itself, how and what this work 
accomplishes. To fully understand the embedded disembeddedness of finance, then, 
requires, as Grossberg puts it “the project of reinventing [financial] economics.”44 The 
goal of cultural studies of finance is not just to remind those who view it as autonomous 
that it is embedded, but to reconstruct financial descriptions and theories that connect 
its embeddedness to what it actually does. Accepting the injunction of Grossberg to not 
“take at face value ‘their’ stories”45 and of Philip Mirowski to “compare what they say 
they do with what they really do,”46 this chapter examines what financial economics 
says finance does and argues that despite its mathematical elegance and rhetorical 
force, these descriptions of finance contain a paradox.  
The supposed autonomy of finance, its existence as a closed and consistent 
system, is premised on the impossibility of a particular form of profit making known as 
arbitrage. A standard definition of arbitrage reads as follows: “Arbitrage is the process of 
buying assets in one market and selling them in another to profit from unjustifiable price 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Grossberg, Cultural Studies, 117. 
45 Ibid., 107.  
46 Mirowski, interview.  
 	   21 
differences. ‘True’ arbitrage is both riskless and self-financing.”47 The second clause 
means that the transaction must be perfectly hedged, can’t end up costing the 
arbitrageur money, and must be performed using only borrowed funds. Financial pricing 
models only work in a theoretical world where arbitrage is not possible. In that 
theoretical world, financial markets can be framed as a closed and consistent system of 
prices.  
But arbitrage does occur, and is, in fact, an enormous source of profit for financial 
firms. Financial economics manages this contradiction by suggesting that when 
arbitrage does occur, it functions to eliminate inefficiencies in markets, pushing them 
towards ultimate rationality. This notion that financial efficiency is produced by arbitrage 
is the apotheosis of the invisible hand—pure self-interest producing a fair, rational 
financial system for all. And yet, economists only informally acknowledge it. Thus, 
arbitrage is, paradoxically, impossible within the formal pricing models that frame 
finance as a closed and consistent system, and yet the very thing that makes real 
markets conform to those models and become efficient. Therefore, financial economics 
has no theory of arbitrage profit; it offers no account of where that profit comes from and 
who might lose when arbitrageurs gain.  
Financial economics suggests that arbitrage is impossible in fully efficient, 
rational markets. In other words, the impossibility of arbitrage is cited as proof of the 
disembeddedness of finance. Therefore, the existence of arbitrage proves that that 
disembeddedness is not complete, that the economist’s vision of a fully rational market 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Randall S. Billingsley, Understanding Arbitrage: An Intuitive Approach to Investment 
Analysis (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Wharton School Pub., 2006), 2. 
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contains a logical flaw. What’s more, actually occurring arbitrage, since it is cited by 
economists as the mechanism that actually creates markets in the image of efficient 
models, may be the very form of its embeddedness, the thing that roots finance most 
firmly in its economic and social context. But this is only possible if arbitrage is 
acknowledged outside the narrow and idealized world of economic models. 
Deconstructing and reinventing financial economics from a cultural studies perspective 
should begin by examining arbitrage as the linchpin of finance’s embedded 
disembeddedness and formally acknowledging and theorizing arbitrage profit.  
This chapter begins the project of interrogating arbitrage by examining the role of 
the no-arbitrage argument in financial economics. It proceeds in three parts. The first 
section frames economics as the study of the context of prices. The second section 
traces the history of contemporary financial economics in terms of the evolution of 
pricing formulae. The final section describes the paradox of no-arbitrage and its 
consequences for understanding what finance does.  
Economics and the Context of Prices 
Before addressing the history of financial economics, I want to suggest that 
economics broadly and financial economics specifically must be understood as 
disciplines concerned with defining the context that influences prices. Economists say 
that economics is concerned with the allocation of scarce resources. This narrative, like 
much in the dismal science, says something simple in a complex and misleading way. 
Economics is actually concerned with the prices that resources have (which happen 
toinfluence their allocation). As a descriptive science, economics could do no more than 
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collect price data and attempt to make some kind of sense of it. However, economics is 
also a normative science that deals with what things are worth and thus with the true 
prices or values at which they should be fairly exchanged.  
It is my claim, to be developed throughout this dissertation, that price is a 
crystallization of a larger context. A single price reflects not only the relationships 
between many commodities, but is also over-determined by the multiple and complex 
forces at work around it. The apparent simplicity or univocality of prices derives from 
their expression in the symbolic medium of numbers, not from the conditions of their 
making. Economics, like some other social sciences, has historically been concerned 
with circumscribing the complex contexts that produce phenomena in order to make 
judgments and predictions about them. So, economics has been characterized by 
changing definitions of the contexts that determine correct prices. Classical political 
economists struggled over the determination of the “value” or true price of commodities, 
alternately citing labor and costs of production as the sole contextual determinants. 
Adam Smith suggested that labor determined natural prices in primitive societies, while 
costs of production determined them in advanced society. David Ricardo and Karl Marx 
held more steadfastly to a labor theory of value. J. S. Mills advocated the cost of 
production value theory.48   
The introduction of the concepts of marginal utility and equilibrium by writers in 
the 19th century shifted the ground of classical value theory, redefining the context of 
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right prices (reconfigured as equilibrium prices) as supply and demand.49 This 
neoclassical price theory viewed supply and demand each as the inevitable result of 
assumed natural human strivings towards the rational maximization of utility. Utility was 
conceived as satisfaction, such that demand was determined by the utility received from 
preferred commodities and supply was determined by productive abilities and the utility 
received from profit.50 Right prices were thus produced by a context limited to the 
interplay of supply and demand determined by subjective but reliably consistent human 
nature.   
Financial economics follows a similar imperative to political economy and 
neoclassical economics of attempting to determine right prices by circumscribing the 
context that produces prices to a calculable set of phenomena. The prices that financial 
economics examines arguably emanate from a more complex context than ordinary 
commodities. Financial securities, after all, represent claims on other entities, such as 
firms but also governments, commodities or income streams, and are traded usually, 
though not always, in absentia, as stocks, bonds, futures, and more recently, a 
mushrooming number of other kinds of contracts and derivatives. Financial securities 
are thus produced out of the contexts of those represented entities as well as financial 
markets for the securities themselves. In other words, the context that financial 
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economics must examine to understand financial prices is double; it is both economic 
and financial.  
A Topical History of Financial Economics 
Histories of financial economics locate its emergence as a coherent discipline 
around the middle of the 20th century. Donald MacKenzie notes that prior to the 1950s, 
finance was studied from an “institutionalist” perspective.51 Justin Fox likewise claims 
that prior to the late 1950s, the discipline of finance taught “a mix of common sense, 
judgment, and tradition that had strikingly little to do with economics;” only in the middle 
of the 20th century did financial economics start to emerge as a rigorous, mathematical 
discipline.52 Mark Rubenstein’s annotated bibliography of the history of investments 
follows a similar timeline: he designates “The Ancient Period” as pre-1950, “The 
Classical Period” as 1950-1980 and “The Modern Period” as post-1980.53  
These histories of finance share not only this timeline, but also a narrative about 
the mathematization and rationalization of the study of financial markets. Over the 
course of the 20th century, the study of finance produced models of increasing 
mathematical complexity. However, this generalization offers little in the way of 
analytical force, other than the conclusion that finance went the way of the other social 
sciences, towards abstraction and sophisticated mathematical modeling, garnering the 	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prestige and objective knowledge attributed to science in the post-war period. However, 
there is another way to tell this story. 
In this section I provide a concise topical history of modern financial economics 
from the perspective of a critique of the embedded disembeddedness of finance. In 
contrast to the biographical histories more commonly told, this history illustrates the role 
that financial economics has played in producing the disembeddedness of finance.54  
In the last 60 years, financial economics has progressively redefined the way 
financial prices are determined, from a process that relies on multiple complex 
economic factors to a process that relies only on the prices of other financial assets in 
the closed and consistent mathematical system of finance. I argue that the 
transformation relied upon the use of the no-arbitrage condition. The following analysis 
periodizes financial economics according to the way it determines right prices for 
financial securities. The three periods are each dominated by a different form of pricing: 
fundamental analysis; mean-variance valuation; and relative valuation.  
The earliest form of systematic financial pricing, called fundamental analysis, 
examines certain measures of a firm’s profitability in order to shed light on the 
appropriate price for its stock. Although fundamental analysis is still practiced today, the 	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emergence of mathematical financial economics in the early 1950s can be located in the 
academic project of producing techniques and models of financial pricing that were 
more rigorous (read mathematical) than fundamental analysis. These new techniques 
can be collected under the label of mean-variance valuation because, although they do 
not make a complete break with fundamental analysis, they assume that the context 
that produces financial prices can be reduced to the expected return and risk of a given 
security. The historical mean and variance of a stock’s prices were used to approximate 
expected return and risk, thus circumscribing the context of financial prices to historical 
price data. Like fundamental analysis, mean-variance valuation is still an important part 
of financial theory and practice; however in the 1970s and particularly in the area of 
derivatives pricing, a new form of valuation called relative valuation emerged. Today, 
relative valuation has become the pervasive mode of thinking in financial economics, so 
much so that it is read back into mean-variance analysis and has been applied to the 
pricing of nearly all kinds of financial securities. 
Fundamental analysis  
Fundamental analysis is the oldest form of financial pricing. Financial economist 
and historian Geoffrey Poitras finds evidence of its foundations in the writings of 17th 
and 18th century commentators.55 Justin Fox suggests that something like modern 
fundamental analysis was already practiced in the early 1900s and advocated by Irving 
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Fisher.56 Fisher suggested as early as 1906 that investors should estimate the future 
income from a stock and discount that amount by an interest rate.57  
What became recognizable as fundamental analysis is a set of formulas or 
procedures for determining the future income stream of a share of stock. The definitive 
texts on fundamental analysis, Security Analysis and The Theory of Investment Value 
were published in the 1930s.58 Security Analysis, written by Benjamin Graham and 
David Dodd, was a guide to finding underpriced stocks by determining their fundamental 
value and comparing it to their prices in the stock market.59 Dick Bryan and Bryan 
Rafferty explain that Security Analysis offered an “intrinsic value formula” that was the 
antithesis of the “speculative fantasy” of value revealed by 1929 stock market crash.60  
Fundamental analysis has evolved since Security Analysis was first published, 
though the aim has stayed the same: analyze the metrics of a firm and its place in an 
industry to determine its fundamental value. A common finance textbook defines 
fundamental analysis as “Research to predict stock value that focuses on such 
determinants as earnings and dividends prospects, expectations for future interest 
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rates, and risk evaluation of the firm.”61 This research can include evaluations of 
macroeconomic factors, industry trends and a set of financial measures of the firm itself, 
all aimed at discovering what future cash payments an investor can expect from 
investing in a stock. Some metrics supposedly represent a “floor” below which a stock’s 
price should not fall. “Book value” or “accounting value,” i.e., the amount of money a 
business would have leftover if it sold its assets and paid its debt as listed on its balance 
sheet is one such measure.62 Liquidation value and replacement cost are other metrics 
of a theoretical floor. Earnings retention ratios, price-to-earnings ratios and dividend 
payout ratios are also examined in fundamental analysis.  
Fundamental analysis is the approach to determining right prices of financial 
securities, specifically of stocks, that defines the context in which prices are determined 
in the broadest manner. It requires the study of the firm and industry as the context in 
which the price of stock is produced. Further, fundamental analysis doesn’t establish 
exactly what the right price of a stock is, but only finds indications that its current price 
might be too high or too low. This process was far too inefficient and subjective for the 
mathematicians and economists who began to build simpler and more mathematically 
elegant models of financial pricing at the inception of financial economics as a proper 
discipline in the 1940s and 50s. 
Mean-variance valuation 	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Prior to the 1940s, the idea of risk and the possibility that risk could be attenuated 
through diversification (holding a group of different stocks rather than just one) was 
acknowledged in investment guides but not explicitly modeled or calculated.63 For 
example, Frank Knight famously defined risk as uncertainty that could be “reduced… by 
grouping cases.”64 A formal mathematical explanation of the relationship between risk 
and investment return and the importance of diversification didn’t come until the notion 
of expected utility was established. The concept is of central importance in von 
Neumann and Morgenstern’s book introducing game theory.65 von Neumann and 
Morgenstern produced a set of rules that showed that individuals will make choices by 
maximizing the utility they expect to receive from a given gamble. They proposed that 
individuals make decisions by assigning subjective probabilities to potential outcomes. 
The concept of expected utility adjusts the utility function of equilibrium pricing models 
by including those subjective probabilities.66  
Harry Markowitz extended this notion of expected utility to investment decisions 
in his Ph.D. dissertation in economics completed in 1955.67 Markowitz fatefully decided 	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to approximate expected utility by defining expected return as the historical mean 
(average) of a stock’s return and expected probability or risk as the historical variance of 
the stock’s price.68 Markowitz used these assumptions to produce what might be 
considered the first financial economic theory of how to select an efficient portfolio of 
stocks.  
Markowitz began his work in response to fundamental analysis. In reading 
Security Analysis and other guides to fundamental valuation, Markowitz noted a logical 
inconsistency between, on the one hand, the idea that one could find underpriced 
securities through fundamental analysis and, on the other hand, the suggestion to hold 
a diversified portfolio. If fundamental valuation really worked, investors wouldn’t need to 
diversify, they would hold only the most underpriced securities.69 Markowitz proposed 
instead that it was the expected utility of investing in an entire portfolio that mattered. 
Markowitz demonstrated that picking the securities to be held in a portfolio was not only 
about the return one might expect from the individual stocks, but the risk of each stock 
and especially the relationship between those stocks. Markowitz claimed that an optimal 
portfolio could be constructed knowing only the expected return (mean) and risk 
(variance) of each security available for selection. With this information the portfolios 
that offered the best return for any given level of risk could be calculated.70  
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This was actually a significant simplification of the messy work of fundamental 
valuation. Portfolio theory suggested that determining which stocks to buy did not 
depend on the elusive fundamental value of those stocks but on calculations made with 
the set of historical returns and variances of those stocks. Defining expected return as 
mean and risk as variance substantially changed the context in which a stock’s price 
could be evaluated. Instead of measuring any number of possible indications of a 
company’s fundamental value as fundamental analysis did, one could simply analyze 
the historical record of a stock’s price and dividends. The assumption that past 
performance was an adequate measure of the expected utility of a stock is remarkably 
unrealistic, but was a necessary move to subject what amounted to an incalculable 
multiplicity of subjective judgments of individual investors to mathematical and statistical 
analysis. Using mean and variance to approximate expected utility didn’t rule out 
making adjustments based on contextual analysis, such as lowering expected return 
figures if a company reduces output; but Markowitz’s simplifying assumptions enabled 
financial economics to find its mathematical legs and have endured for decades as 
appropriate starting places for estimating expected return and risk. 
The redefinition of the context of financial prices was carried through and further 
entrenched with the Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM). It is widely accepted that 
William Sharpe, Jack Treynor and John Lintner all developed relatively independent 
derivations of the CAPM around the same time, in the mid-1960s.71 The CAPM 
assumes that the optimal portfolio selection suggested by Markowitz is undertaken by 	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all investors and specifies the equilibrium prices of financial assets in such an ideal, 
rational world, i.e. it is the equilibrium model of mean-variance valuation. According to 
the CAPM, the return that can be expected on any stock is equal to the return of the 
entire market (or representative index such as the S&P 500) multiplied by a systematic 
risk factor known as beta. Beta is calculated again using historical variance as the 
measure of risk. If prices are at equilibrium, the CAPM will hold. If the return to a stock is 
higher than that suggested by its beta (the difference is known as alpha), it is 
undervalued, i.e. its price is lower than its expected utility, so an investor should buy it. 
CAPM assumes that all investors shared the same estimates of expected returns and 
variances; again historical data was and is most often used to approximate these 
variables.72 The CAPM is a marriage of Markowitz’s probabilistic solution to finding 
optimal investments and the equilibrium dynamics described in microeconomics and is 
still recognized today as “the centerpiece of modern financial economics.”73   
 More importantly, by assuming that all investors would be rational optimizers of 
expected utility, CAPM laid the burden of price determination not on the fundamental 
value of the firm that the stock represented, but on supply and demand for that stock in 
financial markets. In financial markets, participants are all both buyers and sellers and 
thus, supply and demand can be distilled down to expected utility. The shift from 
fundamental value to expected utility suggested that investors’ preferences for securities 
determined right prices. It wasn’t that the fundamentals of a firm were irrelevant but 	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merely that they were already accounted for in expected utility; fundamentals didn’t 
need a formal place in the pricing formula. It was a very short jump from the CAPM, the 
first version of which Sharpe published in 1964, to the efficient market hypothesis, a 
statement of which was published by Eugene Fama in 1970.74 The efficient market 
hypothesis explicitly stated that all available information, i.e. all those reflections of 
fundamental value that fundamental analysis is dedicated to uncovering, is already 
reflected in equilibrium prices. This boils down to the point that while market prices may 
not exactly match fundamental values, the information gathering activity and buying and 
selling of market participants make them as correct as they possibly can be.  
Mean-variance valuation, which found its apotheosis in the efficient market 
hypothesis, didn’t completely dispatch the larger economic context in which firms 
operate, despite the fact that the mean and variance of historical returns were often 
used as placeholders for expected return and risk. Although it uses mean and variance 
to value securities, mean-variance valuation allows the broader economic context back 
in by assuming that prices already reflect it. Prices appear to only depend on expected 
return and risk defined historically, but the efficient market hypothesis assumes that 
investors are always analyzing information and looking for “underpriced” stocks to 
amend their expectations of return and risk from historical estimates. Fundamental 
analysis is the mechanism that drives supply and demand and fixes equilibrium prices. 
Mean-variance valuation, therefore, doesn’t let analysts off the hook; they have to do 
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fundamental analysis to have the correct expected utility and demand and supply stocks 
appropriately.  
Relative valuation 
Although the strand of financial economics that turned from fundamental analysis 
to expected utility, stretching from portfolio theory to the CAPM, seemed to narrow the 
context of financial prices to financial markets, room for appeals to a broader context 
remained in this form of valuation. Paradoxically, although mean-variance analysis 
seems to supersede fundamental analysis, prices can only fully reflect available 
information because fundamental analysis is always underway. Mean-variance 
valuation didn’t so much circumscribe the context in which financial prices are set to a 
narrower set of phenomena as state that prevailing prices in financial markets are 
perfect substitutes for the broader context in which financial prices are formed. That 
broader context that determines values or right prices isn’t irrelevant, it’s just always 
already perfectly reflected in prices.  
The assumption that one needn’t appeal to any extra-financial source to 
determine the right price of financial securities because that work is always already 
completed was a necessary precondition of relative valuation. Like mean-variance 
valuation, relative valuation denies the need for extra-financial sources to determine 
right prices but goes even further to assume that prices can be determined by their 
relationships to one another alone. In particular, relative valuation depends on the no-
arbitrage condition to show what prices must necessarily be.  
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The origins of relative valuation and the no-arbitrage condition can be traced to 
the work of Modigliani and Miller on capital structure. In a 1958 paper, published 
between Markowitz portfolio theory and Sharpe’s CAPM, Modigliani and Miller applied 
economic reasoning to a key problematic in corporate finance, specifically how a firm 
should finance a new project, i.e. whether by issuing stocks or bonds. Scholars of the 
descriptive, management-based finance popular prior to the 1950s examined multiple 
factors that might influence the decision, such as the reputation of stocks after the 1929 
crash or the negative impact on a firm’s image if it held too much debt.75 Modigliani and 
Miller eschewed all these considerations for a single assumption: that “investors… 
prefer more wealth to less.”76 Using this assumption, they set up a logical, rather than 
empirical or descriptive, argument about the capital structure of a firm, i.e. the ratio of 
stocks to bonds that any firm issued.  
Modigliani and Miller argued that the capital structure of a firm was irrelevant, i.e. 
that the firm’s total market value wouldn’t change depending on whether it financed a 
project with stocks, bonds or any mix of the two.77 As proof of this proposition, they 
argued that two firms that offered investors access to equivalent future streams of 
profits were equivalent, even if their capital structures differed. So, if the value of two 
firms, for example one that only issued stock and another that issued stock and bonds, 	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differed, rational investors would perform arbitrage. For example, if the firm that issued 
some stocks and some bonds was more highly valued, investors in those securities 
could sell their stocks and bonds and buy an equivalent share of stock in the cheaper 
firm for less money. If the firms were truly equivalent, the investor would still expect the 
same future profit stream from the second firm, but would have netted a profit from the 
buying and selling of the two firms securities. According to Modigliani and Miller and 
based on their simple assumption that investors prefer more wealth, “The exchange 
would therefore be advantageous to the investor quite independently of his attitudes 
towards risk.”78 Investors wouldn’t be taking on more risk by arbitraging the shares of 
one firm with the bonds of another since the firms offer the same future income stream. 
The arbitrage would offer riskless profit. Modigliani and Miller argued that the result of 
this arbitrage would eventually be that through the mechanism of supply and demand, 
the prices of the two firms would become the same (the higher value firm being sold 
would experience excess supply, lowering its price, while the lower value firm being 
bought would experience excess demand, raising its price).79 
Modigliani and Miller’s “simplifying assumption” about investors preference for 
wealth was certainly not the only assumption they had to make in order for their 
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economic reasoning to work.80 In fact, the assumptions built into their “perfect market” 
with no fees or interest, perfect equivalence between shares of different firms, etc., were 
the subject of many critiques. Yet their approach would eventually become dominant in 
financial economics. By making the assumption that investors would engage in arbitrage 
if they could, Modigliani and Miller weren’t describing the actual prices of stocks and 
bonds from firms with differing capital structures but instead were asserting formalized 
rules that those prices must logically follow. These rules didn’t establish what the 
fundamental values of the firms actually were, only what the relationship of the firms’ 
values must be. In fact, early in their article, Modigliani and Miller relieve themselves of 
the responsibility of having to worry about fundamental value by deciding to focus on the 
market value of firms since “market prices will reflect… preferences of current and 
potential owners,” an early if veiled statement of the efficient market hypothesis.81   
Like CAPM, Modigliani and Miller’s proposition applied equilibrium economics 
and the dynamics of supply and demand to issues of financial valuation. However, the 
focus on relative valuation evident in Modigliani and Miller would soon overtake 
expected utility models like the CAPM. The ascent of relative valuation undoubtedly 
began in earnest with the publication of Fischer Black and Myron Scholes options 
pricing formula in 1973. Unlike Modigliani and Miller’s decision to focus on market 
prices, however, the Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) formula started out as a mean-
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variance equation and only by accident became the foundation of the now dominant 
relative valuation approach in financial economics. 
Black began his work on option pricing by applying the CAPM to warrants, 
financial securities very similar to options.82 The CAPM related expected return, 
represented by the historical mean of stock returns, to riskiness, represented by the 
historical variance of stock returns. Black eventually worked with Scholes to make a 
similar attempt with options. However, in the equation they developed, which was based 
on the CAPM and thus should have contained the CAPM’s two most important 
elements, expected return and risk of the underlying stock, the expected return term 
cancelled out. While Black and Scholes original option pricing formula was based on the 
CAPM and thus subjective investor probabilities for expected return, it didn’t actually 
include expected return as a variable.83  
Robert Merton claimed that although Black and Scholes’ formula was correct, 
basing it on CAPM was an “intuitively appealing” but not “rigorous” justification.84 Merton 
gave the Black-Scholes equation a rigorous mathematical derivation that gives the price 
of an option as a function of the current stock price, the “strike” price of the option (the 
price at which the option will pay its owner a positive return), the “risk-free” interest rate 
(the rate on safest borrowing, such as in the form of U.S. Treasury bonds), the time to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Warrants are options issued directly by a corporation and, when exercised, the 
corporation issues new stock to fulfill them. Hull, Fundamentals of Futures. 
83 Fox, Myth. MacKenzie, An Engine. 
84 Robert C. Merton, “Theory of Rational Option Pricing,” The Bell Journal of Economics 
and Management 4, no. 1 (Spring 1973): 141-183, quoted in Mackenzie, An Engine, 
135.  
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expiration of the option, and the volatility (the historical standard deviation or square root 
of variance) of the underlying stock.85 Like Modigliani and Miller’s capital structure 
argument, the proof of the BSM formula relies on an arbitrage argument. Option prices 
must conform to the BSM price because, if they didn’t, an arbitrage opportunity would 
exist. An investor could produce a “replicating portfolio” consisting of fractions of the 
underlying stock and risk-free borrowing that would give the exact same payoff as the 
option. The option price must therefore equal the cost of producing such a portfolio. If an 
investor could produce a portfolio for less, he could and would purchase the portfolio 
and sell the high priced option, netting a riskless arbitrage profit from the difference.  
BSM offers a logically necessary price for options, instruments that up until the 
publication of the formula were notoriously difficult to price and thus viewed as very risky 
investments. The price given by BSM didn’t rely upon the subjective probabilities of 
expected return but was constructed relative to observable variables in the present, 
particularly the prices of the underlying stock and a risk-free bond. The only exception 
was volatility. A last vestige of mean-variance valuation, volatility, defined as the square 
root of the historical variance, found its way into BSM. However, within 3 years of the 
original publication of the formula, Latané and Rendleman suggested that since the 
prices of options had become stable and consistent after the BSM formula was 
published, they could actually be plugged into the formula so that the single 
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unobservable variable, volatility, could be solved for.86 This “implied volatility” term gives 
an instantaneous, rather than historical, snapshot of the riskiness of the stock. The 
convention for traders became, and remains, to quote the implied volatility rather than 
the prices of options. This reversal banished the last unobservable element from the 
valuation of at least one type of financial security. BSM established the necessary 
relationship between observable variables of stock prices and option prices to deliver a 
measure of risk in the present, without appeal to past mean or variance or subjective 
analysis of possible futures. It was a form of valuation that drew only on the context of 
present financial markets and sought the “resting place” of prices rather than their 
fundamental value.87  
It is hard to overstate the importance of BSM for establishing relative valuation as 
the dominant form of financial price determination. It allowed for the pricing of many 
forms of derivatives, from futures and options to more exotic financial securities whose 
values are “derived” from that of another. The derivation of that value occurs through the 
replicating portfolio technique underlying BSM.88 For example, the price of a simple 
futures contract can be derived from the current (“spot”) price of a commodity or other 
security by calculating the price at which that contract could be replicated. If there is a 
futures contract to sell wheat in 3 months, a replicating strategy would be to buy wheat 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Henry A. Latané and Richard J. Rendleman, Jr., “Standard Deviations of Stock Price 
Ratios Implied in Option Prices,” The Journal of Finance 31, no. 2 (May, 1976): 369-
381, quoted in Rubenstein, A History, 242. 
87 Billingsley, Understanding Arbitrage, xvi. 
88 Elie Ayache, “Remarks,” (presentation, Cultures of Finance Summer Institute, Institute 
for Public Knowledge, New York University, New York, NY, June, 10-14, 2013).  
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now and pay to store it properly for 3 months. The futures contact cannot be more 
expensive than the cost of the replicating strategy. This is the meaning of the no-
arbitrage condition. The futures price must be the price of the replicating strategy or else 
arbitrage would occur and eventually, through supply and demand, force the price to 
that level anyway.  
Fundamental and mean-variance valuation continue to be taught in finance 
classes and practiced on Wall Street; the CAPM variables of beta and alpha are still 
important metrics for stock performance produced by information services and deployed 
in common parlance among traders. However, relative valuation has become so 
dominant a paradigm for pricing financial securities that it has been read back into 
mean-variance and fundamental valuation. This reading back is achieved quite literally 
when professor of financial engineering and retired “quant” Emanuel Derman even 
demonstrates in his “ Intelligent Graduate Student’s Guide to Pricing and Hedging” how 
the CAPM can be derived using a no-arbitrage argument instead of the expected utility 
one originally employed.89 Using the same replicating portfolio strategy that underlies 
the relative valuation formula par excellence, i.e. Black-Scholes-Merton, Derman 
produces the exact CAPM formula, essentially showing that relative valuation can 
provide a unified theory of finance.90 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Emanuel Derman, “The Intelligent Graduate Student’s Guide to Pricing and Hedging,” 
(handout, Columbia University, New York, 2011).  
90 Elsewhere, Derman refers to the no-arbitrage condition as “The One Commandment 
of Quantitative Finance.” Emanuel Derman, “Lecture 1: The Principles of Valuation” 
(handout, Columbia University, New York, 2013), 11. 
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 I have already argued that mean-variance valuation actually builds upon 
fundamental analysis as a necessary precondition. Fundamental analysis seeks to 
determine the value of a firm from metrics that are objectively observable but always 
only reflections of the elusive value figure itself. Mean-variance valuation defines the 
value of a firm with appeals to subjective, future-oriented expected utility, but then 
immediately appeals to the past (historical mean and variance) or fundamental analysis 
(all information is already reflected in prices). Relative valuation takes market efficiency, 
and especially the relationship between expected return and risk, as given and 
dispenses with appeals to the past or the future. The relationships between 
instantaneous market prices is all that relative valuation encompasses.  
Relative valuation is the one technique that has risen to the status of “law” in 
financial economics. There is only one law enumerated in finance textbooks, also called 
the “fundamental theorem of financial economics”: the Law of One Price. The Law of 
One Price has several forms, some more technical than others, but it essentially states 
that “if two assets are equivalent in all economically relative respects, then they should 
have the same market prices.”91 The law encompasses the expected return-risk 
relationship of mean-variance valuation in that it contains the inherent principle that 
“uncertainty demands higher return.”92 If assets are considered to be the same (along 
the metric of risk) their prices must also be the same or else arbitrage will inevitably 
occur between the uneven prices.  The law of one price is also referred to as “the 	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principle of no riskless arbitrage”, i.e. when prices are in parity, higher return can only be 
gained by taking on risk.93  
However, the proof of the principle of no arbitrage is exactly that when the law is 
broken, arbitrage will take place to enforce it! As one textbook puts it, “The Law of One 
Price is enforced by arbitrageurs: if they observe violation of the law, they will engage in 
arbitrage activity… until the arbitrage opportunity is eliminated”, i.e. until the excess 
supply of the expensive asset and the excess demand for the cheap asset produced by 
the arbitrage trades force their prices to converge, just as Modigliani and Miller 
proposed.94  
The no-arbitrage condition that underlies relative valuation is codified in the Law 
of One Price. It is assumed that arbitrage will always occur when possible, based on 
Modigliani and Miller’s assumption that investors will always prefer more wealth.95 The 
Law of One Price thus establishes that finance is a closed and consistent mathematical 
system of prices that doesn’t require any outside elements to function. I am using the 
terms “closed” and “consistent” in loosely the same way they are employed in 
mathematical logic, where closure means that any operation on one element of the 
system will produce another element of the system and consistency means that no 
equation in the system contradicts any others. These conditions do not hold in every 	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94 Bodie, Investments, 325.  
95 According to Anne Villamil, Modigliani and Miller’s proposition “represents one of the 
first formal uses of a no arbitrage argument.” Anne Villamil, “The Modigliani-Miller 
Theorem,” The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008), 674.  
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instance—for example, the no-arbitrage condition doesn’t apply to non-linear 
combinations of assets96—however, the system of prices imagined by relative valuation 
is closed in that all prices can be determined relative to other prices in the system (i.e. 
through a replicating portfolio) and consistent in that the no-arbitrage principle requires 
that if securities are equivalent, they cannot have different market prices, i.e. they 
cannot contradict one another.  
Relative valuation can thus be understood as the vital element in the production 
of finance as disembedded, the main location of its embedded disembeddedness. The 
closed and consistent system of financial prices imagined (and partially enacted as I will 
discuss in the next section) by relative valuation techniques is the theoretical statement 
of financial autonomy par excellence.  
The Paradox of (No) Arbitrage 
The concept of arbitrage plays dual, even opposed roles in financial economics. 
Relative valuation models require that arbitrage opportunities are not available, but the 
proof of that condition is that investors will always already engage in arbitrage, forcing 
prices to converge to “One Price.” Arbitrage is thus paradoxically assumed to be both 
absent, as a condition of the formal economic models, and present as the assumed real 
world mechanism that polices the system to bring it in line with the models. In this 
second role, arbitrage comes to be viewed as a kind of public service that imposes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Hal Varian notes that “the No Arbitrage Condition cannot be directly applied” to an 
asset which “is a nonlinear function of another asset’s price.” So for example, prices of 
derivatives that have more complicated relationships to the prices of underlying assets 
may not fit the no-arbitrage condition. Hal R. Varian, “The Arbitrage Principle in 
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fairness on the system of finance. The Law of One Price sounds like it could be a 
criminal statute, one that echoes actual laws like the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, price 
gouging laws and insider trading prohibitions. Different financial market participants 
should get the same price for the same security; it’s only fair. 
Insofar as arbitrage enforces the Law of One Price, ensuring that prices cannot 
fluctuate relative to one another, it seems to impose order such that all market 
participants can know what prices are and buy and sell at that same price.97 
Arbitrageurs have used just such an argument—that arbitrage performs a public service 
for financial markets—at times when their activities have been challenged. Hirokazu 
Miyazaki writes that when index arbitrage98 came under scrutiny as a possible cause of 
the 1990 stock crash in Japan, “Sekai arbitrageurs… asserted that arbitrage performed 
the important economic function of linking the cash and futures markets so that 
investors might use the futures markets for hedging.”99 The arbitrageurs echoed 
textbook arguments that their activities kept prices fair and transparent; if they didn’t 
undertake index arbitrage, the futures price of the index could deviate from the price 
given by relative valuation models and thus cease to function as a part of a consistent, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Even on regulated exchanges, securities do not have “One Price.” Market makers 
profit by quoting slightly different prices (i.e. the bid-ask spread) at which they will buy 
and sell securities. 
98 Index arbitrage is a strategy in which traders compare the futures price for a stock 
index such as the S&P 500 to the cost of buying or selling the individual stocks that 
make up that index in the present and holding them until the settlement date of the 
futures contract. If those prices are not equal, the arbitrageur could buy the cheaper and 
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intelligible system of financial securities available for hedging. In fact, the public service 
function of arbitrage was noted long before arbitrage took up its place at the center of 
financial economics. In a 1931 book on the subject, Meyer H. Weinstein declares, 
“Arbitrage operations tend to balance demand and supply in all the markets of the 
world.”100 
Understanding arbitrage as the police of the closed and consistent system of 
financial prices confirms to the extreme Adam Smith’s fantasy of the invisible hand. The 
single assumption of the insatiable profit motive leads to the conclusion that arbitrage 
will always occur, ensuring the rationality of the financial system. The logic portrays and 
produces finance as a system completely separated from the broader economic and 
cultural context, i.e. as disembedded.  
As already discussed in the introduction, many critics of finance point out that the 
autonomy of finance constructed by financial economics is simply not true. This is self-
evidently the case with the no-arbitrage condition. For starters, arbitrage actually does 
happen. But even in its second role as the policing mechanism that ensures market 
efficiency, arbitrage is also fraught with complications. Financial models are based on 
wildly unrealistic assumptions of perfect frictionless markets; real markets contain all 
sorts of limits that make the models poor or totally incongruous representations. 
However, financial economists never really thought that the frictionless world they 
assumed was real. Some were just more willing than others to believe that it wasn’t the 
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assumptions that mattered, only the predictive power of the model.101 For example, 
MacKenzie reports that Modigliani was somewhat uncomfortable with the unrealistic 
assumptions underlying his joint work with Miller on the irrelevance of capital structure 
from the beginning.102 Similarly, in her ethnography of current and former students of a 
Masters of Computational Finance program at a business school in New York, 
Stephanie Russell-Kraft reports that her informants were aware that financial models in 
general and the Law of One Price in particular are “all wrong.”103  
In the 1980s and 90s, behavioral finance economists began documenting the 
“limits to arbitrage” and simultaneously compiling a long list of factors that prevent 
arbitrage opportunities from being taken up. They argue that, unlike the frictionless, 
riskless arbitrage trade alluded to by Modigliani and Miller, real world arbitrage is 
necessarily risky, and that those risks can foil attempts at arbitrage or prevent them 
altogether, which results in a number of persistent “anomalies” in financial prices. For 
example, De Long et al. discuss the effects of noise traders, irrational traders who may 
be unjustifiably bullish or bearish on certain securities.104 Arbitrageurs who try to profit 
from the resulting mispricings of assets can only do so if prices eventually start to move 	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back towards rational values, i.e., the values they should have under the Law of One 
Price. If arbitrageurs do not have an infinite time horizon, i.e., if they hope to use the 
capital tied up in the trade in some other capacity or if their investors wish to eventually 
withdraw their money, noise traders may cause the mispricing to persist so long that the 
arbitrage is impossible. Similarly, Schliefer and Vishny suggest that firms that perform 
arbitrage with investors’ money face limits.105 For example, in real markets, arbitrage 
trades may diverge even more during a given time horizon, requiring investors to put in 
more funds for margin calls. This divergence will appear to investors like a loss and they 
may respond by pulling money out instead of investing more. Gromb and Vayanos 
discuss other constraints on arbitrage such as the cost of selling stock short106 and 
constraints on the amount of money an arbitrageur can invest (they don’t all have infinite 
wealth!).107 They also list persistent anomalies such as the value of stocks going up 
when they are added to prominent market indices and the value of stocks sold by 
distressed mutual funds going down. The limits to arbitrage have prevented arbitrageurs 
from completely eliminating the anomalies.  
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The “limits to arbitrage” literature reflects the fact that financial economists are 
well aware of the unrealistic assumptions underlying the Law of One Price and that such 
arguments don’t fit real world circumstances. However, the banner under which this 
research is carried out (“limits to arbitrage”) suggests that despite issues with arbitrage, 
it cannot be scrapped completely as an explanation of pricing. Economists are quick to 
defend arbitrage against regulations that threaten to impose further limits, such as short 
selling bans.108 The limits to arbitrage literature can be read as an immunization against 
claims that the assumptions underlying the closed and consistent system of financial 
prices are unrealistic. By identifying the factors that hinder or prevent arbitrage, this 
literature shifts the blame for the unrealistic assumptions underlying financial models 
from financial economics to irrational investors and regulators who choose to limit 
arbitrage and thus the rationality of financial markets. It is the responsibility of these 
irrational actors to conform to the models, not the models to conform to irrational market 
practices. Financial economics acknowledges that the autonomy of finance is in fact 
fragile and must be approached politically as a project rather than a taken-for-granted 
certainty. Imperfections in the system are a consequence of these irrational limiting 
factors, but the goal of a closed and consistent system is self-evidently a good one in 
which fair pricing prevails. Unrestricted arbitrage is the means to achieving that goal. 
Statistics on arbitrage are not readily available because arbitrage is a secretive 
practice. Profiting from arbitrage depends upon the arbitrageur having knowledge of the 	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mispricing before anyone else; otherwise other investors would, by their own buying and 
selling activities, remove the opportunity. For this reason, firms don’t release details 
about their arbitrage trades. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the focus on 
arbitrage in financial practice has increased in conjunction with the growing dominance 
of relative valuation founded conceptually on the no-arbitrage condition.109 Specifically, 
there appears to be an academic-trading pipeline by which financial economists identify 
theoretical arbitrage opportunities and publish journal articles describing them and then 
market participants undertake those arbitrages. Perhaps the first and most significant of 
these happened with the publication of the BSM options pricing formula. Despite 
evidence that math professor turned hedge fund manager Edward Thorp used a formula 
very similar to the BSM before its publication for arbitraging options, options prices were 
notoriously inconsistent.110 However, when Black began to publish price sheets listing 
the BSM theoretical prices and volatility estimates for different options, traders used 
them “in the practice of arbitrage… and the effects of that arbitrage seem to have been 
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to move patterns of prices toward the postulates of the model” thus removing the 
arbitrage opportunity.111 
The academic-trading pipeline continued to operate after the publication of the 
BSM, with financial economists describing “anomalies” that indicated arbitrage 
opportunities in academic journal articles and traders undertaking the arbitrage and, if 
not erasing the anomalies completely due to “limits to arbitrage” factors, at least 
reducing them.112 Arbitrage is thus the technique that disembeds finance based on the 
model provided by financial economics. Arbitrage brings prices into parity and erases, at 
least to some extent, anomalies that disrupt efficiency. Therefore, the disembeddedness 
of financial markets isn’t then merely theoretical or ideological; it is put into practice. The 
function that arbitrage is assumed to serve, of making markets efficient, self-regulated 
and autonomous is limited, but these limitations are framed not so much as failures of 
market efficiency but as constraints imposed from outside the closed and consistent 
system by irrational noise traders, uninformed investors or misguided regulators. 
Financial autonomy is thus a project to be perfected.  
I have already argued that cultural studies of finance must begin a critique of 
finance by reformulating financial economics to describe what finance actually does 
instead of what financial economists say it does. It is easy to critique the no-arbitrage 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 MacKenzie, An Engine, 166. This is the flagship example for MacKenzie of the 
strongest “Barnesian” form of performativity he describes in his book. 
112 R. David McLean and Jeffrey Pontiff, “Does Academic Research Destroy Stock 
Return Predictability” (paper, European Financial Data Institute-French Finance 
Association Finance Meeting, Paris, December 2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2156623##. 
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condition underlying financial models because arbitrage does happen. Yet, financial 
economists know arbitrage does happen and instead of allowing this fact to contradict 
their no-arbitrage models, they allow that in practice arbitrage is the mechanism that 
polices the system of financial prices, promoting fairness and autonomy. Critiquing this 
second assertion is more difficult because arbitrage actually has been the mechanism 
by which prices have been made to conform to relative valuation models like BSM and 
anomalies in pricing have been attenuated. Arbitrage is the conceptual device that 
allows financial economics to describe finance as autonomous or disembedded, but 
even more so, it is also the device that produces limited but very real autonomy in the 
form of a closed and consistent system of prices. While crashes, crises and persistent 
anomalies show that market efficiency is limited, financial economists have produced an 
explanation for those limits in the limits to arbitrage literature, framing market efficiency 
as an imperative project that can only be achieved by removing regulatory and 
behavioral restrictions on arbitrage. Arbitrage is thus precisely the fulcrum of the 
embedded disembeddedness of finance.  
However, for all of its importance to financial autonomy, arbitrage remains only 
half theorized by financial economics. We know that arbitrage happens subject to 
certain limits, but the result of that arbitrage, the profit, is not accounted for by financial 
models. According to the mean-variance models that underpin relative valuation, profit 
is assumed to be the remuneration for taking on risk. Therefore, any return over the so-
called “risk-free” rate of interest must correspond to some risk. Arbitrage is specifically 
defined as garnering riskless profit. So, tautologically, relative valuation models based 
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on the no-arbitrage condition cannot account for arbitrage profit! This aporia is precisely 
the place that cultural studies of finance can offer a necessary reconstruction of financial 
economics. Arbitrage is an important mechanism of financial profit making, therefore it is 
necessary to construct an understanding of where that profit comes from.  
The “limits to arbitrage” literature, which does acknowledge the practice of 
arbitrage, suggests a possible interpretation of arbitrage profit. Behavioral finance 
economists claim that arbitrage is necessarily risky. This suggests that arbitrage profit is 
just like the profit from holding a risky stock, a remuneration of risk. For example, some 
arbitrage trades are subject to so called “fundamental risk”, meaning that new 
information in the future could change the value of the expected payoff to the trade.113 
This is the case with arbitrage between stocks and arbitrage carried out during a merger 
or acquisition between two firms (unsurprisingly called “risk arbitrage). In these cases, 
the profit can be thought of as remuneration for the fundamental risk of the trade.  
However, the risk that many behavioral finance economists describe in the limits 
to arbitrage literature is different. These are the risks that come with even guaranteed 
arbitrages, i.e. those that involve securities like futures or bonds that have a set payoff 
at a future time regardless of new information that might emerge in the interim. One 
such risk is the agency problem described by Schliefer and Vishny, in which investors 
who are unwilling to meet margin calls might force a firm to exit an arbitrage trade at a 
loss even though the payoff is still guaranteed.114 It does not make sense, however, to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Bodie et al., Investments, 390. 
114 Schleifer and Vishny, “Limits of Arbitrage.” 
 	   55 
suggest that the profit that one might gain from this arbitrage is the remuneration of the 
risk that investors might pull out of the deal. This is not so much a risk as a radical 
uncertainty.115 The conditions that behavioral finance economists identify as risks 
inherent in guaranteed arbitrage are contingencies faced by any investor because the 
future is unknowable. An individual who owns stock might have to sell her position 
during a down week to pay for medical expenses. Similarly, an exchange might be 
permanently shut down leaving all investors who own securities traded there unable to 
exit their positions by selling on the exchange. These events are products of radical 
uncertainty, not the risk that an investment might go up or down that is priced in mean-
variance models. Radical uncertainty is a condition of existence of the investor, not a 
fundamental risk to an investment strategy. Therefore, forms of arbitrage besides those 
that face fundamental risk, i.e. equity or risk arbitrage, still produce a profit that no 
branch of financial economics can explain.  
Arbitrage is the engine of the embedded disembeddedness of finance. It is either 
assumed to be impossible or to be the mechanism that secures finance as a closed and 
consistent system of prices. Yet we cannot rely on financial economics to understand 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 I choose to use the term “radical uncertainty” here instead of just “uncertainty” 
because of the work of Frank Knight. Knight famously distinguished between risk—
uncertainty that can reduced to known probabilities—and uncertainty and claimed that 
profit arises only from uncertainty. Knight’s theory, which predated the risk-return 
relationship established by mean-variance techniques such as CAPM, might in fact 
contradict my argument here, and suggest that arbitrage profit is precisely the 
remuneration of the uncertainty of the trade. However, Knight made his claims about the 
context of entrepreneurship and the profit accruing to the entrepreneur who makes 
business decisions that are uninsurable. By radical uncertainty, I am referring to the 
contingency of existence. I do not believe that Knight would claim, nor that any reader 
would accept, that profit accrues to those who exist contingently. If it did, the critique of 
finance would likely be unnecessary. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty. 
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the profit that results from arbitrage. The vision of finance that arbitrage supposedly 
secures as one where fair prices prevail completely ignores the wealth that is earned by 
those who perform arbitrage. It also makes the question of where that wealth comes 
from unintelligible. Arbitrage is understood as the mechanism that corrects mispricings 
so if anything, arbitrage profit might be understood as an error in the system that the 
arbitrageur captures out of pure self-interest. But to whom did that error belong in the 
first place and why was it deemed an error that could be captured? This is a crucial 
question in light of the fact that over the same period of time that arbitrage has 
flourished as a technique of financial profit making, income inequality in the U.S. has 
grown exponentially, with those in financial services sector leading the expansion at the 
top.116 Arbitrage is then not only a key to the embedded disembeddedness of finance 
but also a mysteriously unexamined mechanism of financial enrichment. The source of 
arbitrage profit is utterly neglected, and even rendered an unintelligible realm of inquiry 
for financial economics. It is thus precisely the topic with which a reformulated financial 
economics, one that describes what finance actually does rather than what economists 
say it does, should begin. A critique of finance from a cultural studies perspective must 
start by examining not what arbitrage supposedly accomplishes for the system of 
finance, but what arbitrage profit is composed of and where it comes from.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Lawrence Mishel and Natalie Sabadish, “CEO Pay and the Top 1%: How Executive 
Compensation and Financial-Sector Pay Have Fueled Income Inequality,” Economic 
Policy Institute Report: Inequality and Poverty, May 2, 2012, 
http://www.epi.org/publication/ib331-ceo-pay-top-1-percent/.  
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Conclusion 
Finance displays a kind of double embedded disembeddedness in that, although 
it is socially constructed, it maintains an apparent and actual relative autonomy from its 
social and macroeconomic context. Beginning in the 1950s, financial economics has 
progressively framed financial markets as a closed and consistent mathematical system 
of prices that need not reference any context outside itself to function. This framing 
relies on the paradoxical function of arbitrage. Relative valuation models assume no 
arbitrage and thus provide no theory of arbitrage profit, even while financial economists 
assume that market efficiency is guaranteed by arbitrageurs. Arbitrage does happen, 
and it also provides some limited efficiency to markets by ensuring price parity. 
However, financial economics entirely neglects the other face of this efficiency; arbitrage 
provides a significant source of profit to firms powerful and wealthy enough to engage in 
it. Thus, arbitrage is the mechanism that produces finance as disembedded, yet it is 
only half-theorized by financial economics. Its economic function is crucial to the framing 
of finance as an autonomous system but no theory of arbitrage profit exists.  
Critiquing financial autonomy from a cultural studies perspective requires more 
than asserting that financial models rest upon unrealistic assumptions or that they are 
socially constructed. It calls for a reconstructed financial economics that describes what 
finance actually does. Focusing on the role of arbitrage in financial economics 
acknowledges the fact that financial autonomy is a project that has been historically 
produced. But it also accepts that arbitrage works: it creates markets in which prices 
are, subject to a number of limits, a closed, consistent system. Finance is both 
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embedded and disembedded through arbitrage. But focusing on arbitrage also reveals 
that financial economics does not account for the significant wealth produced by 
arbitrage for those who can successfully engage in it, even though this is precisely what 
happens. Therefore, cultural studies of finance should begin with a theory of arbitrage 
profit. This theory must examine what arbitrage is and does, its cultural and 
technological conditions of possibility and the relations of power that suffuse it. To begin 
the project of proposing such a theory, I turn in the next chapter to a different economic 
tradition, one that is critical of neoclassical economics: Marxism. I ask if Marxist value 
theory can challenge the financial economic implication that arbitrage profit as a 
mathematical error and contribute to a robust theory of arbitrage profit.  
  





CHAPTER 2: ARBITRAGE AND MARXIST THEORIES OF FINANCE 
The notion of arbitrage as guarantor of market efficiency in financial economics 
can only lead to the conclusion that arbitrage profit accidentally results from an error in 
efficient pricing. When arbitrageurs correct the error of mismatched prices, they just 
happen to receive a profit. However, it is the promise of this profit that directs so much 
professional financial activity to the creation of arbitrage trades. The idea that this profit 
is a mere error doesn’t support the importance of arbitrage as a profit making strategy. 
There is, however, another significant economic tradition that might explain the source 
of arbitrage profit: Marxian economics contains a rigorous theory of profit in capitalism, 
specifically the theory of surplus value.117 Therefore, it is worth looking to this tradition 
for an answer to the question of how arbitrage profit is constituted.  
To understand whether Marxism can offer a better account of arbitrage, I first 
must first explain the relationship between the Marxist theory of surplus value and 
finance, the domain in which arbitrage takes place. Marxist interpretations of finance 
rest upon the distinction Marx makes between two sets of terms: productive and 
unproductive labor, and real and fictitious capital. The two dichotomies are related but 
not identical. Productive labor is that which results in surplus value, while unproductive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Although I am aware of the importance of the “transformation problem” in Marx’s 
work, for the purposes of this chapter I assume identity between surplus value and profit 
for two reasons. First, offering an interpretation of the transformation problem is beyond 
the scope of this work; and second, in the next chapter I will argue against distinctions 
made in both Marxian and neoclassical economics between a real or fundamental value 
and price.  
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labor is labor, whether paid or unpaid, that does not ultimately produce surplus value, 
such as some forms of service work or reproductive labor. Marx clarifies this distinction 
in Vol. I: “Capitalist production is not merely the production of commodities, it is 
essentially the production of surplus-value… That labourer alone is productive, who 
produces surplus-value for the capitalist, and thus works for the self-expansion of 
capital.”118 
 Later interpreters of Marx have clarified this distinction in a way that makes its 
implications for a Marxist theory of finance clear. Wolff and Resnick explain the 
difference between productive and unproductive labor with regard to management: “The 
productive capitalist directs me to supervise productive laborers, to make sure they 
perform the maximum possible surplus labor. In this case I do unproductive labor since 
my labor power is not a direct part of the production of capitalist commodities.”119 In 
addition to managing, Wolff and Resnick classify merchanting, renting land and 
moneylending as unproductive labor, that is labor that does not create value, even 
though it indirectly aids in the production and appropriation of surplus value. 
Harry Braverman explains that unproductive labor is that which relates to the 
realization of surplus value, through the “distribution, storage, packaging, transportation, 
display, etc.” of commodities, or the appropriation of surplus value, through “the use of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Karl Marx, Capital Vol I: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production, ed. Frederick 
Engels (New York: International Publishers, 2003), 477. 
119 Richard D. Wolff and Stephen A. Resnick, Economics: Marxian versus Neoclassical 
(Baltimore, M.D.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 166. 
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capital simply for purposes of credit, speculation, etc.”120 Braverman argues that while 
realization and appropriation “engage… enormous masses of labor,” this labor “does not 
enlarge the value or surplus value available to society or to the capitalist class by one 
iota.”121  
From the perspective of Marxian economics, the activities of financiers are 
unproductive.122 Lending at interest is specifically categorized by Wolff and Resnick as 
an unproductive, “nonclass” process in which “no labor or surplus labor is done, no new 
commodities are created.”123 Although lending may be done to industrial capitalists who 
then use the money as capital, the labor of the banker is nonetheless itself unproductive 
of value. Lending increases money, but not surplus value, which is only created through 
productive labor. This interpretation of moneylending is supported by Marx’s 
designations of both usury (lending to non-capitalists, i.e. consumer lending) and banks 
lending to capitalists as “parasitic”.124  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the 
Twentieth Century (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1998), 286.  
121 Ibid., 287. 
122 Wolff and Resnick, Economics.  
123 Ibid., 165. 
124 “Usury centralizes money wealth where the means of production are dispersed. It 
does not alter the mode of production, but attaches itself firmly to it like a parasite and 
makes it wretched.” Karl Marx, Capital Vol. III: The Process of Capitalist Production as a 
Whole, ed. Friedrick Engels, (New York: International Publishers, 1894), Marxists 
Internet Archive, 1999, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894-c3/ch36.htm. 
“The credit system, which has its focus in the so-called national banks and the big 
money-lenders and usurers surrounding them, constitutes enormous centralisation, and 
gives to this class of parasites the fabulous power, not only to periodically despoil 
industrial capitalists, but also to interfere in actual production in a most dangerous 
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On the other hand, “fictitious capital” refers to paper securities that appear to 
have value but do not have a basis in real commodity production.125 For Marx, the credit 
system is the domain of fictitious capital, in which government bonds, other claims on 
debt, bills of exchanges and titles of ownership such as stocks are traded. All are 
fictitious in that they represent claims on value but are not themselves values produced 
by labor. Capital is advanced in the form of a loan or to buy a stake in a company; the 
paper that represents that capital is not the real capital advanced, but a fictitious 
doubling of it.126  
Unproductive labor and fictitious capital can overlap, but unproductive labor 
doesn’t necessarily involve fictitious capital. A merchant exchanging commodities for 
payment in commodity money is not dealing in fictitious capital. However, within this 
framework, arbitrage fits both within the unproductive sphere and the credit system as 
the home of fictitious capital.127 It is a transfer of fictitious capital between financiers that 
does not produce value. Wolff and Resnick would likely designate arbitrage as another 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
manner.” Karl Marx, Capital Vol. III: The Process of Capitalist Production as a Whole, 
ed. Friedrick Engels, (New York: International Publishers, 1894), Marxists Internet 
Archive, 1999, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894-c3/ch33.htm. 
125 Karl Marx, Capital Vol. III: The Process of Capitalist Production as a Whole, ed. 
Friedrick Engels, (New York: International Publishers, 1894), Marxists Internet Archive, 
1999, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894-c3/ch29.htm. 
126 “With the development of interest-bearing capital and the credit system, all capital 
seems to double itself, and sometimes treble itself, by the various modes in which the 
same capital, or perhaps even the same claim on a debt, appears in different forms in 
different hands. The greater portion of this "money-capital" is purely fictitious.” Ibid. 
127 Even arbitrage in “commodities” markets is actually arbitrage of futures or forwards 
that represent commodities.  
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“nonclass process.”128 Thus, at first glance, it appears that arbitrage profit does not 
qualify as “real” according to the Marxist theory of profit as surplus value.  
However, many scholars have produced their own interpretations of finance from 
a Marxist perspective that delve more deeply into the subject and elaborate the 
distinctions between productive and unproductive labor and real and fictitious capital. 
These interpretations can be grouped into four broad categories. The first dismisses the 
importance of finance altogether. The second cedes to finance a central role in 
capitalism even while maintaining that it does not produce value. The third category 
suggests that finance is exploitative in a way similar to the appropriation of surplus value 
described by Marx, but still maintains a distinction between real value production and 
finance. The fourth category explodes the productive/unproductive and real/fictitious 
distinctions, opening the possibility that finance in general and arbitrage in particular 
play a fundamental role in value production and appropriation in the contemporary 
context. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I present each of these categories and explore 
their implications for understanding arbitrage. In response to work in the third and fourth 
categories, I present the first of two central claims of this dissertation. I claim that 
surplus value appropriation can occur outside the context of industrial capitalism. In fact, 
the appropriation of surplus value produced by labor is just one form of a broader logic, 
capture, which takes different forms in different formations of capitalism. Arbitrage is the 
form of capture unique to financial capitalism. 	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Marx on Finance 
Category 1: Money and Finance Do Not Matter 
As late as 1982, in a review of Rudolf Hilferding’s Finance Capital, Jerry Coakley 
wrote: “A common attitude on the left is the notion that money and finance do not 
matter.”129 While this may be somewhat hyperbolic and it was certainly not a universally 
held notion, there have been and remain today large and influential strains of Marxism 
that largely dismiss the importance of finance. In a 1996 journal article, Simon Mohun 
defended the productive/unproductive dichotomy as an essential feature of the Marxian 
labor theory of value, and dismissed the notion that remuneration of labor done in the 
commercial or financial sectors is anything other than “the consequence of unequal 
exchange with industrial capital, the terms of which are determined by competitive 
struggle.”130 Profits “’really’ earned in the productive sector” are distributed to the 
financial sector, but the financial sector plays no role in producing surplus value.131  
Critiques of finance as unimportant rest not only on Marx’s productive/ 
unproductive dichotomy, but also the notion of  fictitious capital. Even contemporary 
Marxian theorists maintain that the vast profits of the financial sector are fictitious, i.e. 
representations of capital advanced but not created. Financial activities are not truly 
important for the economy the way productive capitalist activities are. For example, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Jerry Coakley, “Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist 
Development,” Capital & Class 6 (1982): 140. 
130 Simon Mohun, “Productive and Unproductive Labor in the Labor Theory of Value,” 
Review of Radical Political Economics 28, no. 4 (1996): 45. 
131 Ibid. 
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their 2013 explanation of the financial crisis, Dumenil and Levy ask, “Were the profits of 
the financial sector real profits?” (127) and answer themselves: “The analysis of the 
financial sector in the United States suggests… the formation of a strong bias toward 
fictitiousness, at least from the second half of the 1990s, with a dramatic expansion 
after 2000.”132 The financial sector produced fictitious profits through techniques like 
mark-to-market accounting that did not anchor the prices of financial securities to real 
production.  
Dumenil and Levy start to move towards the second category, in which finance is 
seen as important even though not productive, when they claim that the redistribution of 
real value to the financial sector impacted the greater economy: “The other side of the 
coin is that such fictitious gains nourished the income flows paid out by financial 
corporations as wages to upper management or dividends, real drains on the own funds 
of corporations.”133 They interpret the crisis as the result of the diversion of real capital 
from reinvestment into production to pay financiers for their unproductive labor:  
the outstanding surpluses garnered during the years preceding the crisis 
were, to a large extent, fictitious… Conversely, the outstanding flows of 
high wages at the top of the wage pyramid and the dividends paid to 
shareholders were quite real. When accounts were adjusted to reality, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, The Crisis of Neoliberalism (Cambridge, M.A.: 
Harvard University Press, 2011) UNC-Chapel Hill Libraries, eBook, 127-8. 
133 Ibid., 130-1. 
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cost of these real drains on fictitious surpluses was dramatically revealed 
in the sudden meltdown of corporations’ own funds.134  
In this interpretation, finance is not productive of value and its importance lies only in the 
way it drains value away from the productive sphere.   
In this interpretation of finance, arbitrage would seem to be even less significant 
than mainstream financial economics suggests it is. The profit gained in arbitrage is only 
a transfer of fictitious capital between individual financiers. No value is produced and 
real value is only redistributed as remuneration for the unproductive labor of the 
arbitrageurs. In this way, arbitrage may be indirectly harmful to capitalism, but it is not a 
part of the real economy.  
Category 2: Finance Is Necessary but Not Productive 
 In contrast to the work that dismisses finance, work in this second category 
shows the importance and necessity of finance, even while it maintains that it does not 
produce value. Chief among these contributions is Rudolf Hilferding’s 1910 Finance 
Capital.135 In it, Hilferding maintains the productive/unproductive interpretation but adds 
nuance to Marx’s theory of finance. He distinguishes two forms of credit: private or 
circulation credit used as a means of deferred payment in commodity exchange and 
capital or investment credit, which “involves the transfer of a sum of money from the 
owner, who cannot employ it as capital, to another person who intends to use it for that 	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purpose.”136 His major focus is analyzing the role of banks in producing money and 
capital markets for these two kinds of credit and the relative power over industrial capital 
that they acquire in this role.  
Hilferding’s book provides an extensive treatment of Marx’s position on finance 
and also highlights a lasting contradiction in the Marxist theory of finance: financial 
capital is “necessary” but not “productive.”137 Hilferding argues that capital credit 
significantly aids production: “For productive capitalists, therefore, their own productive 
capital becomes only the basis of an enterprise which is expanded far beyond the limits 
of the original capital with the aid of borrowed capital.”138 Lenders’ money capital 
accrues a portion of the profit that it helps to create, in the form of interest.  
For Hilferding, shares of stock are also “certificates of indebtedness” that transfer 
money capital to industrial capitalists for production; however, the shares themselves 
are not capital at all.139 He writes, “Once a share has been issued it has nothing more to 
do with the real cycle of the industrial capital which it represents.”140 Unlike money 
capital that is lent out for interest, the money capital advanced to the capitalist at the 
time of the initial flotation of shares is transformed into industrial capital for good: it “is in 
the hands of the sellers of this productive capital and will never return to its starting 	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point.”141 For Hilferding, a share is merely a title to dividend income, which therefore 
makes it “fictitious capital.”142 Thus, activities of traders in capital markets are clearly 
unproductive and can’t even result in a true profit. Speculation, as he calls any purchase 
or sale of “titles to interest”143 results in 
gains or losses [that] arise only from variations in the current valuations of claims 
to interest. They are neither profit, nor parts of surplus value, but originate in 
fluctuations in the valuations of that part of surplus value which the corporation 
assigns to the shareholders… Whereas the capitalist class as a whole 
appropriates a part of the labour of the proletariat without giving anything in 
return, speculators gain only from each other. One’s loss is the other’s gain.144  
There are important implications of this characterization of shares and 
speculation for the interpretation of arbitrage and the source of arbitrage profit. 
Hilferding includes activities that we could reasonably identify as arbitrage in his 
description of speculation: 
[the speculator] does not hold securities in the hope of sharing in the higher profit 
– as an investor does – but seeks to gain by buying and selling his securities… 
His gain does not arise from a share in profit, for he gains also from declining 
profits, but from price changes, which means that at a particular time he can buy 
securities more cheaply than he sold them, or sell them more dearly than he 
bought them… [speculative gains] occur only because contradictory valuations 
are made, only one of which can turn out to be correct.145 
Arbitrage, since it trades two assets that are somehow similar but have different 
prices, could fit within Hilferding’s definition of speculation as profiting from 	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“contradictory valuations.” Arbitrage profit then, is a gain that comes not from surplus 
value, but only at the expense of other speculators. Arbitrage is like a game of 
Monopoly between members of the capitalist class. Slips of paper are passed around, 
some players may end up with more than others, but nothing is made, no value is added 
to the game. Although he adds the insight that credit and finance are necessary for 
capitalism, the interpretation of arbitrage that follows from Hilferding remains within the 
productive/unproductive dichotomy. What’s more, if finance is necessary for capitalism, 
arbitrage looks very much like it does in mainstream financial economics, a necessary 
part of making efficient markets. Hilferding, in fact, suggests just that: 
The development of a market for fictitious capital makes speculation possible. In 
turn, speculation is necessary to keep this market open for business at all times, 
and so give money capital as such the possibility of transforming itself into 
fictitious capital, and from fictitious capital back into money capital, whenever it 
chooses. For the fact that marginal gains can be made by buying and selling is a 
constant stimulus to engage in these activities and to ensure the permanent 
existence of an active market. The essential function of the stock exchange is to 
provide such a market for the investment of money capital. Only in this way is the 
investment of capital as money capital made possible on a large scale.146  
This sounds similar to financial economists Shleifer and Vishny’s discussion of the 
essential function of arbitrage: “Arbitrage plays a critical role in the analysis of securities 
markets, because its effect is to bring prices to fundamental values and to keep markets 
efficient.”147 Arbitrage is necessary for markets to function. 
 The understanding of finance as necessary, but unproductive and fictitious, is an 
interpretation mirrored by other Marxist theorists. John E. Parsons challenges  “bubble 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Ibid., 139. 
147 Shleifer and Vishny, “Limits of Arbitrage,” 35.  
 	   70 
theorists” such as Harry Magdoff and Paul Sweezy who “mention only the possibility of 
crisis embodied in the capitalists financial system.”148 In contrast, he finds that the 
“expansion of the financial sphere is supportive of the expansion of the productive 
sphere.”149 Similarly, according to David Harvey, “fictitious capital is contained in the 
very concept of capital itself.”150 Harvey says that all paper claims, including credit 
money, are “characterized as fictitious value” but they reduce the time and costs of 
circulation, especially by transforming fixed into circulating capital.151 Investments in 
fixed capital equipment and buildings “would be impossible without access to credit,” 
and the “credit system permits continuity in money circulation while embracing 
discontinuity in production.”152 In short, fictitious capital is necessary for the 
development of capitalism: “The barrier fixed capital creates to future accumulation… 
can be overcome only by way of the credit system in general and by the creation of 
fictitious forms of capital in particular… Fictitious capital is as necessary to accumulation 
as fixed capital itself.”153  
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Harvey agrees with Hilferding that finance is necessary but unproductive, but he 
also critiques Hilferding for not foregrounding the internal contradictions of finance 
capital. Fictitious capital in finance may be necessary for capitalism, but it is also the 
source of many problems and crises. While it has the potential to “fine-tune the engine 
of accumulation”, in the long run finance capital exacerbates the tendency towards over-
accumulation, allowing a small group of powerful financiers to accumulate a great deal 
of value at the expense of industrial capitalists and even of production itself, and permits 
speculation that causes “fictitious accumulation” (bubbles) bringing on crises in their 
aftermath.154 While adding this caveat to Hilferding might suggest a slightly less rosy 
interpretation of arbitrage than the one proposed by mainstream financial economics, 
the necessary but not productive category still suggests that arbitrage is a zero sum 
game between speculators in which profits are not “parts of surplus value,” i.e. not “real” 
profits in the Marxian sense.155 
Category 3: Financialization as Exploitation 
 In the 1980s and 90s, Marxists and other social theorists began to use the term 
“financialization” to describe “a gravitational shift toward finance in capitalism.”156 The 
term has been used and the shift described in many different ways and a 
comprehensive survey is not possible here. However, the general thrust of work in this 
category is to move beyond older notions of how finance works (such as those found in 	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Capital, Vol. III and Hilferding) to suggest a new functionality. Finance is seen within the 
financialization literature as central to capitalism and to processes of exploitation. Some 
of these scholars go so far as to reject the notion that finance concerns only fictitious 
capital. However, even those who espouse some kind of financialization thesis still 
maintain the productive/unproductive dichotomy and ultimately place finance in the later 
category.  
 In A Brief History of Neoliberalism, David Harvey argues that recent decades 
have been characterized by processes of neoliberalization and “the main substantive 
achievement of neliberalization… has been to redistribute, rather than to generate, 
wealth and income.”157 The main mechanism by which this redistribution is achieved is 
what Harvey calls “accumulation by dispossession.”158 Accumulation by dispossession 
is not a process of appropriating surplus value, but rather “the continuation and 
proliferation of accumulation practices which Marx had treated of as ‘primitive’ or 
‘original’ during the rise of capitalism.”159 In addition to privatization, manipulation of 
crises, and state redistributions, finance is one of the main mechanisms of accumulation 
by dispossession. In fact, financialization, and in particular the “speculative raiding 
carried out by hedge funds and other major institutions of finance capital” constitutes the 
“real cutting edge” of the new process of accumulation by dispossession.160  	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For Harvey, neoliberalism is characterized by the same inevitable class struggle 
as previous iterations of capitalism, but this new battle is being fought through 
accumulation by dispossession rather than through battles over, for example, the length 
of the workday or wages. Finance is important because it is a central way in which 
redistribution to elite classes occurs. And yet, Harvey is unable to permit that the wealth 
accumulated is surplus value, i.e. true capitalist profit. He declares that finance “creates 
a vast amount of fictitious wealth” not real value.161 Accumulation by dispossession is 
therefore not a radical rethinking of finance in capitalism, but a rewording of an old idea 
that financial processes are parasitic. Except for Harvey, finance is now closer to 
outright theft than mere leeching off production.  
Costas Lapavitsas gives another term for his rethinking of the role of finance in 
capitalism: “financial expropriation.”162 Financial expropriation is “extracting financial 
profit directly out of the personal income of workers and others.”163 Financial 
expropriation is the form of exploitation attendant to financialization, which has taken 
place since the 1970s due to “mediocre and precarious growth” in “real 
accumulation.”164 Since profits to real production have stagnated, financial expropriation 
has allowed continued profitability by accessing workers’ income in other ways: “the 
increasing ‘financialisation’ of individual worker-income is clear, in terms both of 	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liabilities (mostly borrowing for housing) and assets (mostly pensions and 
insurance).”165 As workers must borrow to consume and use their own funds for things 
previously provided by the state, wages functionally decrease. 
Lapavitsas suggests that contemporary financial expropriation has much in 
common with pre-capitalist usury. Financial institutions funnel workers’ income, through 
both debt and investment, into capital markets where they can extract fees and 
otherwise “tilt transactions to their own benefit.”166 This happens in conjunction with the 
breakdown of social provisions for things like education, pensions and welfare. As 
individuals must rely more and more on financial markets, financiers are able to enrich 
themselves  
And yet, Lapvitsas is clear that financial expropriation does not involve the 
production of surplus value. That is, in the last instance, finance is again parasitical, 
only in this case it leeches value off of workers directly, as in usury, instead of 
appropriating a share of the surplus value, as interest or dividends, created in 
production: 
Financial expropriation, then, is a source of profit that has emerged 
systematically during the recent decades. It should be clearly distinguished from 
exploitation that occurs in production and remains the cornerstone of 
contemporary capitalist economies. Financial expropriation is an additional 
source of profit that originates in the sphere of circulation. In so far as it relates to 
personal income, it involves existing flows of money and value, rather than new 
flows of surplus-value. Yet, despite occurring in circulation, it takes place 
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systematically and through economic processes, thus having an exploitative 
aspect.167  
 Finally, work that fits under the banner of autonomous Marxism makes similar 
moves with regards to rereading the place of finance in contemporary capitalism. One 
piece that stands out in this regard is Vercellone’s “The Crisis of the Law of Value and 
the Becoming-Rent of Profit” in Crisis in the Global Economy.168 Verlcellone rejects the 
reading of the financial crisis that sees it as a spectacular build up of fictitious capital, 
the remedy to which would be refocusing on real production. Instead, the crisis is 
indicative of a genuine crisis of “the law of labor time value.”169 Previously, capitalists 
organized production and reinvested surplus value in production; they were “agent[s] of 
production.”170 Today, labor organizes itself autonomously to produce value out of the 
general intellect.171 Production no longer relies on capitalists, and yet, capitalists still 
appropriate surplus value. They now do so through a rentier logic that is facilitated by 
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finance. But rent is “a pure relation of distribution.”172 Financialization “results from an 
endogenous change in the logic of valorization” in which “large companies are today 
essentially concerned with their financial architecture and ultimately seem to occupy 
themselves with everything but the direct organization of production.”173  
Vercellone’s argument places finance at the center of the new logic of capital. 
Finance is the method by which surplus value is appropriated. However, finance today 
is different from industrial capitalist management in that it is solely a parasitical drawing 
of rent from autonomous labor processes. In some ways, this reading is even more 
protective of the notion that finance cannot produce value than orthodox Marxist 
readings. All profit making is now financial rent and thus finance is utterly external to 
value production; it has no “real function in the process of production.”174  
The work in this third category makes more room for finance within the Marxist 
theory of capitalism. Even though finance may play a more central role, as the cutting 
edge of accumulation processes, usury-like expropriation or surplus value appropriation, 
these authors still reinscribe a fundamental commitment to the notion that finance does 
not produce value. From such a perspective, arbitrage can be interpreted as playing 
some kind of role in the parasitic function of finance and thus having a negative or 
exploitative impact on workers or lower classes. Arbitrage trading can fit well within a 
Marxist notion of exploitation. To illustrate the strength of this characterization I’ll 	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present a brief case study of an arbitrage trade that has been characterized as 
exploitative.  
Arbitrage as exploitation: The case of market timing 
Market timing is the practice of buying or selling mutual funds based on “stale 
prices.”175 Mutual funds calculate their net asset value (NAV) at the close of trading 
each day based on the closing prices of component securities (stocks, bonds, etc). 
Investors wishing to purchase the fund pay the per share percentage of the NAV, so it is 
essentially a price that is only updated once daily, despite continuous trading of 
component securities.176 Mutual fund timing takes advantage of the mismatch between 
when the price of the fund and the prices of its components are updated. Say for 
example, that an international stock held by a particular mutual fund and traded on a 
foreign exchange that has closed for the day will, according to certain financial models 
(for instance long-term correlation between domestic and foreign markets), be 
significantly influenced by after-hour’s events.177 Until 4 p.m. EST, the mutual fund’s 
price will still reflect the “stale” price for the stock. If a savvy investor could see that the 	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component stock will likely have an amazing day, he would buy up many shares of the 
mutual fund at the lower price, wait until the NAV is recalculated and sell it back the next 
day for an arbitrage profit.  
Regular mutual fund investors do not engage in this kind of trading, but instead 
buy mutual funds for long-term gains; they are known as “buy-and-hold” investors. Buy-
and-hold investors would also stand to benefit from the increase in NAV the following 
day in so far as that would be an increase of their long-term investment.178 However, 
when arbitrageurs buy up lower priced shares and sell them the following day the net 
effect is a smaller increase in the value of the fund for buy-and-hold investors. This 
occurs for three reasons. First, administrative costs increase with multiple rapid short-
term trades. Second, managers may not have enough time to invest quick in- and out-
flows of cash, such that that money never “goes to work” for the fund as a whole, 
earning returns in fund investments. But most importantly, when arbitrageurs buy the 
fund at the “stale” prices, they gain immediate access to returns. They realize the 
returns when they sell the next day upon the recalculation of the NAV. Part of those 
returns are cashed out by arbitrageurs, instead of delivered to long-term investors.  
This form of arbitrage is thus criticized as “diluting” returns for buy-and-hold 
investors.179 As Houge and Wellman put it, “the trading profits earned by market timers 
come at the expense of other long-term investors.”180 They continue:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Houge and Wellman, “Fallout.”  
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid., 132.  
 	   79 
Market timers utilize information produced during U.S. trading hours that is 
not fully reflected in daily NAVs. By observing large index movements or 
trends in similar types of securities, timers are able to predict the direction 
of future NAV changes. For example, the positive correlation across global 
financial markets implies that large increases in U.S. equity indexes are 
often followed by positive changes across international equity markets. 
Thus, a market timer could purchase international equity funds following a 
sharp rise in U.S. markets and sell these funds when U.S. markets trend 
down. This strategy generates significantly positive excess returns 
because the timer is able to trade at stale net asset values. Moreover, the 
strategy is perfectly legal.181 
The last line of this quote highlights the tension between the notion that arbitrage is a 
legal strategy and the exploitation evident in the trade. What’s more, market timing is 
not a limited activity that affects a few unlucky investors but rather a systematic practice. 
Eric Zitzewitz estimated in 2002 that over 70% of mutual funds were subject to market 
timing and the average buy-and-hold mutual fund investor lost 2% of the value of their 
assets to arbitrage.182  
 The “dilution” critique of market timing exposes the exploitation inherent in 
arbitrage trades. Just like industrial capitalism in which “free laborers,” bereft of any 
resources but their own labor power, confront the owners of the means of production, 	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arbitrage is about relative positions of power. The notion that arbitrage is exploitation, 
rather than a zero-sum game among traders, suggests that it is central to capitalism and 
thus to the uneven power relations in society. However, the authors in the third, 
“financialization as exploitation” category are at pains to differentiate the exploitation of 
finance from the fundamental exploitation of capitalism: the appropriation of surplus 
value by industrial capitalists. Even Vercellone who actually says that finance is a form 
of the appropriation of surplus value must add the caveat that surplus value is now only 
appropriated as rent, i.e. in a way utterly separated from the production of that value.183 
This distinction is necessary to maintain the notion that value is only produced by labor 
and only appropriated by the capitalists that deploy that labor to increase value. The 
notion that finance could somehow produce real value is wholly rejected except in a 
narrow category of work that refuses to allow its analysis of contemporary capitalism to 
be limited by the productive/unproductive and real/fictitious dichotomies. 
Category 4: Financial Value 
  In their 2006 book, Capitalism with Derivatives, Dick Bryan and Michael Rafferty 
radically reinterpret a key aspect of finance, derivatives, from a Marxist perspective.184 
They argue that in a post-Bretton Woods world, financial derivatives serve as a new, 
global form of money, commensurating between different forms of capital in the 
absence of fixed exchange rates. In the course of their analysis, they reject the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 Vercellone, “Becoming-Rent.” 
184 Dick Bryan and Michael Rafferty, Capitalism with Derivatives: A Political Economy of 
Financial Derivatives, Capital and Class (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).  
 	   81 
productive/unproductive dichotomy while maintaining fidelity to Marx’s theory of money. 
The write: 
The interpretation of Marxian theory through the productive/unproductive 
distinction proves stifling of an understanding of changes that occur within 
finance. If the premise of analysis is to identify finance as unproductive (but 
necessary) and the object of analysis is the question of whether finance has 
increased its share of surplus value at the expense of the share of productive 
capital, the subject of finance itself becomes highly simplified… Developments 
within finance, such as the enormous growth of financial derivatives, fail to 
receive direct analytical attention.185  
But Bryan and Rafferty do find this growth significant. They argue that Marx’s 
theory of money is fundamentally about the function of money as commensurating 
between different values (commodities, capital, labor time, etc). Marx, however, “took for 
granted the equivalence of money to other forms of capital” because he examined 
money only as gold.186 Today, the proliferation of state fiat money with floating 
exchange rates and forms of capital such as financial assets make the problem of 
commensuration one that cannot be solved by recourse to a single commodity 
equivalent such as gold. Derivatives perform money functions that are impossible for 
any single commodity in contemporary capitalism. They are “literally thousands of types 
of commodities whose specific characteristics are designed to secure commensurability 
between different forms of capital.”187  
 Bryan and Rafferty’s argument has significant implications for a Marxist theory of 
finance. Derivatives trading performs the key function in capitalism of commensurating 	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across currencies and forms of capital. If finance thus has a distinctly financial form of 
money, it cannot be a fictitious parasite on the real value circuit, but instead must be 
understood as an integral part of it. In short, if derivatives are now the money capital (M) 
in M-C-M’ and money capital is what mysteriously increases in the capitalist process, as 
represented by the prime (‘), perhaps there is a truly financial form of that growth.  
Similarly, in his response to the global financial crisis, geographer Geoff Mann 
claims that Marxist value theory must decisively reject the notion that finance is 
fictitious.188 Mann suggests that the “’labour’ predicate” of Marxist value theory may be 
an anachronism.189 He writes, “To see value as historically determinate is also to 
understand that – while value remains ‘value’, the organising principle of capitalism – as 
capitalism changes, so too will the way in which value operates.”190 (176). For Mann, the 
financial crisis reveals that “value as such has more recently escaped labour’s bonds” 
(176).  
He challenges the notion that factories, machines and land are “real” values 
whereas derivatives like those involved in the financial crisis, asset backed securities 
(ABS), credit default swaps (CDS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), are 
somehow fictitious by noting that the latter are “just another, albeit sophisticated and 
mystifying… commodity – one that the crisis has not so much exposed as fictional as 
rendered just plain valueless” (181). Like Bryan and Rafferty, Mann suggests that 	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financial activity need not be understood as unproductive, but goes further to suggest 
that taking finance seriously requires a reconceptualization of value. Value should not 
be defined as that which is produced by labor, but is “best understood as a form of 
social wealth constituted by a spatially and temporally generalizing social relation of 
equivalence and substitutability under, and specific to, capitalism” (177). That does not 
mean that abstract labor is no longer important, as he notes: “contemporary capital’s 
power still lies to a significant extent in the expropriation of labour’s surplus-product” 
(ibid). But other formations of the social relations that constitute value as such also 
exist. In particular, “the web of social relations” that constitutes finance is a source of 
value just as the social relations of labor are (181). For Mann, the financial crisis shows 
that financial value is no less real than labor value.  
The fourth category of Marxist approaches to finance deviates significantly from 
the other three by claiming that finance deals in real values and that financial activity 
may even be productive of value. From this perspective, arbitrage may play a more 
integral role in capitalism than suggested by other Marxist approaches. If money and 
value are both now legitimately financial and arbitrage is, as I have argued, the central 
profit making strategy of finance, arbitrage profit must consist of real surplus value. 
Although Bryan and Rafferty and Mann open the door to this possibility, neither offers a 
rigorous explanation of how arbitrage profit is constituted. What is needed is an 
explanatory framework that builds upon their analyses and allows a broader conception 
of surplus value appropriation that can occur in more than one way.  
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 In line with the possibilities opened up by this work, I offer the first of two central 
claims of this dissertation: surplus value appropriation is not confined to industrial 
capitalism but instead is a process that can occur in many different configurations of 
capitalism. This process or logic, which is definitional of capitalism but not singular in its 
manifestation, is renamed “capture”. Arbitrage is the form of capture proper to finance 
and without it finance would not exist as such.  
Renaming arbitrage as capture seems to provide an answer to the question of 
where arbitrage profit comes from. Like industrial capitalist value appropriation, 
arbitrage as capture must involve exploitation, i.e. uneven relations of power that allow 
the appropriation of value by some at the expense of others. The case of market timing 
seems to demonstrate these relations. Buy-and-hold investors don’t have the 
information or resources to perform arbitrage and so suffer diluted returns. But in fact, 
claiming that arbitrage is exploitative in the capitalist sense raises even more questions. 
If arbitrage is like the capitalist appropriation of surplus value created by labor in 
commodity production, how is the value captured by arbitrage created? Put differently, 
who wins and who loses? Is it always buy-and-hold investors who are exploited by 
arbitrage? Even if it is, are we to believe that buy-and-hold investors are, like workers, 
producers of value? These questions cannot be answered simply by naming arbitrage 
as capture. Instead, a rigorous explanation of capture in general and the process of 
arbitrage capture in particular are needed. 
Conclusion 
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 Traditional Marxist conceptions of finance open the way for a better 
understanding of arbitrage profit than that offered by mainstream financial economics. 
Although the first two categories of Marxist work on finance presented in this chapter 
suggest that arbitrage is insignificant or a zero-sum game between speculators, the third 
category raises the possibility that arbitrage may be a form of capitalist exploitation. This 
notion is worth pursuing, but only in light of work in the fourth category that successfully 
critiques the salience of the productive/unproductive and real/fictitious dichotomies in 
the context of contemporary financial capitalism.  
 What is needed is a framework that answers the question of how finance in 
general and arbitrage in particular can be productive of value. In the next chapter, I 
propose a framework based on the work of Grossberg et al. that accounts for the 
multiple ways that value operates in capitalism by framing value much as Mann does, in 
terms of social relations.191 This framework allows me to redefine arbitrage as the 
apparatus of capture unique to financial capitalism. I explain the functioning of that 
apparatus of capture in detail.  
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CHAPTER 3: ARBITRAGE AS CAPTURE 
 
In financial theory, arbitrage is either assumed to be impossible in efficient 
markets, or is the very mechanism that secures financial markets as closed, consistent 
systems. In the latter guise, arbitrage is seen as a sort of beneficent policing force in 
financial markets, but no account of the source of arbitrage profit can be given. The 
Marxist theory of surplus value points towards an alternative account of arbitrage, but 
only once notions of finance as unproductive are eschewed. The work of Dick Bryan 
and Michael Rafferty and Geoff Mann offer constructive notes towards allowing finance 
to be a domain of real capitalist value, but a rigorous, detailed framework is necessary 
to finally understand how arbitrage functions and how arbitrage profit is constituted.   
In this chapter, I present my interpretation of a recent article by Lawrence 
Grossberg, Carolyn Hardin and Michael Palm, “Contributions to a Conjunctural Theory 
of Valuation” as such a framework.192 In this article, Grossberg et al. build upon 
Postone’s rethinking of Marx to produce “the outlines of a theory that approaches value 
in both formal (conceptual) and conjunctural terms.”193 This theory significantly 
broadens the category of value, beyond both the subjective valuations of utility 
maximizing consumers and producers in neoclassical economics and the Marxist 
category of wealth produced by labor. This has significant implications for understanding 	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arbitrage. It allows arbitrage into the real world of value, dissolving the 
productive/unproductive dichotomy and the notion that finance is the domain of fictitious 
capital. In Grossberg et al.’s framework, arbitrage occupies a central position in the 
value processes of financial capitalism.  
The remainder of this chapter is divided into two parts. First, I present Grossberg 
et al.’s framework, noting some implications of their work for rethinking value. Second, I 
follow up on the claim that arbitrage is an apparatus of capture by analyzing a specific 
historical example to offer a redefinition of arbitrage. Against the vague financial 
economic definitions of arbitrage that neglect the issue of profit, the capture framework 
demonstrates that arbitrage is a creative process oriented precisely to that task of 
capturing profit. It involves three steps: the proposal of equivalence, the calculation of 
profit, and the actualization of capture. I conclude by meditating on the issue of risk. 
Risk is not a category that Grossberg et al. reference when presenting their capture 
framework, and yet arbitrage is always referred to as “riskless” in financial economics. 
This contradiction will be taken up more fully in the next chapter.  
Rethinking Value 
 Grossberg et al.’s framework begins by building on the work of Moishe Postone. 
In Time, Labor, and Social Domination, Postone argues that value is not a universal, 
transhistorical category, but a category specific to capitalism that reflects a particular 
organization of society.194 Postone reinterprets Marx’s critique not as a critique of 
capitalism or of the distribution of value from the standpoint of labor, but a critique of 	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labor itself as playing “a historically unique role in mediating social relations.”195 The 
labor theory of value is then at best a limited and contingent theory of value. Postone 
explains that labor is not “the transhistorical essence of social life” but only plays that 
role within capitalism.196 For Postone, traditional Marxist critiques that see labor as this 
essence and see value as created by labor, rather than by the social mediating role of 
labor, miss the mark.  
Grossberg et al. also add historical specificity to the category of value, but unlike 
Postone, they do not limit value only to the capitalist period. Instead, they present a 
taxonomy of different values along with a “diagram… of value transformations.”197 For 
Grossberg et al., there is a distinctly capitalist value, but there is also pre- or non-
capitalist economic value, aesthetic value, ethical value and many other forms.  
Grossberg et al.’s framework is opposed to the Marxist labor theory of value in 
that they do not identify the way or ways that value is produced, but instead suggest that 
all value begins as what they call “social mattering.”198 Those things that we come to 
understand as values or having value, in whatever form, are originally defined by:  
the primordial stickiness that holds people together in relations of mutuality 
before any commonality but out of which commonalities and collectivities 
can be formed. In our view, a primordial state of sociality is defined by an 	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affective organization of nonindividuated investments or desirings that 
constitute the very possibility of social relationality as a simultaneously 
attenuated and dense web of mutual matterings.199 
Social mattering is the foundation of value, but this insight is only a starting point for the 
goal of their analysis, to describe the ways that social mattering is transformed into 
different forms of value. While they acknowledge that social mattering can follow many 
trajectories of transformation into forms of value like those mentioned above, their focus 
is on the transformation of social mattering into economic and capitalist value.  
 Before describing these transformations, I want to note two important facets of 
their overall approach to this framework of value. First, they place a great deal of 
importance on obligation and debt. Obligation does not result, for Grossberg et al., from 
a lack or emptiness that must be filled but instead is a sort of photo negative of value; 
obligation indicates what matters. They write: “We thus argue that value, at this point 
taking the form of affective matterings, is indicated and actualized through obligation. 
Obligation marks what matters.”200 That which matters is actualized as obligation and, in 
later transformations, debt, an important distinction in their work. They find evidence for 
this notion in scholarly work on gift giving, reciprocity and the debt-origins of money. For 
instance, Geoffrey Ingham suggests that ancestral sacrifice “codified elements of social 
structure into a hierarchy of value” by indicating what debts had to be paid to ancestors 
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and with which valuable items they could be satisfied.201 The connection between value 
and obligation is born out in Grossberg et al.’s framework by the fact that each form of 
value (social mattering, economic value and capitalist value) corresponds to a specific 
kind of debt (obligation, indebtedness and capitalist debt). 
 Second, while Grossberg et al. find evidence of the “primordial stickiness” of 
social mattering in the work of economic sociologists and anthropologists focused on 
so-called “primitive societies”, they insist that the category is not purely historical.202 The 
transformations of value they describe are identifiable as historical and anthropological 
realities but also take place in countless daily transformations as well. Thus, they do not 
suggest a single temporal trajectory in which social mattering has given way to 
economic value and then finally capitalist value. All three of these forms of value, as well 
as many others, coexist. The processes that transform values are both broadly historical 
and quotidian. Their framework is thus open to a great deal of complexity around the 
ways value functions.  
 A large part of Grossberg et al.’s article is taken up with describing the 
transformation of social mattering into economic value and economic value into 
capitalist value. Beginning with the notion of social mattering as described above, they 
map the emergence of something identifiable as economic value. This transformation is 
evident historically in the development of money. Money, they argue, developed out of a 
codification of the “undifferentiated mutual indebtedness” that they associate with social 	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mattering.203 Citing scholars like David Graeber and Geoffrey Ingham, they reject the 
neoclassical myth of money as a technology for solving problems with barter and 
instead see debt money as the originary form of money.204 Money was first and 
foremost an accounting of debts between individuals. Tokens only developed as a way 
to reliably pay those debts.  
The transformation from social mattering expressed by webs of undifferentiated 
obligation to economic value expressed by countable, recordable indebtedness between 
individuals is thus evident in the development of debt money. More generally, 
Grossberg et al. describe this transformation as one of deterritorialization, enumeration 
and commodification. They borrow the term “deterritorialization” from Deleuze and 
Guattari but define it for themselves in this way:  
Deterritorializing processes pry apart or dissociate relations from their contexts. 
Through deterritorialization, debts and the now fully economic values they mark 
are no longer tethered to the location of their origin within a community and 
context; they can travel. Deterritorialized debts can circulate and change form, 
becoming commodities or money. Deterritorialized commodities circulate the 
values that can repay these debts. Deterritorialized humans, meanwhile, are 
constituted as unique individuals who enter into two-sided debt relations, rather 
than as indivisible constituents of a fabric of sociality/obligation.205 
In the “structure of feeling of obligation” that Grossberg et al. associate with 
social mattering, obligations are singularities—the are unique, non-transferable, non-
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commensurable relations.206 Deterritorialization extricates singularities from the 
particularities of the context in which they are embedded. Deterritorialized lumps of 
metal can function as circulating money. Deterritorialized lengths of cloth can be bought 
and sold on markets instead of used by the family that produced them. Or to take a 
more modern example, a deterritorialized share of ownership of a corporation can be 
sold by its original owner.  
The deterritorialization process results in commodification: the production of sets 
of enumerable goods that can be sold in markets for roughly the same price.207 
Commodities, whether money or other forms of exchangeable goods, can also now be 
used to pay debts. An obligation that formerly cemented a social bond of shared history 
and complex mutuality can now be rendered as a countable economic indebtedness. 
Again, this is not solely a historical transformation from primitive sociality to market 
society. For instance, if one neighbor views giving another neighbor a cup of sugar as a 	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neighborly duty, she is operating at the level of obligation. The sugar is a part of a 
structure of feeling of obligation that deepens the social bond between them. However, 
if the neighbor receiving the sugar pulls out her wallet and asks, “what do I owe you?” 
she has moved to the register of economic value and debt. Paying the money 
equivalent of the sugar closes down the social bond associated with obligation. The 
sugar no longer indicates social mattering of the neighbor relationship, but is instead an 
economic debt payable in money (or another gift, etc). 
It is important to note again here that this transformation is neither total nor 
complete. Although both neighbors may routinely buy sugar for money at the market, 
the idea that one neighbor would give another neighbor money for “borrowing” a cup of 
sugar is crass, which demonstrates this point. The dense web of social matterings that 
they call obligation is not obliterated or totally used up in the transformation to economic 
indebtedness. The transformation of the structure of feeling of obligation into economic 
debt always partially fails, such that obligation remains alongside and within the 
economic register. None of the transformations that Grossberg et al. describe are total 
in the sense that we ever reach a new plane of full economization. Similarly, economic 
indebtedness remains even after the next transformation they describe, the emergence 
of capitalist value. 
Grossberg et al. do not equate economic value and capitalist value. Much as 
Postone does, they define capitalist value as the result of particular social relations. 
However, unlike Postone, they broaden the conception of capitalist value beyond the 
labor relation, to define it as the form of value that is subject to the process of capture 
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and the social relations and taken-for-granted rules that enable the latter. The notion of 
capture is derived from the work of Deleuze and Guattari. An apparatus of capture is an 
assemblage that is made up of two operations: “direct comparison and monopolistic 
appropriation.”208 In the process of capture, comparison produces a “difference or 
excess constitutive of profit.”209 Deleuze and Guattari name ground rent, profit from the 
appropriation of surplus labor, and taxation as three apparatuses of capture.210 
Grossberg et al. characterize capture in this way: 
Capture names a seemingly paradoxical operation in which the appropriation of a 
surplus (from some stock or totality) constitutes the very totality from which the 
surplus is appropriated. Capture works precisely by establishing the possibility of 
a difference (between the surplus and the stock), which enables the possibility of 
a comparison. And it is the comparison that enables the identification and 
appropriation of the surplus. Capture introduces difference into transformations of 
value by constituting both sides of the equation, so that the capture of the surplus 
(re)constitutes the stock from whence it came in the very act of capturing the 
difference.211  
For Grossberg et al., capitalist value is defined by a transformation of value 
whose end point and driving force is the operation of capture. Three articulated 
processes characterize this transformation of economic into capitalist value and are 
preconditions of capture: decoding, unitization and flow. Decoding can be understood as 
a stripping away of the “specific and concrete meaning” that links commodities to the 
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contexts out of which they emerge.212 Currencies and other commodities that reach the 
level of economic value through deterritorialization still retain the markings and 
significance of their origins. Deleuze and Guattari describe the traces that remain 
inscribed on things even after they have been to some degree disassociated from 
particular territorial locations as “codes”. The process of decoding strips away those 
traces so that coins from one particular region may be interchangeable with those from 
another. According to Grossberg et al., decoding effectively “obliterates any concrete 
actuality of obligation” leaving debts and values without reference to origins or 
meaning.213 
However, this process of decoding is not complete without unitization. Unitization 
is an operation of recoding decoded values that renders each an equivalent, equalized 
unit. Unitization replaces old traces of meaning with quantification, making debts, 
commodities and values not only countable, but transferable and interchangeable. Our 
uniform state-issued currency is one good example of decoded, unitized debt-value. In 
the past, multiple private and semi-public currencies have circulated in the U.S.214 But 
today, we have a uniform, government issued currency denominated in fully 
exchangeable units. Even though physical US currency still contains small traces (serial 
numbers, magnetic strips)—which reinforce the notion that even this transformation is 
never complete)—any US dollar can be used to clear any debt within the U.S. (and also 	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in many other countries). Electronic dollars are even more decoded, lacking the traces 
of physical dollars. 
Along with decoding and unitization, flow completes the transformation of 
economic values necessary for capture. Capture is, as Grossberg et al. put it, a process 
of “comparison that enables the identification and appropriation of the surplus.”215 
Decoded units allow comparison and identification of surplus, but flow is the necessary 
movement of those units such that those comparisons can actually occur. Decoded, 
unitized values must circulate so that exchange can take place and the difference 
illuminated by the comparison can be captured.   
Drawing heavily on the work and language of Deleuze and Guattari, Grossberg et 
al. establish a framework for understanding value that breaks with both neoclassical and 
Marxist conceptions. However, their framework maintains fidelity to the Marxist theory of 
value in two ways. First, it acknowledges that a process of value appropriation is at the 
heart of capitalism. Second, it actually frames the surplus value appropriation described 
by Marx as one of several forms of capture. The calculus described by Marx in Capital 
fits within the framework of capture presented by Grossberg et al. For Marx, exchange 
value, as opposed to use value, is produced by abstract labor time measured only 
quantitatively. The time spent by individual human laborers creating use values is, in the 
process of capitalist production, decoded into abstract labor time. Unitized quanta of 
abstract labor time are then crystallized in commodities that circulate. Units of the value 
of commodities expressed in money capital are fully commensurable regardless of the 	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use values to which they are attached. Through flow or circulation (production, sale, 
purchase, reinvestment, etc.), these quanta are compared to socially necessary quanta 
of abstract labor time such that a surplus of value produced by labor can be identified 
and captured by the capitalist. The comparison of socially necessary labor time and 
surplus labor time does not exist prior to the conception of surplus value appropriation. 
Instead industrial commodity production is an apparatus of capture in which profit is 
derived from surplus labor time that makes socially necessary labor time—the stock—
an intelligible category.  
Arbitrage as Capture 
Grossberg et al.’s framework offers a way to understand capitalism as one point 
on one of many trajectories in multiple complex transformations of value. In addition, 
capitalism is multiple—it is different depending on the different forms that apparatuses 
of capture can take. Grossberg et al. suggest that arbitrage is the apparatus of capture 
that defines contemporary finance capitalism. They write: 
the variety of [financial] securities—such as claims on an industrial capitalist 
enterprise (stocks, dividends), claims on future production (futures), claims on 
debt repayments (bonds and debt-backed derivatives), as well as second-order 
representations of volatility and the risk of these claims (options, swaps, etc.)—
follow the same process of decoding, unitization, and flow, producing an 
enormous flow of fluctuating and changing values.216  
And further,  
two sets of securities are selected out of the proliferating flow of decoded and 
unitized claims. They are placed into a relationship of comparison whereby the 
trader, depending on the model he or she chooses to judge their fundamental 
value (and there are many, often conflicting models), determines that they are 
both equal in value and different in price (Beunza, Hardie, and MacKenzie 2006). 	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This comparison produces a surplus of price, which the trader captures through 
buying and selling.217 
Grossberg et al. note that arbitrage fits the process of capture in their model. This 
lends far more analytical clarity to the general process of arbitrage than financial 
economic definitions do. For example, in his 2006 book Understanding Arbitrage, 
finance professor and business consultant Randall Billingsley offers this rather typical 
definition: “Arbitrage is the process of buying assets in one market and selling them in 
another to profit from unjustifiable price differences. ‘True’ arbitrage is both riskless and 
self-financing… use of the term has broadened to include often-risky variations.”218 This 
definition is too abstract (“buying assets in one market and selling them in another” 
could apply to any and all merchant or foreign trade activities) and at worst contradictory 
(“true” arbitrage is riskless, but there are risky versions!)  
Reformulating arbitrage as an apparatus of capture clarifies the process. In the 
next section, I provide an analysis of a particular historical example of arbitrage to 
demonstrate the way arbitrage functions as capture. The value transformations 
explained by Grossberg et al. are evident in this example, but they take unique forms in 
the process of arbitrage. In particular, arbitrage involves three steps: the proposal of 
equivalence (decoding and unitization), the calculation of excess (the comparison of 
sets) and the actualization of capture (flow and appropriation).  
Postlewayt’s Arbitrage 
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According to finance professor and economic historian Geoffrey Poitras, the first 
documented instance of something like modern arbitrage can be found in eighteenth 
century merchant manuals, under the name “arbitration of exchange.”219 Poitras 
recounts an arbitrage described in a 1751 merchant manual authored by Malachy 
Postlethwayt. The manual provides calculations of “arbitrated rates” between London, 
Paris and Amsterdam.220 Arbitrated rates were the rates of exchange that established 
parity between all three currencies, i.e. the same amount of currency would be gained 
from exchanging London sterling directly for French crowns as making a “triangular” 
trade between London sterling to Amsterdam groats and Amsterdam groats to Paris 
crowns.221  
Next, “Having shown how to determine arbitrated rates, Postlewayt provides 
worked examples of appropriate arbitrage trades when the actual exchange rate is 
above or below the arbitrated rate.”222 In one example, the Amsterdam-Paris exchange 
rate is significantly higher than the arbitrated rate. Therefore, the arbitrageur can carry 
out the following trade. First, he sells a bill of exchange (a promise to pay at a future 
date) in London for repayment in Paris and receives sterling in exchange. He uses 
these funds to buy a bill of exchange in London repayable in Amsterdam in groats. The 
arbitrageur then travels to Amsterdam and receives groats. He transports these to Paris 	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and exchanges them for crowns to cover the original bill sold. This trade would net a 
“self-financing arbitrage profit” if the Amsterdam-Paris exchange rate were high enough 
to more than cover the transport costs involved.223  
Postlewayt’s arbitrage can be reread through the framework of capture provided 
by Grossberg et al. To begin with, despite the fact that he was a merchant, Postlewayt’s 
arbitrage didn’t involve sugar, coffee, or fabric, but rather currencies. In Poitras’ history 
of arbitrage, every example of arbitrage presented until the modern period of stock and 
bond markets concerns currencies. Other sources also claim that the first arbitrage 
trades involved currencies, particularly in the activities of moneychangers and 
bankers.224 This focus on currencies is indicative of a key precondition for arbitrage: the 
similarity of the things being arbitraged. In other words, the transformation of social 
mattering into economic value detailed by Grossberg et al. is a necessary precondition 
of arbitrage. Arbitrage is only possible on commodities that have been deterritorialized. 
Prior to the standardization of commodities in the industrial era, currencies were the 
only exchangeable articles that exhibited a high level deterritorialization and, therefore, 
were subject to arbitrage. 
Beyond that precondition, Postlewayt’s arbitrage involves three distinct, 
identifiable steps that map onto the process of capture explained by Grossberg et al. 
The first step involves a seemingly simple assumption: that the value of currencies in 
one place is the same as their value in another place. This equivalence is more radical 	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than the similarity assumed as a precondition of arbitrage. Understanding certain coins 
or bills to be similar enough to one another to pay debts or serve as media of exchange 
within a particular jurisdiction such as a state or nation requires only deterritorialization; 
codes that trace the origins of those currencies remain. However, assuming that coins 
or bills should have the same value even in different contexts involves actually making a 
claim about the irrelevance of differences between those contexts. In other words, the 
first step of arbitrage consists of proposing the processes of decoding, removing the 
context specific codes of that which is to be arbitraged, and unitization, recoding 
commodities as units of a single, universal set. 
Postlewayt explains that groats in Amsterdam can be converted to crowns in 
Paris, which requires that groats be recognized and accepted as currency in both 
locations, despite the fact that groats are not used as the medium of exchange in Paris. 
Thus, his choice to describe a potential arbitrage trade that traverses those contexts is 
the first step of the trade. However, while it may seem self-evident, the relation is not 
given. As I will explain, this first step doesn’t really involve making an assumption but 
instead proposing an equivalence, asserting that commodities do not have “specific and 
concrete meaning[s]” within a context but instead are all members of an extra-contextual 
set.225  
The second step in arbitrage is the calculation of profit. The example that 
Postlewayt gives shows how an arbitrage profit can be made if currencies that are 
considered to be equivalent members of a single universal set have differing prices. The 	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comparison of prices leads to the calculation of a possible profit if the low priced 
currency is exchanged for the high priced one. This comparison takes up the extra-
contextual set and distributes it according to a difference in price. Once two sets are 
constituted by their difference in price—in Postlewayt’s example, groats in Amsterdram 
and groats in Paris—they can be compared to one another. In the act of comparison, 
that difference becomes an excess. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, “between the two 
sets… there is established a correspondence, a comparison.”226 The arbitrageur makes 
the comparison to identify the profit that can be captured through arbitrage.  
Finally, the third step is the one that Postlewayt recommends his readers take, 
capturing the excess that has been calculated. This step requires the flow, the putting 
into circulation of and exchange of the things to be arbitraged. In Postlewayt’s arbitrage, 
actualization would require purchasing the appropriate bills and transporting specie to 
make the trade. I refer to this step as actualization because it brings forth two 
consequences. First, if successful, an arbitrage trade actualizes the capture of the profit 
calculated in the second step—the arbitrageur ends up taking ownership of the 
calculated excess. Secondly, many (though not all) arbitrage trades are self-negating, 
which means that if the trade is carried out a number of times, the forces of supply and 
demand bring down the higher price and increase lower price until the prices are in 
parity. This actualizes, to a degree, the equivalence proposed in the first step. Two 
items that could have had very different contextual significances that contributed to their 
disparate prices are made equivalent in price.  	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 In what follows, I expand upon this characterization of arbitrage by unpacking the 
precondition and each step outlined above. What emerges is a description of arbitrage 
that lends a great deal more specificity to financial economic definitions, but also 
contradicts the notion that one “finds” arbitrage opportunities. Instead, arbitrage is the 
process of actively proposing and producing the relation of equivalence and excess that 
allows capture to take place.  
Step 0:  Deterritorialization/Commodification 
Equivalence between any two things, whether coins, bushels of grain, or lengths 
of fabric, is not a natural or essential condition. Two coins exist instead as singularities. 
Singularities refer to “being such as it is”, the unique conditions of existence specific to 
something unto itself.227 However much a coin may be categorized in different ways, as 
made of metal, as a ducat, as having a certain weight, in and of itself, it is not the same 
as any other coin, no matter how closely they may resemble one another. They do not 
occupy the exact same physical location; the condition of their making, from the ore that 
was mined to the time, if not also the place, of minting are different.  
The “dense web of mutual matterings” that defines the origins of value is 
occupied only by singularities.228 Deterritorialization extricates singularities from the 
particularities of the context in which they are embedded constituting instead a set of 
commodities that are defined by their similarity. The main purpose of currencies, to 
serve as units of account for the payment of debt and trade, required that they be more 	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fully deterritorialized. According to David Graeber, Geoffrey Ingham, and other critics of 
the neoclassical economic theory of money, currencies did not emerge as a way to 
manage the logistical problems of barter, but instead, as methods of accounting for debt 
relations.229 Money started out as an abstract accounting of debt and only developed 
into forms of coinage as trade intensified and the need for impersonal methods of 
payment emerged. Currencies, first as units of account and later as coinage, were thus 
a method of enumerating and recording personal relations of obligation as credit, i.e. in 
ways that separated obligation from the precise time, place and situation in which it was 
incurred.  
 In order to serve this function, currencies had to be organized into sets of similar 
coins or bills that could be accepted to close debts. This is not to say that currencies 
have always been self-evidently homogenous. Trade in medieval Europe was 
characterized by a complicated hodgepodge of currencies in circulation. Multiple units of 
account allowed different coins to circulate, but political turmoil, debasement of base 
metals, and clipping of minted coins meant that even within a unit of account, the value 
of any particular coin could be uncertain. According to Geoffrey Ingham, strong central 
authorities set up “sovereign monetary spaces” by imposing a common unit of 
account.230 Within these spaces, such as the one set up by Charlemagne, coins 
become “invariable, in that people continued to count in these ratios regardless of the 
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debasement, clipping or deterioration of the actual coinage.”231 That is, despite physical 
differences, coins circulating in the Middle Ages that contained as little as 3 percent of 
the amount of silver as their face value indicated according to the abstract standard 
retained their purchasing power in relation to other coins. Sovereign monetary spaces 
served to deterritorialize currencies so that sets of similar coins were constituted to aid 
in the payment of debt and trade of commodities within those spaces. Importantly, 
deterritorialization is always a bounded process; it only sets up the similarity of 
commodities within a particular territory or context defined in some specific way, for 
instance as a sovereign monetary space.  
Commodification of currencies has reached, through a long and storied history, 
something of a pinnacle, at least within some sovereign territories, but many 
commodities still retain territorialities that make a tremendous difference. Wine, for 
instance, is a commodity characterized specifically by its variations, from varietal to 
varietal, year to year, and geographical location of origin. While it does not matter where 
or in what circumstances a U.S. dollar, physical or electronic, came into existence, other 
commodities are segmented into far narrower sets. Agricultural food products in the 
U.S. for instance have experienced marked reterritorialization since the inception of the 
sustainability movement. Sustainably and ethically raised animals are consciously 
distinguished from factory farmed animal products because the contexts in which they 
were produced are different in significant ways. Labels such as “organic”, “natural” and 
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“free range” are all affixed to these differentiated products to justify the difference in 
price between this set of commodities and factory-farmed products.  
Arbitrage requires as a precondition that these singularities be deterritorialized 
into sets of similar commodities within specific contexts. Commodities defined by 
important differences are thus not suitable for arbitrage. For instance, the sets defined 
as Tyson chicken breasts on the one hand, and organic chicken breasts sold at Whole 
Foods on the other, retain differences that make arbitrage between them untenable. 
Absent some form of willing duplicity, an arbitrageur would not attempt to arbitrage 
between Tyson chicken and organic chicken. These goods are distinct. But he might 
attempt to arbitrage between say domestic organic chicken and imported organic 
chicken if he can argue that the difference between the contexts of these two sets is 
irrelevant. This illustrates the first true step of arbitrage. Deterritorialization/ 
commodification is an economic process that is a necessary condition of arbitrage, but 
arbitrage only properly begins with the proposal of a more radical relation than 
deterritorliazed similarity, the relation of true equivalence made possible by decoding 
and unitization. 
Step 1: Proposing Equivalence (Decoding and Unitization) 
Units of account are mechanisms specific to money that can standardize the 
value of different coins within a particular context regardless of physical weight or 
composition, constituting them as sets of similar commodities. This deterritorialization is 
a necessary precondition for arbitrage. However the first distinct step in the arbitrage 
trade requires decoding that strips commodities of the codes that continue to distinguish 
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individual elements as different in anyway. Even deterritorialized commodities may 
retain traces of their origins and unique differences that prevent the proposal of true 
equivalence. Proposing this more radical relation of equivalence requires decoding and 
unitization to transform two or more contextually specific sets of similar commodities into 
a universal set of identical commodities. A contemporary example will illustrate this shift.  
Book publishers routinely produce two different editions of their textbooks; 
domestic, English language textbooks are reproduced, with minor aesthetic changes, 
but identical text, for foreign markets. These “international edition” books are sold 
overseas, often at lower prices. The lower prices attached to international editions 
express the difference in contexts in which the books are used. U.S. higher education 
markets are characterized by inflated and ever increasing prices for tuition, fees and 
textbooks. In other markets the cost of education is lower so international editions are 
priced lower at what these other markets will bear.  
 In 2013, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., appealed its a lawsuit against a Thai college 
student named Supap Kirtsaeng who financed his U.S. education by reselling cheap 
international editions of their textbooks in the U.S. (via eBay and other similar sites) for 
higher prices all the way to the Supreme Court.232 Kirtsaeng prevailed, basing his 
defense on the “first sale doctrine,” that a book lawfully purchased may be resold as the 
owner sees fit. The lawsuit highlights two important points for the current study. First, 
and to be revisited later, arbitrage, as that is precisely what Kirtsaeng was doing, is 	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often vilified and attacked as cheating or gaming the system, despite its glowing 
reputation within financial economics. Second, the equivalence of commodities across 
contexts is a relationship that is not natural but must be established. Proposing this 
equivalence across contexts is the first of three steps in executing an arbitrage trade.  
 Decoding and unitization remove the traces that connect commodities to their 
origins and contexts to constitute a universal, extra-contextual set where any unit is 
interchangeable with any other unit. Arbitrage must propose this relation but it is not 
always successful in actualizing it. In the case of Kirtsaeng vs. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
the success of the arbitrage rested on the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. It could 
have also failed; the court could have decided that Kirtsaeng did not have the right or 
resell the books, voiding the relation of equivalence.  
In the case of currencies, bills of exchange that originated in long distance 
merchant operations offer a prime example of this proposition of equivalence across 
contexts. Bills of exchange were notes issued by one banker to a buyer that instructed a 
second banker to repay a sum at a future date in a different location to a different 
payee, often in a different currency and at a specified rate of exchange (Ingham 2004). 
According to Ingham they originated in Islamic trade and entered Europe around the 
thirteenth century. Bills of exchange replaced physical coinage with abstract and thus 
perfectly equivalent representations of currencies that could circulate far outside 
sovereign spaces. Whether used to complete merchant transactions or for arbitrage, as 
in the Postlewayt example recounted above, bills were a technology aimed at fixing the 
relationship between currency here and currency there as one of equivalence. Instead 
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of transporting pounds sterling to Antwerp and exchanging them for groats there, which 
would leave the arbitrageur in the uncertain position of having to find someone to make 
the exchange at an unknown rate, the bill effectively actualized the equivalence of 
pounds in London with pounds in Antwerp and fixed the rate of exchange that would be 
used upon delivery of the bill. This was done in part to alleviate some of the dangers of 
transporting specie and of changing exchange rates over time. But bills had the effect of 
both deterritorializing and decoding currencies by drawing on imagined universal sets.  
In the example of Postlewayt’s arbitrage recounted above, currencies are the 
subject of the trade because, as I have already argued, currencies were deterritorialized 
relatively early through the unique mechanism of units of account. Postlewayt’s example 
also calls for the use of bills of exchange as they do the work of securing equivalence 
across contexts in advance of the actual transport of the currencies. Bills of exchange 
decoded and unitized currencies, insuring their availability and equivalence across 
contexts. Thus, their mere existence in the 18th century enabled the first step of 
Postlewayt’s arbitrage, the proposition that groats in London were the same as groats in 
Amsterdam, that crowns in London were the same as crowns in Paris, and so on. 
Step 2: Calculating Profit (Comparison of Sets) 
The proposition that currencies could be equivalent, effectively the proposal of 
decoding and unitization, across different contexts led to the logical consequence for 
Postlewayt that the prices of those currencies, i.e. their exchange rates, should be the 
same across contexts as well. In other words, if pounds, groats and crowns were all 
units of universal sets of particular currencies, exchanging pounds for groats for crowns 
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should cost the same as exchanging pounds directly for crowns. Equivalence of all units 
of each set meant that no price discrepancy could be justified. However, price parity, is, 
like equivalence of commodities between contexts, not essential or given. Prices are 
contextual. 
That prices differ across contexts is not a radical revelation, at least not to 
corporations and business consultants. A group of consultants and a professor of public 
management recently published Contextual Pricing, in which they offer tools for taking 
advantage of context. They explain:  
Success comes from understanding context. This idea has been leveraged with 
great results by some leading companies. The Coca-Cola Company, for instance, 
includes temperature at the point of sale in its pricing context. An ice cold cola 
commands a better price in the middle of summer on a hot beach than during a 
snowstorm in the Arctic! Being able to adjust prices to the immediate context of 
the buying occasion is how Coke has moved to monetize contextual insights.233  
 There are so many examples of seemingly identical commodities having different prices 
in different contexts, its hard to know how the economic Law of One Price explained in 
chapter one can bear the weight of its name: a can of soda from a grocery store or an 
amusement park vending machine, a pair of Levi’s jeans in a Spanish boutique or an 
American outlet mall, a cup of clean water in the suburban U.S. or in Koya District in 
Sierra Leone. In short, prices are contextual things.234  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Robert Doctors, Michael Barzelay, John G. Hanson and Cecilia Nguyen, Contextual 
Pricing: The Death of List Price and the New Market Reality (New York: McGraw Hill, 
2012).  
234 In addition to being a central argument of this dissertation, this declaration is a 
playful homage to Carruthers and Stinchcombe’s “price is a social fact” and Beunza et 
al.’s “a price is a social thing”. Bruce G. Carruthers and Arthur L. Stinchecombe, “The 
Social Structure of Liquidity: Flexibility, Markets, and States,” Theory and Society 28, no. 
3 (1999): 358. Beunza et al., “A Price.” 
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I have already argued in chapter one that economists have, since the inception of 
their discipline, been concerned with defining which elements of a context determine 
prices. Neoclassical economics narrows the supposed context of prices to individual 
subjective preferences and the mechanisms of supply and demand. The theory of 
marginal utility misses, of course, the fact that individual preferences are themselves 
conditioned by the context. It misses, in short, the cultural nature of pricing. Prices are 
the result of economic calculation, but economic calculation is built precisely on social 
mattering that inheres in specific contexts. How much something costs is determined 
not by the intersection of preferences but by the intersection of relations that constitute a 
context. Oscar Wilde’s famous aphorism “Nowadays people know the price of 
everything and the value of nothing” is a statement not about errors in price but about 
the state of collective mattering.235 That we value things the way we do, that prices are 
what they are, is a reflection of the state of collective mattering. But just because 
mattering is collective, does not mean it is communal. Prices are not neutral 
expressions of collective desires to produce and consume goods. They are the result of 
the tensions and uneven relations of power that suffuse a context. Thus, Wilde’s 
aphorism is a war cry: we must change what matters!  
Collective mattering obviously differs from one context to the next. So, one would 
not expect the price of a cow in the U.S. to be the same as the price of a cow in India. 
However, the first step of arbitrage, the proposition of equivalence between sets of 
commodities across contexts such that both merge into a universal set, reframes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008).  
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differences in prices as errors or excesses. Supap Kirtsaeng proposed that the English 
language, international edition textbooks he found in his native Thailand were in fact 
equivalent to domestic edition textbooks in the U.S. This intercontextual comparison 
reframed the prices of those textbooks not as the unique results of collective mattering 
in each context, but as prices of units of a single universal set of fully equivalent 
commodities. Their disparity was therefore necessarily an error or excess, or more 
specifically, profit.  
 The second step of arbitrage, reliant entirely on the first step of proposing 
equivalence between sets of commodities across contexts, is the calculation of price 
difference as an excess available for capture as profit. The entire example given by 
Postlewayt in his 1751 manual is an exposition of this second step of arbitrage. 
Postlewayt first calculates the possible arbitrage profit available to the merchant moving 
bills of exchange and specie in a particular triangular route. This calculation is the 
working out of “arbitrated rates”, of the theoretical price parity that would prevent 
arbitrage profit. Then, Postlewayt imagines the realistic possibility that those rates are 
not in parity and calculates the profit an arbitrageur could capture from that disparity.  
However, arbitrage is an apparatus of capture so the proposal of equivalence is 
oriented specifically to the purpose of comparison and capture. As Deleuze and Guattari 
write, “the mechanism of capture contributes from the outset to the constitution of the 
aggregate upon which capture is effectuated.”236 In arbitrage, that aggregate is extra-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari write that an apparatus of capture is “inseperable 
from a process of relative deterritorialization” that makes differences “comparable” and 
excess “appropriable.” Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 441. 
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contextaul, universal set equivalent units commodities. In financial economics 
definitions, arbitrage is the process of finding two equivalent commodities trading at 
different prices and exchanging one for the other to profit from the error in their pricing. 
But understood as an apparatus of capture, arbitrage is not about “finding” opportunities 
for comparison and capture, but creating them.  
The calculation of profit proposes price parity in order to render price disparity as 
an error and the difference between prices as excess rather than radically contextual 
difference. Work in the sociology of finance that focused on arbitrage in the 2000s 
contains indications of this interpretation of arbitrage. In their article “Tools of the Trade: 
the Socio-Technology of Arbitrage in a Wall Street Trading Room,” Beunza and Stark 
argue that arbitrage traders use a number of social and technological tools to make 
associations and construct equivalencies between securities in order to arbitrage 
between them.237 In order for successful arbitrage to take place, traders must find two 
sets of financial securities that are equivalent (for contemporary financial markets this 
almost exclusively means they have the same risk and expected return) but are trading 
at different prices. Arbitrage traders use different models and techniques for identifying 
securities that are equivalent but here-to-for not identified as such. In other words, they 
produce equivalences depending on which model they use. Thus, Beunza and Stark 
can argue that “a trading room is an engine for generating equivalences.”238  
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238 Ibid., 373. 
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Similarly, Beunza et al. suggest “many—probably most—current forms of 
arbitrage exploit discrepancies in the prices not of the ‘same’ asset but of ‘similar’ 
assets”, i.e. they rely on constructed equivalences.239 The foregoing discussion of the 
way that commodification is the creation of sets of similar items through 
deterritorialization should demonstrate that the difference between arbitrage of the 
“same” or “similar” assets isn’t really a difference at all. Nonetheless, following this 
claim, they note that “the ‘similarity’ of financial assets is always in a sense theory-
dependent” which is to say that all arbitrage relies upon deterritorialization as a 
precondition, and has as its first step, the theoretical proposition of equivalence across 
contexts. 240 This proposition must be defended and promoted in order for the calculated 
arbitrage profit, the excess available for capture, to be successfully achieved. Thus, 
Beunza et al. discuss the ways that arbitrageurs at investment banks and hedge funds 
must convince others, such as managers, that the equivalencies are true in order to get 
and keep the capital necessary for a trade. Convincing other traders may even play a 
material part in ensuring the success of a trade. In a discussion of certain kinds of bond 
arbitrage that involved buying and selling bonds in the (supposed) knowledge that their 
prices would converge over time, Beunza et al. write: “If that discussion and attention [of 
a particular arbitrage trade] leads others also to seek to exploit a discrepancy, then their 
purchases and sales will narrow the discrepancy, or at least reduce the risk of it 
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widening.”241 Thus, the proposition of equivalence is a project that may be successful or 
unsuccessful, depending upon the final step. 
Step 3: Actualization (Capture and Flow) 
The first two steps of arbitrage propose “the constitution of the aggregate upon 
which capture is effectuated”, i.e. equivalent sets of commodities across contexts, and 
calculate the potential profit for capture. Through the proposition of decoding and 
unitization and the comparison of sets, the stage is set for putting units into flow in the 
act of trading, i.e. the process that is usually identified in financial economics as 
arbitrage. Within the capture framework offered by Grossberg et al., however these first 
two steps are as integral to the process as the third because, if successful, capture 
actualizes the propositions made in the first two steps in two ways. First, it may have the 
effect of actualizing the relation of equivalence between commodities insofar as it may 
bring their prices into parity. For example, if enough arbitrageurs undertook Postlewayt’s 
arbitrage, the act of buying groats and selling crowns would, via the mechanism of 
supply and demand, raise the price of groats and lower the price of crowns, bringing 
them into parity.  Such an arbitrage trade would be self-negating. After a certain amount 
of arbitrage is carried out, the opportunity for further profit from that trade is erased. But 
the forces of supply and demand don’t always work to ensure parity, as I explore in the 
next chapter. 
Second, capture renders the difference in price as an excess insofar as it is 
successfully taken as profit. However, this actualization may also fail. Postlewayt’s 	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proposed arbitrage would have to be carried out by an arbitrageur actually buying and 
selling the coins and bills in the triangular trade. The success of such an attempt would 
depend first on the actual costs and outcome of the necessary journeys. If the cost of 
travelling from London to Amsterdam and then from Amsterdam to Paris were higher 
then the proposed arbitrage profit, the trade could not be successfully completed. 
Similarly, the journeys themselves could prove disastrous. The arbitrageur could have 
his coins or bills stolen or could fall ill or be attacked. Finally, the part of the trade in 
which the rate of exchange is not set in advance by the purchase or sale of a bill of 
exchange, specifically the exchange of groats for crowns in Paris, might be adversely 
affected by a change in exchange rates from the time the potential arbitrage trade is 
calculated to the time the trade is carried out.242  
Conclusion 
Grossberg et al., drawing heavily on the work of Deleuze and Guattari, provide a 
theoretical framework that reimagines value as something that is based in social 
relations but undergoes multiple transformations. This framework also repositions the 
labor theory of value as an account of one form of capitalist capture among many. In 
this framework, arbitrage is freed from the productive/unproductive labor dichotomy and 
notions of fictitious value that are traditionally attached to finance in Marxism, and 
instead is the apparatus specific to financial capitalism. 
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The value transformations that lead to capitalist capture as well as the operation 
of capture itself are all evident in the process of arbitrage. Arbitrage requires 
deterritorialization/commodification as a precondition and proceeds through three steps: 
proposing equivalence (decoding and unitization), calculating profit (comparison of sets) 
and actualization (capture and flow). Although arbitrage is often discussed as a process 
of discovery, of finding opportunities for capturing profit from price differences, it is 
actually creative: the first two steps propose relations that didn’t previously exist and the 
third step attempts to actualize those relations. Because the process produces the 
possibility of new relations, it may either succeed or fail; those relations may come into 
being or not. No arbitrage trade can, from the outset, be guaranteed success.  
This reformulation of arbitrage challenges traditional financial economic 
definitions of the term in two ways. First, while arbitrage may bring prices into parity 
across contexts, the effect that financial economics focuses on when it frames arbitrage 
as guarantor of market efficiency, the capture framework foregrounds capture as the 
driving force of arbitrage. It thus reverses the logical order of the financial economic 
definition. In the capture framework, efficiency is the side effect of arbitrage driven by 
profit rather than the other way around.  
Second, fitting arbitrage into the framework of capture provided by Grossberg et 
al. also challenges the idea that “true” arbitrage is riskless. As I already indicated, 
multiple factors may endanger arbitrage even if a potential profit is identified. In financial 
economics, these factors are categorized as risks. Recall the second part of Billingsley’s 
definition of arbitrage given in the introduction of this paper, “‘True’ arbitrage is both 
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riskless and self-financing… use of the term has broadened to include often-risky 
variations.”243 It seems that Postlewayt’s arbitrage wouldn’t therefore qualify as true 
arbitrage at all. In Billingsley’s definition, it seems that guaranteed success, or in his 
terms risklessness, is definitional of “true” arbitrage and arbitrage that faces possible 
failure is something else. However, the framework that I have presented, of success and 
failure, is much more useful for understanding arbitrage. Why then does the economic 
definition of arbitrage make the distinction between true, riskless arbitrage and activities 
that are not quite arbitrage, but are nonetheless deemed “variations”? 
 The answer to this question must be sought within the specialized world of 
financial economics, which proposes that all profit must be remuneration for risk. If you 
earn a dollar, it is because you risked some amount of money in the investment. This 
idea is formalized in the Capital Asset Pricing Model, an equation that gives the 
expected return of any financial security as a function of its riskiness. The profit one 
gains from trading activities should always derive from taking on some risk; this is the 
process of investing. Arbitrage can be conceived as riskless in this world because it is 
framed as the exception that proves the rule. Recall that arbitrage is, for financial 
economics, the guarantor of market efficiency. It polices markets for unfair price 
disparities and through the mechanism of supply and demand brings them back into 
parity. In other words, anytime prices reflect anything other than a remuneration of risk, 
they are “unjustifiable”. Arbitrage fixes the error, bringing prices back to levels that are 
justified by the riskiness of the securities they represent. Because it is addressing and 	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correcting errors in the relationship between risk and return, arbitrage is, in the world of 
financial economics, the sole financial activity that can produce a profit without taking on 
risk.  
The reformulation of arbitrage as an apparatus of capture that I have offered in 
this chapter is fundamentally inconsistent with this economists’ world. All arbitrage, 
because of its creative nature, is subject to the possibility of failure, and thus, to some 
degree, involves what economists would call risk. Part of the problem in adjudicating the 
difference between the economists’ definition of arbitrage and the framework I have 
proposed is the fact that the term risk is deeply problematic, especially in moving in and 
out of the economist’s specialized world. On the one hand, risk that a stock might go up 
or down, if it is something that can actually be measured, seems to be something that 
might reasonably be tied to return. However, some degree or risk, or what I have called 
radical uncertainty, is ubiquitous to existence. What is truly guaranteed? An arbitrage 
profit that seems sure on paper might be prevented by the closure of an exchange, the 
death of a counterparty or even an act of god like an earthquake. Radical uncertainty in 
this sense is not something that can ever be entirely quantified. Moving between the 
financial meaning of risk as the source of profit and the colloquial definition that 
encompasses the contingencies of radical uncertainly presents a significant challenge 
to rigorously analyzing the specificity of arbitrage. To make sense of the economists’ 
claim that arbitrage is riskless, it will therefore be necessary to reject the language of 
risk altogether and instead take up the question of what conditions influence success or 
failure in arbitrage trades. This is the topic of the next chapter.  




CHAPTER 4: ARBITRAGE AND “RISK”: TIME CONTINGENCY AND SIMULATED 
INSTANTANEITY 
I want to add to the reformulation of arbitrage offered in the last chapter a 
rethinking of the notion that arbitrage is necessarily riskless. Framing arbitrage as an 
apparatus of capture suggests that arbitrage is better understood as a creative 
endeavor that may succeed or fail. In the example of Postlewayt’s arbitrage presented 
in the last chapter, there were multiple factors that could influence the success or failure 
of the trade, including the costs and dangers of the journeys between Paris, Amsterdam 
and London and the possibility that exchange rates could change during those journeys. 
The intervening time between the proposal of an arbitrage trade based on a price 
disparity that can provide a profit and the execution of the trade, as well as the time 
between each piece or “leg” of the trade, in some way determines the success or failure 
of the trade. If the arbitrage could be somehow instantaneously carried out when the 
profit is first proposed, it would always be successful. However, the creation of the new 
relations of equivalence between commodities in different contexts and of price 
difference as excess takes time. Time is a crucial component of success or failure of 
arbitrage. Put differently, instead of understanding arbitrage as riskless, the capture 
framework suggests that the success or failure of arbitrage relies on the arbitrageur’s 
ability to control what I will call time contingency.  
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In this chapter, I first explain this term, time contingency, and use it as an 
analytical tool to distinguish different forms of financial profit making and different forms 
of arbitrage. Second, I argue that the success of arbitrage relies on controlling time 
contingency in such a way as to simulate instantaneity. Arbitrage only appears to be 
riskless ex post facto for the arbitrageur who successfully simulates instantaneity at the 
expense of others. The financial economic definition of arbitrage thus confuses the 
eventual success of some arbitrage trades with an ontological condition of being without 
risk. I provide several historical examples of arbitrage trades that successfully simulate 
instantaneity to illustrate this point. Each of these examples demonstrates not only the 
importance of simulated instantaneity but also the fact the market efficiency is indeed 
not the goal of arbitrage but rather an eventual side effect that must be continually 
overcome. I conclude by noting the common popular interpretation of arbitrage as 
cheating or gaming the system. This interpretation recalls the notion that arbitrage is 
exploitative in the capitalist sense. In the next chapter, I further pursue the idea that 
characterizing arbitrage as cheating or exploitation fully explains the source of arbitrage 
profit.  
Time Contingency 
Writing in 1896, economist Henry Crosby Emery distinguishes “time speculation” 
or “time-dealings” from “place-speculation.”244 The former attempts to capitalize on time 
with the use of financial derivatives such as futures and options. Time speculation 
occurred when derivatives were used “when an anticipated difference in the present and 	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future prices of the commodity in question leaves room for a possible profit.”245 This he 
contrasts to the “place-speculation” of arbitrage. For Emery, place speculation—“to buy 
where goods were cheap, and to sell where goods were dear”—is initially inseparable 
from “trader’s business.”246 “Place-speculation… was not separable from ordinary trade 
under the earlier conditions of imperfect and uncertain means of communication.”247 
Place-speculation became modern arbitrage when communication technologies (in his 
time, the telegraph and the telephone) became so advanced that “the prices in both the 
selling and the buying markets are known at the same moment.”248 For Emery, arbitrage 
differs from the buying and selling that constitute ordinary trade by the instantaneity of 
price discovery. I will return to the issue of this instantaneous knowledge shortly, but 
first, Emery’s distinction of time-speculation and place-speculation affords a more 
productive differentiation of financial activity with reference to time rather than risk and 
risklessness. In particular, financial activity can be categorized according to the way that 
changes in price over time impact the profitability of that activity. 
First, investing and speculation can be grouped together as activities that require 
openness to time. What we might think of as traditional investing—buying a share of 
stock or even contributing to a new project directly—requires an openness to time; the 
hope is that the capital disbursed will grow in value over time. Investing does not yield 	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instant profit, but instead requires time to pass. What Emery calls time-speculation, the 
use of derivatives to secure future profits, also requires this openness. Both investing 
and speculation seek to profit from what I am calling time contingency, the uncertainty of 
future events.  
The only meaningful differentiation that can be made between investing and 
speculation in this register is in the potential direction of changes in value over time. 
Investing is undertaken in the hopes that the original investment will be returned with an 
additional return. Speculation also seeks a profit in the future, but does not necessarily 
profit from increased returns. For example, one can speculate using futures, by entering 
a futures contract to sell corn at $450 per bushel in one month in the hopes that corn will 
actually trade for $440 at that future time, and he can immediately buy corn at the 
prevailing market price and then fulfill his contract at $450 a bushel netting a $10 profit. 
A decrease in price may still produce a positive speculative return. If the price rises to 
$460, the speculator will lose $10, making speculation, like investing, an uncertain 
endeavor. Both investing and time-speculation seek profit from openness to time—from 
the possibility of change between the present and the future—but speculation may profit 
from a decrease or increase in value, depending on the strategy used, whereas 
investing profits only from an increase in value. 
A meaningful distinction can be made between investing and time-speculation on 
the one hand and hedging—taking an offsetting investment position to reduce the risk of 
one’s initial investment—on the other. Hedging, whether with stocks, bonds or 
derivatives, attempts to negate specific pieces of time contingency so as to manufacture 
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a narrow, targeted openness to time as opposed to a radical openness to whatever 
fluctuations the future might bring. So, for example, a farmer might sell corn forward at a 
rate of $450 per bushel to guard against the possibility that the price could fall 
substantially and reduce her profit. She has negated the possibility that prices will fall 
below $450 per bushel, but in the process has lost the advantage of being able to sell at 
a higher price as well, should the market move in that direction. She could also buy 
options to sell at $450. For a cost, she would again negate the downside risk of prices 
falling, but keep the upside possibility of selling at a higher price should prices increase 
over time. Both are examples of hedging limiting the openness to time such that only 
certain outcomes are possible (i.e. future sales will only occur at $450 or above $450.) 
In contemporary financial markets, unhedged investing is generally practiced only 
by individual and institutional investors, not by investment banks, hedge funds and 
traders. The latter engage in sophisticated hedging strategies to limit time contingency 
when they engage in speculative activities. They also engage in three additional forms 
of profit making with different relationships to time: taking fees for executing trades for 
clients; functioning as “market-makers;” and engaging in arbitrage. Fees for service are 
not distinctly financial in that such profit making takes place in many other sectors. 
Market making and arbitrage, on the other hand can be analyzed and distinguished from 
investing, speculation and hedging in terms of time contingency. 
Market makers offer to buy stocks at a slightly lower price than they offer to sell 
them. This “bid-ask spread” is the remuneration for their service of always being willing 
to buy or sell the stock, thus providing “liquidity” or convertibility of the stock into cash. 
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According to Carruthers and Stinchcombe, “market makers in organized stock 
exchanges help to conduct a continuous auction of a given stock,” meaning that 
“sometimes for short periods the market makers must own stocks for which there are no 
bidders at the moment (a ``long'' position) or have sold stocks they have not yet bought 
(a ``short'' position).”249 Unlike investment or time-speculation, market making doesn’t 
rely on changes in price unfolding in time for profit to be achieved. Market makers’ profit 
is structural. As supply and demand for a stock push its price up and down, the bid-ask 
spread and thus the market makers profit stays relatively stable. However, market 
makers’ positions as guarantors of liquidity mean that their activities are nonetheless 
subject to time contingency insofar as they must hold unhedged long or short positions 
in stocks if no buyers or sellers are available. If the price changes during that period, the 
new price at which they must offer or accept a stock may wipe out their profit. 
Market making occupies a sort of middle position between investing and time-
speculation on the one hand and arbitrage, what Emery calls “place-speculation,” on the 
other. In as much as investing and time-speculation require time contingency for profit, 
arbitrage is the opposite: arbitrage is defined by opposition to the contingency of 
passing time. As with market making, arbitrage profits are endangered in proportion to 
the amount of time that passes between the buying and selling legs of that trade. But 
additionally, time passing between the calculation of profit and the execution of the trade 
also works against the profitability of arbitrage. Instead of openness to time, 
instantaneity is key to arbitrage profit because any temporal separation between 	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calculating profit and actualizing capture of that profit introduces the possibility that the 
conditions upon which the calculation of profit is based may change. The same is true 
for the temporal separation of buying and selling. If one leg of the trade is entered into at 
a time prior to the second, the price of the latter asset may change disadvantageously. 
This fact is evident in the inclusion of the phrases like “almost immediately” or 
“simultaneous” in many definitions of arbitrage.  
The success of arbitrage is predicated on an impossible feat—instantaneous 
trading. Even the fastest computer programmed with an algorithm to identify (i.e. create, 
based on various models of value) arbitrage opportunities and act on them immediately 
is still limited by the speed at which electronic signals can travel. The absolute limit of 
fiber optic cable is the speed of light, but differing cable lengths and software execution 
times introduce further constraints.250 True instantaneity of execution and simultaneity of 
both legs of arbitrage is an absolute limit point that existing technology cannot achieve. 
In light of this fact, the meaning behind the quotation marks around “true” in Billingsley’s 
definition of arbitrage (see pg. 112) is evident: instantaneous arbitrage is impossible. 
The only trades that are possible involve some degree of time contingency, and thus are 
not totally guaranteed. However, some arbitrage trades are more successful than 
others. 
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Simulated Instantaneity 
The probability of success or failure in arbitrage depends upon the way that time 
contingency is addressed. Successful arbitrage relies on what I call simulated 
instantaneity. Simulated instantaneity involves limiting time contingency in relation to 
other arbitrageurs to ensure successful trading. Simulating instantaneity requires 
winning a battle on two fronts: first, against time itself, which threatens the profit that is 
posited through calculation and necessarily separates the two legs of any arbitrage 
trade; and second, against other arbitrageurs whose trading activities may negate or 
“use up” the arbitrage profits available from a particular trade. The first battle, as I have 
already explained, relates to the dangers of time contingency. The second relates to the 
self-negating nature of some (but not all) arbitrage trades over time. The act of buying 
goods in one market increases demand, and thus may increase price. Similarly selling 
goods in another market increases supply, and thus may decrease price. In markets 
where supply and demand have these effects, arbitrage trading will eventually raise the 
price of cheap goods and lower the price of expensive goods until the disparity of prices 
(essential to the possibility of arbitrage profit) is erased. Therefore, the first 
arbitrageur(s) to carry out a trade may in many cases very quickly exhaust its 
profitability, leaving slower arbitrageurs out of profit making entirely. 
The twin-front battle for simulated instantaneity is fought in two different ways. 
First, advantages in communication, especially the speed and connectedness of 
arbitrageurs’ communication networks, allow some to profit more securely from 
arbitrage, by reducing the time lag between calculation and trade and between each leg 
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of a trade, and thus to profit before/at the expense of slower arbitrageurs. The three 
steps of arbitrage trading that I described in the previous chapter—proposing 
equivalence, calculating profit and actualizing capture—all rely upon and deploy 
processes of communication across contexts. Arbitrageurs, whether of currencies in the 
eighteenth century or equities in the twenty-first century stock market, must learn of the 
existence of similar items in different contexts between which equivalence can be 
proposed. Calculation of profit relies upon the discovery of price information between 
contexts. And the actualization of an arbitrage trade depends upon the transportation of 
goods and/or communication of trading signals for the purposes of buying and selling. 
Arbitrage thus relies on the differential ability of some arbitrageurs to achieve 
advantages of speed and connectivity that allow them to communicate through their 
networks better and faster than others.  
However, advantages in communication for the purposes of arbitrage are not 
only about who has the fastest communication technologies. As will become evident in 
several of the examples below, relative advantages of network connectivity can 
sometimes trump absolute advantages of speed. Sarah Sharma has critiqued the 
contemporary, hegemonic discourse of speed as analytically limiting. Speed theorists, 
she argues, miss the multiple, intersecting and contradictory speeds at which life is 
lived. She writes, “the explanatory power of speed works to produce differential time and 
exacerbate structural inequalities experienced at the level of time.”251 Drawing on her 
notion of differential time, I will refer to the advantages of speed and connectivity that 	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allow some arbitrageurs to simulate instantaneity at the expense of others, a necessarily 
structural inequality, as network differentials. Importantly, because network differentials 
are used to secure arbitrage profits, and arbitrage is often self-negating, network 
differentials usually even out over time. This evening out tends to bring greater 
efficiency to markets, but also forces arbitrageurs to seek out ways to create new 
advantageous network differentials.  
Second, price stabilization, often in the form of contracts such as futures, allows 
arbitrageurs to “lock in” arbitrage profits, effectively simulating instantaneity not through 
network differentials but by artificially negating the possibility of change over time. 
Contracts such as futures, options, and some exotic derivatives that are created in 
contemporary financial markets are designed to limit time contingency by fixing a price, 
thus negating the effects of supply and demand over time. In the service of arbitrage, 
this limiting simulates instantaneity. Neither advantageous network differentials nor the 
stabilization of prices through contracts fully erase time contingency, but each simulates 
instantaneity in ways that reduce the time contingency of arbitrage trading in particular 
ways. However, there is another important distinction to be made. I have already 
suggested that supply and demand do not always have the effect of reducing or erasing 
arbitrage profit opportunities. In some cases, complex forms of price stabilization 
produce what I will call money machines, arbitrage trades that rely on structural 
inequalities in price that are maintained over time. In these trades, profits are seemingly 
endless. In the next section, I will discuss the way that simulated instantaneity, both 
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through network differentials and price-stabilizing contracts, enable ordinary arbitrage. 
Following that, I will discuss the special case of money machine arbitrage. 
Network Differentials and Price-Stabilizing Derivatives Contracts252 
The configuration of advantageous network differentials and price stabilization for 
the purposes of arbitrage often go together, so there is no easy way to disentangle the 
two in analysis. Indeed, perhaps the first significant technology for controlling time 
contingency, bills of exchange, fits into both categories. As James Carey points out, 
prior to the invention of the telegraph, “transportation and communication were 
inseparably linked” (15). Hence, early arbitrage trades relied upon transportation 
networks. Bills of exchange reconfigured early transport-communication networks by 
replacing physical coinage with lighter, easy to conceal paper slips, thus alleviating 
some of the dangers of transporting specie. Arbitrageurs who used bills instead of coins 
could travel faster and cheaper than those carrying specie. This created a network 
differential between those who used bills and those that had to transport physical coins. 
The network differential made arbitrage cheaper, easier and faster for the carriers of 
bills, i.e. it simulated instantaneity by allowing bill carriers to be the fastest or only 
arbitrageurs. In some cases, this may have amounted to a reduction in costs that quite 
literally produced an arbitrage profit where before none existed. Einzig writes that 
physical coinage had to be moved “under the guard of a heavily armed convoy.”253 	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Because arbitrage profit is calculated as the difference in prices minus the costs of 
enacting the trade, removing the cost of an armed convoy may have allowed the 
calculation of an arbitrage profit previously unavailable. Network differentials that allow 
some arbitrageurs to simulate instantaneity often also reduce costs and thus increase, 
or even produce new, arbitrage profits. 
Bills of exchange were also contracts that fixed exchange rates during the 
duration of the bill, and therefore across the physical space over which they were 
transported, making them a technology of price stabilization as well. Because bills of 
exchange necessarily specified a rate of exchange at which they could be used as 
payment or exchanged for coins, they stabilized the exchange rate that could have 
otherwise fluctuated over the intervening time that an arbitrageur had to take to travel 
from one location to another. This price stabilization was key to early triangular 
arbitrage.   
Bills of exchange provided one means of achieving faster transportation and 
price stabilization in early arbitrage, but the very configuration of transportation networks 
was also important. Discussing early triangular arbitrage trades that could be carried out 
between bills of exchange in different urban centers in the medieval period, Poitras 
claims that “As late as the 16th century, only the Italian merchant-bankers, the Fuggers 
of Augsburg, and a few other houses with correspondents in all banking centres were 
able to engage actively in arbitrage.”254 These houses formed networks that allowed 
them to achieve the fastest communication about exchange rates under the conditions 	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of slow, treacherous transport-communication. The bankers who established 
correspondents (not unlike modern bank branches) in multiple locations who could carry 
out transactions with bills and specie already on site thus reduced the time-to-trade to 
the time it took a messenger to move between banking centers. Arbitrageurs without 
such a network might learn of a price discrepancy but be unable to undertake the trade 
because they did not have the coins on hand to purchase appropriate bills. 
By the mid-eighteenth century, the diffusion of bills of exchange and advances in 
banking that allowed relative ease of currency exchange evened out the advantageous 
network differentials, allowing all merchants to undertake triangular arbitrage, as 
Postlewayt’s manual encouraged them to do. However, this arbitrage was still 
conducted entirely through transportation of bills, coinage, and information. Arbitrage 
was influenced dramatically by the introduction of communication technologies in the 
nineteenth century that created new network differentials for some at the expense of 
others.   
Shunting 
According to Emery, arbitrage was transformed from an “essential part” of 
“ordinary trade” into its modern form when it became possible for “prices in both the 
selling and the buying markets [to be] known at the same moment.”255 This is a 
fascinating claim, coming as it does from a book written at the end of the nineteenth 
century. By our standards today, telegraph and telephone communication could never 
be considered truly instantaneous. Yet, Emery highlights what I believe to be a crucial 	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moment in the history of arbitrage. The telegraph, according to James Carey, “permitted 
for the first time, the effective separation of communication from transportation.”256 This 
separation, for Carey, “ushered in the modern phase of history.”257 It also allowed a 
dramatic leap forward in simulated instantaneity. Before the telegraph, the speed of 
arbitrage transactions was impeded by the limits of physical transport—either of specie 
and bills or—in the case of those dispersed merchant bankers, of price information and 
orders. With the invention of the telegraph and soon after, the telephone, that limit point 
was breeched, for some, and both Emery and Carey assign a great deal of weight to 
that event. 
Emery suggests that by 1896, the impact of the separation of communication and 
transport had made arbitrage as nearly instantaneous as could be imagined. He 
describes the case of domestic shunting, the name given to arbitrage between stock 
exchanges within the U.S.258 
Private wires between the cities, telephones in the exchanges, and operators 
quick to translate and transmit the signals of the brokers on the floor, constituted 
an effective machinery for operations of a very interesting kind. By means of 
these devices the same man was practically trading in Boston and in New York 
at the same time. A change in price in either place was known by the broker on 
the floor of the other within less than thirty seconds. This was trade reduced to its 
finest point.259  
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 For Emery, technologically mediated arbitrage was so successful and complete 
that it had effectively erased price differences between exchanges and ceased to be 
speculation at all. He writes, “If both prices are actually known at the same moment, to 
buy at one price and sell at another is not to take a risk, and so is not speculation.”260 
Carey, who cites Emery in his discussion of the telegraph, actually declares the “decline 
of arbitrage” to be one of the significant outcomes of the introduction of telegraphy.261 
Carey was in some ways correct that the telegraph “brings the conditions of supply and 
demand in all markets to bear on the determination of a price.”262 Arbitrage involved the 
proposal of equivalence between contexts and, when successful, the equalization of 
prices between those contexts. This is the efficiency producing side effect of arbitrage. 
As arbitrage is continuously sought for the purpose of capturing profit, it also brings 
price into parity.  
However, Carey’s assertion that this evening out of prices across markets 
“eliminates opportunities for arbitrage by realizing the classical assumption of perfect 
information” misses the mark.263 Prices between markets are not equalized once and for 
all, but kept in parity by continuous arbitrage operations. Any small fluctuation in prices 
is a profit opportunity for arbitrageurs. But perhaps more importantly, the telegraph was 
not instantaneous; it was only the fastest in comparison to previous speeds of transport-	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communication. As telegraphy became widespread, arbitrage at the speed of the 
telegraph would become easier for anyone to engage in. This would ensure efficient 
pricing, i.e. that prices remained in parity across markets, but also make arbitrage more 
distributed and less profitable since anyone could do it. The diffusion of the technology 
essentially evened out the network differential.  
Elsewhere, Adam Rottinghaus and I have argued that diffusion of technologies 
throughout markets results in “increased market coordination”, i.e. it erases previous 
network differentials.264 This diffusion also “results in dwindling profits and therefore 
presents a serious problem” for arbitrageurs.265 An arbitrageur who could cut the 
communication time between exchanges down even further from “less than thirty 
seconds”, i.e. construct a more advantageous network differential, stood to profit at the 
expense of others who still used the old technology. Far from ending arbitrage, the 
telegraph ushered in a communication technology arms race that is still going on today. 
It was the first in a long procession of emerging technologies used to create network 
differentials. Each new technology redefined the possibilities of simulating instantaneity 
and thus of arbitrage.266  	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Index Arbitrage 
Subsequent to the invention of the telegraph, other communication technologies 
were used for the purposes of arbitrage, including the telephone and early computer 
technologies. In the 1970s and 80s, developments on the Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT), Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
allowed for another dramatic leap in simulating instantaneity. Between 1968 and 1978, 
the NYSE went from transmitting orders via phone and swapping paper stock 
certificates at the end of each day to electronic trading and clearance.267 In addition, 
from 1972 to 1987, the CBOT and CME successfully introduced financial futures on 
currencies and stock indices and implemented electronic trading of them as well.268  
Previously, futures were only traded on commodities. Allowing financial futures, 
and particularly futures on stock indexes,269 created a new kind of arbitrage opportunity. 
Index arbitrage involves buying (low) a portfolio of stocks that closely approximates270 
an index and entering into a futures contract to sell (high) that index at a future date (or 
vice versa), on the assumption that when that expiration date arrives, the index and the 
portfolio will have nearly the same value and the difference between the contracted 	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futures price and the present price will yield a profit. This deal would fall into the second 
category of simulated instantaneity: price stabilization. Assuming that the cost of holding 
the securities (such as interest on money borrowed for such a purpose) did not erase 
the difference between today’s (spot) price and the futures price, an arbitrage profit was 
secured via contract instead of network differentials. As with other forms of arbitrage, 
profits would be swiftly eroded by initial trading and remain only for intermittent 
fluctuations in spot or futures prices. 
However, the introduction of electronic trading around the same time that 
financial futures were also introduced led to a high-speed form of index futures arbitrage 
that yielded enormous profits from small, intermittent fluctuations that were previously 
too fleeting to capitalize upon. Large banks with advanced computer programs were 
able to engage in automated “program trading,” the “coordinated purchase or sale of an 
entire portfolio of stocks” for the purpose of arbitraging between stock index futures and 
spot prices.271 Program trading relies on computer algorithms to respond to changes in 
prices for the calculated index and a group of stocks that approximates that index. 
Programs identify disparities between future and spot prices and automatically send 
orders through electronic trading platforms to “almost simultaneously” perform the 
arbitrage trade.272 
Stock index arbitrage through program trading relies on both kinds of simulated 
instantaneity: network differentials for those firms with the computer algorithms and 	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access to electronic trading platforms to carry out program trading, and price 
stabilization through the use of index futures. Index arbitrage is only successful for the 
arbitrageur with the most advantageous network, the one who can develop the fastest 
network of computer programs, connections to electronic trading systems and access to 
capital to fund the trades. An arbitrageur who sees a disparity and then calls his broker 
to place an order will likely find that either the program trading of more sophisticated 
arbitrageurs has already erased the disparity, or worse, the duration of his “slow” trade 
could leave him buying up stocks at spot only to find that he cannot sell a futures 
contract at a profit. The trade is only successful for the fastest, most well connected 
arbitrageur. For the slow arbitrageur, the trade is very risky, as he is left with a mound of 
unhedged stocks. This example sheds some light on the use of the term “riskless” in the 
economic definition of arbitrage. Arbitrage is riskless ex post facto for the arbitrageur 
who successfully simulates instantaneity at the expense of others. Traders and 
commentators never assume ex ante risklessness. They are fully aware of the fact that 
arbitrage can either succeed or fail, as evidenced by this quote from an analysis of 
program trading: “there is a great deal of competition among arbitragers, arbitragers 
only place programs when an opportunity exists to execute a program successfully.”273  
In 1988, following spirited debate among traders and journalists about the role of 
program trading in amplifying stock market volatility, the NYSE restricted program 
trading, banning firms from using the electronic Designated Order Turnaround (DOT) 
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system when markets rose or fell more than 50 points.274 This ban or “collar” as it was 
called, had the effect of foiling many attempts at arbitrage.275 Large swings in market 
values allowed firms to arbitrage between the spot value of stocks whose value had 
changed dramatically and the futures price of the index that had yet to reflect that swing. 
If electronic trading was banned when large swings occurred, arbitrageurs could not 
lock in their trades quickly enough to profit before the index futures price was updated.  
In response, a number of Wall Street firms voluntarily halted index arbitrage, at 
least on their own accounts.276 Thus, some index arbitrage was effectively suspended 
by removing access to the high-speed communication technology (the DOT system) 
that was a crucial part of simulating instantaneity in the trade. However, not every firm 
needed the DOT technology to perform the arbitrage. When the “collar” was later 
removed, Goldman Sachs petitioned the NYSE board to reinstate it, ostensibly for the 
good of investor confidence, as there was widespread belief that index arbitrage 
increased market volatility.277 However, Goldman spokesperson Robert Mnuchin 
admitted in 1989 that keeping the collar “would work to the advantage of large firms, 
such as Goldman, which have enough traders to execute such trades without using the 	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computer system.”278 In other words, Goldman wanted to restrict use of the DOT 
technology because it evened out network differentials among all the large firms, 
making markets more efficient and thus reducing opportunities for arbitrage. In the 
absence of the DOT, Goldman could use the advantageous network differential between 
its human network and the human networks of other, smaller and less well connected 
firms, to successfully simulate instantaneity better than those firms could without access 
to the DOT. Goldman’s request demonstrates that successful arbitrage doesn’t depend 
on absolute speed but on simulating instantaneity under whatever the given 
technological conditions. In this case, restricting communal access to the DOT system 
would have benefited Goldman because it would have reduced market efficiency and 
allowed the firm to profit from being fastest at using the older, slower telephone ordering 
system.  
High Frequency Trading 
Instantaneous arbitrage is never truly possible, but simulated instantaneity allows 
some arbitrageurs to profit as if it were. It follows that the ultimate goal of arbitrageurs is 
to simulate instantaneity, either through network differentials or through price 
stabilization, better than anyone else. For network differentials, there is today an arms 
race fought in the realm of emerging technologies. For example, latency arbitrage, a 
form of high frequency trading (HFT), utilizes network differentials between high speed 
networks of superfast fiber optic cables and computer algorithms on the one hand, and 
the slower electronic trading systems of exchanges on the other. A large buy or sell 	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order for a stock will decrease or increase supply and thus increase or decrease price. 
Latency arbitrage anticipates these changes before the trade actually reaches a central 
electronic clearing house and a new price is calculated and distributed electronically.279 
Arbitrageurs can sell short at the current price knowing that once the new price is 
calculated, they can buy the stocks at the new lower price. Latency arbitrage 
guarantees a profit to those arbitrageurs who are able to, in effect, see the future, to 
know what the price will be fractions of a second before the price actually changes. 
Their profit is guaranteed because they trade in the fractions of a second between a 
price changing event and a change in price, i.e. nearly instantaneously.  
The network differentials utilized for successful latency arbitrage depend on the 
speed of communication technologies to give one arbitrageur an advantage over the 
slower electronic trading systems, but also over other arbitrageurs. If a faster latency 
arbitrageur buys up all available stock for an anticipated trade before any others, no one 
else can profit. Therefore, there is a constant push to increase speed to stay ahead of 
other traders. MacKenzie et al. point out that “high-frequency trading firms rent space 
for their computer servers in the same building as an exchange’s,” a practice known as 
co-location.280 One particular high-frequency trader commissioned a new fiber optic 
cable between Chicago and New York for the purposes of arbitrage, drilling through the 
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Allegheny Mountains to achieve the most direct route. The cable shaved “1.3 
milliseconds off the previously fastest one-way time.”281  
As more and more high-frequency traders use new, fast communication 
technologies, they increase market efficiency, as evidenced by the increased liquidity 
and lowered bid-ask spreads evident in many markets since the inception of HFT. This 
diffusion also, however, decreases arbitrage opportunities by evening out previously 
advantageous network differentials. The result is that many high frequency traders are 
now unable to gain a significant advantage. According to Matthew Phillips at Bloomberg 
Businessweek, the profitability of HFT is declining because high-speed algorithms and 
co-location have become too common in the market. Since 2011, the volume and profit 
margin of HFT have both been halved. Many HFT firms have shut down, and the 
remaining firms make a fraction what traditional investment firms make.282 The result, 
along with decreasing profits, is a more frantic search for the next fastest method of 
simulating instantaneity.  
This race for new network differentials for latency arbitrage seems to be reaching 
its own limit point. High frequency traders already rely on both fiber optic connections 
and networks of microwave dishes to transmit signals as quickly as possible between 
exchanges. Financial engineering firm Anova, in partnership with military contractor 
AOptix, has already completed a laser network connection between exchanges in 	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London and Frankfurt and is set to construct another connecting the NYSE with the 
NASDAQ. The new laser network will shave nanoseconds off the current connection 
between the two exchanges for a cost of several billion dollars.283  
Similarly, financial journalist Bruce Dorminey claims that physicists are 
developing technology that would be able to transmit encoded neutrinos between 
particle accelerators and they see an application in transmitting financial information 
over long distances.284 According to the J.P. Morgan Chase options trader Dorminey 
interviewed for the piece, many firms would be willing to pay for the average 30 
millisecond advantage the technology would afford for the purposes of international 
arbitrage.285 
 Falling profits to high frequency traders do not suggest that latency arbitrage will 
die off completely, but that there is more competition for the trades that are available 
because simulating instantaneity at the expense of other arbitrageurs has become more 
difficult. To be assured of success, arbitrageurs most hope for new ways to achieve 
advantageous network differentials, for example with lasers or particle accelerators. 
Technologically simulated instantaneity is only ever fleeting. As soon as new 	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technologies are available to many players, previously advantageous network 
differentials dissolve. 
Money Machine Arbitrage 
Not all simulated instantaneity is fleeting. In this final section, I will discuss money 
machines, arbitrage trades that depend on structural price inequalities that do not 
converge over time under the pressures of supply and demand. An illustrative case of 
money machine arbitrage comes not from the world of finance but instead from the 
world of petty crime. As of 2014, the per pack tax on cigarettes in New York state was 
$4.35. The per pack tax in several southern states was less that $.50 per pack.286 It 
should not be surprising, then, that nearly 60% of cigarettes sold in New York are 
“smuggled” in by arbitrageurs who buy them in southern states and drive them to New 
York.287 While journalists and politicians might refer to these traders as criminals or 
even “gangsters”288 they are in fact executing an arbitrage trade. 
(http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21567111-when-government-gets-
greedy-some-people-turn-crime-urge-smurf). The cigarette arbitrageur utilizes structural 
inequalities in prices set up by differing tax law in different states that force prices to be 	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uneven. This is a form of lasting price stabilization that is achieved not be derivatives 
contracts but by regulatory authorities. 
Arbitrage proposes equivalence across contexts, and in many cases, if 
successful, it actualizes that equivalence, bringing both prices into parity through the 
dynamic of supply and demand. In the case of money machine arbitrage, this effect is 
restricted. The difference in tax rates represents a kind of short circuit in the contextual 
pricing of cigarettes. Successful cigarette arbitrage (this criminal industry supposedly 
costs governments $10 billion a year) nonetheless does not equalize prices, meaning 
that the opportunity for profit from the arbitrage is perpetual.289 It is a veritable money 
machine, churning out profit to any arbitrageur who undertakes it. Of course, in the case 
of cigarette arbitrage, there is a deterrent for would be arbitrageurs – the practice is 
illegal. The regulatory matrix of state tax law that sets up the money machine is also 
invested in not allowing it to function. New York State wants the tax dollars that come 
from legal cigarette sales, which it misses out on when “gangsters” sell their illegal 
cartons. However, not all money machine arbitrage trades are outlawed. I will argue in 
chapter six that one of the central mechanisms that precipitated the 2007-9 financial 
crisis was a money machine arbitrage in subprime mortgage-backed securities. Like 
cigarette arbitrage it relied on a regulatory matrix of structural price inequalities. Unlike 
cigarette arbitrage, the money machine did eventually break down.  
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Conclusion 
 The success of arbitrage depends upon the ability of arbitrageurs to control time 
contingency by simulating instantaneity. Instantaneity can be simulated through network 
differentials or price stabilization. Network differentials allow faster arbitrageurs to profit 
at the expense of others, but are often evened out by the diffusion of communication 
technologies. As a result, price parity and market efficiency increase, even while the 
availability of arbitrage decreases. Arbitrageurs must always seek new technologies to 
create advantageous network differentials. At the opposite end of the spectrum is 
money machine arbitrage in which price stabilization is structural and lasting.  
This account of arbitrage differs considerably from economic accounts of riskless 
buying and selling. Financial economic accounts of arbitrage foreground its efficiency 
producing effects, framing it as a benevolent, policing force that makes prices fair for 
everyone. The alternative account I have suggested frames arbitrage as a battle and 
perpetual race to game the system, to find new ways of capturing value at the expense 
of others (the opposite of fairness). In this account, efficiency is an unwanted side effect 
that limits profit making ability, not the driving force of trading.  
 The public service image of arbitrage suggested by financial economics also 
contradicts the historical record of actual arbitrage trading. In each of the examples 
provided in this chapter, the specific arbitrage was vilified or outright banned. Domestic 
shunting was effectively banned by the New York Stock Exchange in 1898.290 The 
greatest grievance against arbitrageurs appears to have been that brokers who assisted 	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one another with arbitrage on two exchanges did not charge each other commissions 
but instead “shared the costs incurred, dividing any profits or losses resulting”, a clear 
violation of the exchange’s rules.291 The Governing Committee of the NYSE eventually 
settled on a “prohibition on sending continuous quotations” from the floor of the 
exchange via telephone, which effectively curtailed domestic arbitrage by brokers who 
then had to rely on the slower, riskier, technology of the ticker.292 
 I have already discussed the suspicion surrounding program trading and its 
contributions to stock market volatility. The 50-point “collar” that the NYSE imposed on 
program trading effectively curtailed the most profitable index arbitrage trades, as the 
latter relied upon volatility for intermittent fluctuations in spot-futures parity. Latency 
arbitrage has received similar scrutiny and hostility for promoting volatility and harming 
investors. High frequency trading is the new bogeyman of stock market investing. The 
2010 “Flash Crash” was blamed on high frequency traders and in 2013, a contributor to 
CNNMoney claimed that latency arbitrage leaches billions of dollars from “unwitting 
investors.”293  
 Arbitrage is characterized as a battle to find new, better ways of gaming the 
system for profit, a battle that has been historically decried as unfair and banned 	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multiple times by popular observers. This resonates with the idea, raised in chapter two, 
that arbitrage is exploitative. In the capture framework, arbitrage profit is not a mere 
error or mathematical excess that accrues to arbitrageurs engaged in the public service 
of making markets efficient, it is value, transformed from social mattering and captured 
by arbitrageurs. But, who wins and who loses in this battle? Is it exploitation only of 
other arbitrageurs? Are buy-and-hold investors the losers? What remains in the project 
of redefining and reframing arbitrage is to seriously examine the exploitation of 
arbitrage. In the next chapter, I take up that task.  
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CHAPTER 5: ARBITRAGE AND THE AXIOMATIC 
In the last two chapters, I endeavored to support the claim that arbitrage is the 
form of surplus value appropriation unique to finance. In this chapter, I offer and support 
the second central claim of this dissertation, that arbitrage profit is the result of the 
organization of the system of finance, not the activities of individual arbitrageurs. This 
claim suggests that while arbitrage is, like the exploitation that results in surplus value 
appropriation in industrial capitalism, an apparatus of capture, something more is 
needed to understand how that exploitation works.  
This claim is predicated on the fact that there is more than one theory of capitalist 
exploitation. In particular, Postone distinguishes between what he calls the “traditional” 
Marxist critique of exploitation and his own critique of “abstract domination.”294 In the 
traditional critique of exploitation the inequalities of capitalism are reduced to 
exploitation as the theft of value. Under this interpretation, redistribution that returns the 
products of labor back to workers would correct the inequality. Postone convincingly 
argues that the traditional critique misses the “abstract domination” at the heart of 
capitalism by focusing solely on the distribution of value. He writes, “Capitalism is a 
system of abstract, impersonal domination. Relative to earlier social forms, people 
appear to be independent; but they actually are subject to a system of social domination 
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that seems not social but ‘objective.’”295 This abstract domination is found in the labor 
relation in which individuals are forced to sell their labor as a condition of survival and in 
the service of value production. Thus, the true location of domination in capitalism is not 
in the appropriation of surplus value, but in the system of social relations that produces 
labor value as the source of wealth.  
In the last chapter, I began describe the social relations that produce financial 
value and support arbitrage as the form of value capture in finance when I described the 
way that powerful financial firms confront each other in a battle and perpetual race to 
game the system, to find new ways of executing trades at the expense of others. But 
there is a larger and more complex system of abstract domination at work in finance that 
requires examination. In this chapter, I suggest that the notion of the axiomatic, a final 
piece of Grossberg et al.’s capture framework, provides the analytical tools to examine 
the system of social relations that make arbitrage the form of value capture in financial 
capitalism.296 Understanding arbitrage profit requires an understanding of the axiomatic 
of finance, not simply an accounting of arbitrage trades.  
To make this claim, I first revisit Postone’s critique of traditional Marxism in more 
depth, making the case that his critique can be understood as a call to examine the 
axiomatic of industrial capitalism. Second, I present the concept of the axiomatic, 
drawing upon Grossberg et al. and Deleuze and Guattari’s original writing on the 
subject. Third, I briefly meditate on the impact of Grossberg et al.’s entire framework, 	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encompassing value transformations, capture and the axiomatic, for understanding 
value broadly. Finally, I suggest that a critique of the political economy of finance is 
possible through an examination of the axiomatic that supports arbitrage as the 
apparatus of capture of finance.  
Postone’s Critique of Traditional Marxism 
To explain the axiomatic, I’ll return briefly to the work of Postone in Time, Labor, 
and Social Domination. According to Postone, traditional Marxist critiques of capitalism 
focus on the mode of distribution. The mode of production is not considered a problem 
and capitalist exploitation can be overcome with “a new, just, and rationally regulated 
mode of distribution”, one that distributes the products of labor back to workers.297 
However, Postone believes that traditional Marxism misreads Marx’s critique of political 
economy. For Postone, Marx was not focused on exposing the exploitation of the labor 
relation in particular (a critique of capitalism from the standpoint of labor) but was 
instead attempting to demystify the “abstract domination” of the labor relation as a form 
of social mediation.298   
This abstract domination is found in the labor relation in which individuals are 
forced to sell their labor as a condition of survival and in the service of value production. 
Thus, the true location of domination in capitalism is not in the appropriation of surplus 
value, but in the system of social relations that produces labor value as the source of 
wealth. As Geoff Mann puts it in his discussion of Postone, “Capitalism is worthy of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 Postone, Time, Labor, 8. 
298 Ibid., 127. 
 	   152 
critique not, principally, because labour does not get enough of the value ‘produced’; 
capitalism is worthy of critique because, in it, labour is condemned to the production of 
value.”299 
Postone reinterprets Marx’s critique of capitalism as an in depth explanation and 
critique not of the appropriation of surplus value (the focus of ”traditional Marxism”), but 
of the social relations of abstract domination embodied in the category of value.300 
Postone suggests that Marx’s objective was to describe the broader system in which 
labor is not the sole source of wealth, but the form of social mediation that defines 
wealth in capitalism as value produced by labor. Another way to describe Postone’s 
critique is to say that traditional Marxist critiques of exploitation focus too much on the 
process of capture itself and neglect the axiomatic.301  
The axiomatic is a way of understanding the complex rules and social relations 
that enable capture. Grossberg et al. borrow the term from Deleuze and Guattari who 
give a lengthy exposition of the term with regard to industrial capitalism.302 They claim 
that capitalism is defined “by a social axiomatic that stands opposed to codes in every 
respect.”303 An axiomatic thus consists of two parts. First, it is a set of axioms that are 	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not codes or meanings, not “ideological formulas but operative statements… primary 
statements, which do not derive from or depend upon another statement.”304 Second, it 
is a set of social relations that are built upon those statements. The unity of the 
axiomatic is the complex system of regulative statements and social relations that 
enable capture. Each apparatus of capture is necessarily bound up with an axiomatic. 
Labor value capture has its own axiomatic. Deleuze and Guattari write, “Marx 
demonstrated the functioning of capitalism as an axiomatic.”305 Other forms of capture 
likewise have their own, different, axiomatics. 
Axioms and Social Relations 
The set of axioms primarily direct flows of value towards and through the process 
of capture. In this way, they play a regulative role. Deleuze and Guattari explain this role 
with regards to industrial capitalism. They highlight the association of axioms with the 
State: “the capitalist State is the regulator of decoded flows as such, insofar as they are 
caught up in the axiomatic of capital.”306 Various initiatives and arms of the state play 
roles in the production of axioms, in particular economics.307 So, for example, Deleuze 
and Guattari say, “Keynesian economics and the New Deal were axiom laboratories.”308 	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They also claim that “there is a tendency within capitalism continually to add more 
axioms”309 and that as these axioms are added, “The State is thus induced to play an 
increasingly important role in the regulation of the axiomatized flows.”310  
Grossberg et al. build upon this analysis to suggest that the axioms and the 
social relations that constitute axiomatics interact in specific ways. In particular, axioms 
are able to direct flows of value precisely by regulating the social mattering that remains 
through the failure of previous transformations of value. It is worth quoting this argument 
at length: 
axioms set up the “rules” that distribute sets of divided but not differentiated units, 
such that one set can be smaller than another and capture can take place. 
But such axioms always inscribe the very failure of that capture. This is 
possible only because earlier (in formal, not in temporal terms) processes of 
deterritorialization, decoding, abstraction, and so on, are never complete, never 
entirely successful… Axiomatics allow the necessary and strategic failures of 
“earlier” transformation processes to be articulated into the process of capture 
itself… the axiomatic… reintroduces obligation—gathered up from the failures of 
other processes—back into the materiality of social relations, and hence back 
into the ongoing transformations and calculations of value. That is, it 
reconstitutes social reality as a structure of feeling, an organization of social 
relations. If decoding, unitization and flow remove all meaningfulness from the 
commodity, the axiomatic strategically reintroduces obligation precisely where it 
has been seemingly evacuated. The axiomatic establishes affectively organized 
regimes of behavior without which capitalism itself would fail. The axiomatic 
defines a particular instantiation of capitalist value (capture) even as it limits the 
extent to which the logic of capture can be lived.311 
The rules that allow capture to function are thus directed in part to the regulation of 
social mattering that escapes complete evacuation by the processes of value 	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transformation. Think for instance of the social mattering surrounding labor. Even as 
labor time is decoded and unitized, so many aspects of workers lives and bodies 
escape complete transformation. Industrial capitalist capture rests on this contradiction. 
It requires both the evacuation of social mattering in values through decoding-
unitization-flow but also that labor be performed by workers who must necessarily 
remain social individuals capable of reproducing themselves and continuing to feed the 
apparatus of capture. Labor continues to bear innumerable codes of extra-capitalist 
meaning. In order for labor value capture to be successful, it is these remnants of social 
mattering that must be regulated. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari can claim that axioms 
“dealing with the working class, employment, union organization, social institutions” 
were all necessary for, not opposed to, capture.312 The axiomatic is the system in which 
that contradiction is worked out through regulative axioms and the social relations built 
upon them. 
Grossberg et al. suggest that this paradoxical function of the axiomatic makes it 
vulnerable. Even though axioms are taken-for-granted, primary statements that enable 
capture, “this reintroduction of obligation, of a disembedded obligation to be sure, 
means there is always something—something affective—that is not captured by the 
axiomatic… a lived experience of obligation is always threatening to disrupt and even 
overwhelm the axiomatic, and this defines the axiomatic as a site of constant struggle 
and transformation.”313 The axiomatic is the site where challenges to capitalist capture 	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can take place. Deleuze and Guattari also suggest that the struggle against capitalism 
must be fought at the level of the axiomatic.314 The axiomatic, as the context of capture, 
is always in flux as it adjusts to the exigencies of the changing conditions of social and 
physical existence by adding and subtracting axioms. This flux is an opportunity for 
struggle to take hold.  
A Contextual Theory of Value 
The framework presented in Grossberg et al. has implications not only for 
understanding arbitrage, but also for rethinking value more generally. Grossberg et al.’s 
insights suggest that the determination of price is indeed contextual and that the 
axiomatic defines that context in capitalism. Quite unlike both Marx’s theory of value in 
which prices only reflect value in the aggregate (complete with the “transformation 
problem” this theory spawned)315 and the neoclassical formulation of value as subjective 
and price as the equilibrium solution to differing subjective valuations, a contextual 
theory of value rejects the notion of price as distorting value or values. Price is the 
expression of struggles over valuation, and, importantly, in capitalism, those struggles 
are determined by the axiomatic. 
Value is the incarnation of social mattering. The transformations of that social 
mattering that make it economic value express the relation between social mattering 
and price. Price is contextually determined by social relations and ongoing struggles 
over how to collectively value things. Price does not perfectly reflect the social mattering 	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of commodities at every moment at the level of economic value, but it is determined by 
struggles over that mattering. Thus, at the level of the economic, price and value are 
related but not identical. 
The process of capture, however, claims decoded-unitized commodities and 
entirely strips the social mattering that once anchored them, defining their prices purely 
in terms of its own rules and relations, i.e. the axiomatic. Through the process of 
decoding-unitization-flow, the apparatus of capture severs the connection between 
social mattering and price, producing prices that are determined by the axiomatic 
instead. Capitalist value therefore is price, and the capitalist axiomatic determines that 
price. The only social mattering involved in the determination of capitalist price-value is 
the forms of obligation that are strategically reintroduced to secure capture. Capture 
short-circuits the social process of price formation by replacing social context with its 
own axiomatic. The struggles over what something is worth run up against a stifling 
roadblock in capitalism in the axiomatic 
Judgments about prices that appear “wrong” or that seem to represent “fictitious” 
values within capitalism actually reflect struggles over the power of the axiomatic to 
evacuate the role of the social in determining value. The notion that financial securities 
shouldn’t count as valuable (i.e. are fictitious) is an assault on the financial apparatus of 
capture in which these securities are valuable for their role in capture rather than their 
social importance. Outside of that apparatus, the social mattering of these securities can 
be debated and challenged; their prices shifted by those struggles. However, within the 
apparatus of capture, prices remain independent of these struggles to the extent that 
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latter do not directly engage the axiomatic. The one route for struggles over prices is the 
same route for challenges to capitalism, through the axiomatic and its strategic 
deployment of obligation.  
A Critique of the Political Economy of Finance 
Postone’s Time, Labor and Social Domination can be read as a claim that Marx’s 
writings were an attempt to grapple with and critique the complex axiomatic of industrial 
capitalism, not simply a critique of surplus value appropriation as exploitation. I argued 
in the previous chapter that arbitrage must also not be seen as too simple a form of 
exploitation. Although it involves uneven relations of power and profit, arbitrage is, like 
labor value capture, more complex. The capture framework provided by Grossberg et al. 
does not provide an answer to the question of where arbitrage profit comes from, 
precisely because it disqualifies the question. The source of arbitrage profit is not to be 
sought in balance sheet calculations of the capture that takes place, for instance of the 
percent dilution in mutual funds due to market timing, but instead in the conditions that 
make capture possible. The concept of the axiomatic reveals that understanding 
arbitrage profit requires a demystification of the social relations and taken-for-granted 
axioms of financial capitalism. And struggle against capture must be directed to the 
axioms that shape the social relations (for instance, between buy-and-hold investors 
and arbitrageurs) that we see as exploitative.   
To understand arbitrage profit, therefore, a broader set of questions must be 
engaged. What is the axiomatic of arbitrage capture? What are the taken-for-granted, 
primary axioms that enable and enforce the validity of arbitrage? How can we identify 
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times of change or flux in the axiomatic as moments of opportunity to fight or orient new 
or shifting axioms? What is required, in homage not only to Marx, but also Postone and 
Deleuze and Guattari, is a critique of the political economy of finance.  
Conclusion 
Grossberg et al. also elaborate the important concept of the axiomatic, which can 
be used to analyze the conditions of capture without falling into “traditional” critiques of 
exploitation. Instead of locating the injustice of capitalism in the moment of 
appropriation, the axiomatic shows that there is a set of taken-for-granted rules that not 
only make capture possible, but also make the monopolistic appropriation of value (by 
industrial capitalists or arbitrageurs) the only form of distribution possible in a capitalist 
system. From this perspective, arbitrage is not cheating or theft, but the result of the 
organization of the axiomatic. Challenging the exploitative nature of arbitrage can only 
happen through a process of demystifying the axiomatic of finance and directing 
transformative action to the flux, the addition and subtraction, of axioms.  
The contemporary financial system is built upon a complex axiomatic, one that is 
different from the one Marx attempted to describe even if they share some formal 
structure. The axiomatic of financial capitalism also has been and continues to be, like 
the axiomatic of industrial capitalism, in a state of complicated flux. While a full 
description of this axiomatic and critique of the political economy of finance is obviously 
beyond the scope of this dissertation, in the final chapter I employ the concept of the 
axiomatic to critique the process of capture involved in the financial market for subprime 
mortgage-backed securities in the run up to the recent financial crisis. The highly 
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profitable arbitrage trade that produced this enormous market relied on forms of 
regulatory price stabilization that will reveal some broader facts about the functioning of 
the financial axiomatic and about arbitrage as the financial apparatus of capture. It was 
also a trade that failed spectacularly, and that failure was a time of extreme flux in the 
financial axiomatic. With the benefit of hindsight, I will pay special attention to whether 
and how challenges to the axiomatic were made at that time and with what result, in the 
hopes that this analysis will reveal possibilities for future challenge.  
  
 	   161 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: ARBITRAGE AND THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS 
Arbitrage is the apparatus of capture specific to financial capitalism. That does 
not mean that arbitrage is the sole source of capitalist profit or that financial capitalism 
has replaced all other forms of capitalism. Indeed, capture provides a unique analytical 
tool with which to parse contemporary capitalism into distinct if overlapping and 
articulated capitalisms. The contemporary U.S. economy (itself an arbitrary selection of 
contextual boundaries and metrics) is defined by the intersection of several forms of 
capitalism, with unique but articulated apparatuses of capture, including but not limited 
to both financial and industrial capture, to say nothing of the myriad non-capitalist 
economic formations that also coexist with it.316 
Reframing capitalist economies as constituted by different forms of capture 
demonstrates how great and troubling is the gap in scholarly understanding surrounding 
financial capitalism. Finance, in regards to capitalism as a whole, is characterized both 
in mainstream neoclassical treatments and Marxist accounts as an adjunct to real 
production or, if central to the economy, still a realm of fictitious capital. The framework 
provided by Grossberg et al. allows finance to be reframed as a full and complete form 
of capitalism with its own unique form of capture (arbitrage) and axiomatic that is 
articulated in complex ways to other capitalist and non-capitalist economic systems. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316 J.K. Gibson-Graham, The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It): A Feminist Critique of 
Political Economy (Cambridge, M.A.: Blackwell Publishers, 1996).  
 	   162 
As I suggested in the last chapter, in order to understand finance as a capitalist 
form and arbitrage as the particular practice of financial capture, what is needed is a 
critique of the political economy of finance: an unpacking not only of the mechanism of 
capture in arbitrage, but even more importantly, of the taken-for-granted, primary 
axioms and social relations that enable and enforce the success of arbitrage. I claimed 
that a simple accounting of who profits and how is not enough as such an accounting 
leads to characterizations of arbitrage as simple exploitation in the style of the 
“traditional Marxism” condemned by Moishe Postone. Like Postone’s insight into the 
abstract domination of industrial capitalism, a critique of the political economy of finance 
must uncover the rules that create uneven relationships of power in which arbitrage 
delivers profits to some and not others.  
The axiomatic of finance includes all of those axioms and the social relations that 
make finance not only a mechanism of capture but a unique social system. Axioms 
direct flows of social mattering so that the apparatus of capture can function. In this 
chapter, I begin the task of explaining the axiomatic of finance by examining the 
mechanics of a particular and very important arbitrage trade. In the run up to the 2007-
09 financial crisis, arbitrageurs adapted a strategy known as securitization, whereby 
loan originators transform mortgages into financial securities and sell them to investors, 
to their purposes. Securitization, the history of which I will address below, seems to 
have originated as a way to increase lending and transfer credit risk to “capital market 
investors willing to hold the risk” (Jaffee et al., 68). Arbitrageurs, however, created 
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sophisticated securitization trades for the purpose of capturing value through the 
transaction.  
Examining the mechanism of capture in mortgage securitization and in particular 
the arbitrage in second-order securitizations known as collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs) offers an excellent way to begin the critique of the political economy of finance. 
The arbitrage delivered billions of dollars in profit to arbitrageurs in the early 2000s 
based on the subprime mortgages of borrowers who would eventually face defaults and 
foreclosures on an unprecedented scale. The juxtaposition of extreme profit for 
arbitrageurs and financial crisis for borrowers, and eventually workers as well after the 
crisis precipitated a deep recession, suggests that the arbitrage trade was exploitative. 
But that exploitation was only possible because of the rules and social relations, i.e. the 
axiomatic, supporting the securitization process. The subprime mortgage CDO arbitrage 
can serve as a case study of a distinctly financial apparatus of capture and the financial 
axiomatic.  
What’s more, the financial crisis corresponded to a spectacular failure of this 
particular apparatus of capture. This crisis was a time of great flux in the capitalist 
axiomatic. The value of subprime CDOs plummeted, too-big-to-fail banks went bankrupt 
or were acquired by other firms, popular outrage at financial firms spurred the Occupy 
Wall Street movement and new regulations were suggested.317 In addition, the subprime 
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mortgage CDO apparatus of capture was effectively destroyed in the crisis; the creation 
of CDOs backed by subprime mortgages has never recovered to pre-crisis levels. 
However, the question remains as to whether the broader financial axiomatic was 
significantly changed during this time of flux.   
In this chapter, first detail the arbitrage in subprime mortgage-backed CDOs, a 
trade I characterize as one of the “money machine” arbitrages described in chapter four, 
because it relied on structural inequalities rather than fleeting differences in price. Next, 
I reconstruct the historical context out of which this apparatus of capture emerged. In 
particular, I point to three developments over the last 50 years: the development of 
individual or everyday finance in which the provision of the everyday necessities of life is 
more and more dependent on direct or indirect participation in financial markets; the 
proliferation of derivatives; and the rise of mortgage securitization. These were 
necessary preconditions for the subprime mortgage CDO arbitrage trade. Third, I derive 
two axioms out of this context, the axiom that “the provision of security must be 
achieved by risk;” and the axiom of “risk and return.” By way of conclusion, I ask 
whether any responses to the financial crisis significantly engaged these axioms. 
Analyzing responses to the financial crisis can provide insight into how that axiomatic 
can be proactively shaped in future times of flux. 
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Subprime Mortgage CDO Arbitrage318 
The subprime mortgage CDO arbitrage was a complex trade that began with 
mortgages issued by banks to borrowers with low credit ratings. The designation 
“subprime” refers to the relative riskiness of these borrowers who must pay higher 
interest rates on their mortgages. The trade utilized financial securities based upon 
these mortgages. Subprime mortgaged-backed securities (MBS) were formed when the 
banks that originated the mortgages sold them to investment banks. These banks then 
bundled the mortgages together into a single pool of collateral and issued bonds—debt 
securities—to investors based on that collateral. The pool would receive income in the 
form of principal and interest payments to the constituent mortgages and this income 
would be passed through to investors.  
However, the income was not divided equally among all the bonds. There was 
risk that some mortgages in the pool would default and deliver less income than 
expected on the bonds. Like other private (i.e. those not issued by government-
sponsored entities such as the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)) 
MBS, subprime MBS bonds were divided into different levels of risk and return called 
tranches. The highest tranches, referred to as “senior” or “super senior,” got first priority 
in receiving the income from the collateral. If default occurred, they were least likely to 
be impacted. The bonds in the highest tranches were therefore considered low risk and, 
like any other financial security, paid a correspondingly low interest rate: low risk, low 	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allowed me to better understand the specific mechanics of the trade described in this 
section. 
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return. Lower tranches, referred to as mezzanine, junior and equity, would absorb the 
loss from default first. This risk was compensated by a higher interest rate. These bonds 
would forego the income in the event of a default in exchange for a higher rate of return 
if no default occurred. 
The risk of MBS was assessed by the same credit ratings agencies that graded 
more traditional forms of debt such as sovereign and corporate bonds. The ratings 
agencies were asked to assess the risk to each tranche of MBS and assign it a grade 
on the same scale as traditional bonds (AAA is safest followed by AA+, AA, AA-, A+, A, 
A-, BBB+, BBB, and so on all the way to CCC+).319 They used advanced mathematical 
models to predict the likelihood of default for each pool of mortgages that was 
securitized and then predict the level of default each tranche could withstand.320 
(Alchemy). The component mortgages in these deals were risky loans but they were 
also geographically diverse, so the models used by ratings agencies suggested that 
while some mortgages in a pool would default, the majority would not.321 Thus, a large 
proportion, typically around 80%, of the resultant securities were rated super safe or 
AAA.322 See Figure 1 below for an illustration of this process. Individual loans are 	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pooled into a collection of future cash flows. These cash flows are separated into 
tranches, each of which is rated based on its estimated default risk. The senior tranche 
highest on the “waterfall” receives the highest rating and is least likely to be affected by 
default.323 The deal illustrated is typical in that nearly 80% (79% in this case) of the 
resultant securities are rated AAA.  
 
Figure 1: Typical Subprime Mortgage Securitization (proportions taken from Ashcraft 
and Schuermann.324)  
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The subprime mortgage CDO arbitrage utilized the lower rated tranches of these 
subprime MBS deals to create second-order securitizations known as CDOs. CDOs 
were developed in the corporate bond market in the late 1980s.325 Like other 
securitizations, CDOs were created when an investment bank issued securities on a 
collateral pool of debt. In the case of CDOs, the issuing bank purchases risky debt in 
financial markets to construct a collateral pool against which it issues bonds. The first 
CDOs consisted of “junk” bonds: high risk, high yield corporate debt. But the volume 
and diversity of deals quickly grew to involve all kinds of debt including low-rated MBS 
but also home equity loans, credit card debt, student loans, corporate debt and even 
other CDO securities.  
Like subprime MBS, CDO bonds are also tranched according to their sensitivity 
to default and these tranches are given ratings by credit ratings agencies. Also like 
subprime MBS, a large proportion of CDO bonds, around 80%, gained the highest 
possible credit rating of AAA.326 Figure 2 illustrates a typical, multi-sector CDO deal (the 
collateral includes home equity loans, residential MBS and low rated bonds from other 
CDOs). The average risk rating of the collateral pool (left) is BB (mezzanine), while the 
average risk rating of the CDO securities is AAA (senior).  
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Figure 2: Typical Collateralized Debt Obligation Deal (proportions taken from Covey et 
al.327). 
Ratings agencies knew that the collateral pools of CDOs contained high-risk 
debt, but using the same mathematical models as they employed to rate first round, 
subprime MBS, the agencies rated these diversified CDO securities as mostly super 
safe. Benmelech and Dlugosz describe the CDO ratings process as a form of alchemy, 
since low rated bonds went into the collateral pool and high rated bonds came out.328  
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According to Vinod Kothari, CDOs are generally split into two categories 
depending on their purpose.329 Balance sheet CDOs are deals constructed in order to 
liquidate assets held on the balance sheet of a bank, often for the same reasons as first 
order securitizations: to sell off risky loans and thereby reduce regulatory capital, a topic 
I discuss in more depth below, and also to free up capital for more lending or investing. 
Arbitrage CDOs are usually created by firms other than banks for the purpose of 
capturing the difference in the rate of interest collected on the (risky, high yield) 
collateral debt of the CDO and the rate of interest paid on the CDO securities.330 CDO 
deals result in a large proportion of AAA-rated bonds on which investors expect a lower 
rate of return, resulting in a large difference or “spread” between the interest rate 
received on the high-yield collateral and the low interest rate paid on the majority AAA-
rated CDO bonds.  
The 2006 Lehman Brothers brochure on which Figure 2 is based illustrates 
exactly how CDO arbitrage occurs.331 The collateral pool of the CDO deal receives an 
average interest rate of 180 basis points (bp) (.018%). The CDOs liabilities, i.e. the 
securities it issues to investors, are nearly all rated AAA, so they pay a much lower 
yield, on average 49 bp. The “gross excess spread” is thus 131 bp. After the fees 
deducted by the originating firm (27 bp), a “net excess spread” of 104 bp exists on the 
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deal.332 This excess is delivered to the holder of the lowest, most risky tranche. The 
equity tranche, as it is called, is so risky that it is not rated; any defaults will immediately 
impact the equity tranche. While rated tranches are compensated with a rate of interest 
that is both attractive enough to incentivize investors but also is commensurate with 
their relative risk, the highly risky and unrated equity tranche is compensated with the 
entire excess spread. Equity generally takes up 3 to 8% of the face value of a CDO 
deal.333 Despite its small pay in, the equity receives around a 20% return on investment 
due to the net excess spread. This return is extremely large compared to other 
investments (the average annual return on the S&P 500 between 2000 and 2005 was 
nearly flat at .16%.334  
Because the equity tranche is the “first loss” piece of a CDO, purchasing it 
doesn’t seem to fit the economic definition of arbitrage as a trade that nets a riskless 
profit. However, as I have showed, the economic definition doesn’t describe the process 
of arbitrage well. Instead, arbitrage is best understood as a financial apparatus of 
capture. Figure 2 illustrates the correspondence between the subprime mortgage CDO 
arbitrage trade and steps of the capture process. First, the individual debt instruments 
that make up the collateral pool of a CDO, including MBS, home equity loans and bonds 
from other CDOs, are already deterritorialized sets of similar commodities sold in 
multiple financial markets. They are decoded and unitized by the securitization process. 	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Instead of remaining distinct securities with individual cash flows, they are pooled by the 
issuing bank into an undifferentiated collection of future cash flows.335 They are then 
divided, or unitized, into CDO securities and put into flow when they are sold to 
investors. The comparison is made possible by the proposal of equivalence between the 
collateral pool of the CDO and its issued bonds. When the CDO bonds are subjected to 
the same credit rating process as the debt comprising the collateral pool of the deal, 
they were marked with the same assessment of risk and thus made a part of the same 
market, but since each is backed by the same collateral, their equivalence is easily 
secured. The price differences that produce the excess spread that is captured by 
equity holders is produced by the “alchemy” of CDO rating that takes low rated, high 
yield bonds and transforms them into high rated, low yield bonds. The capture occurs 
when a portion of the payments to the original debt flows to the equity holders instead of 
being passed through as interest paid out on the new CDO securities. 
The CDO arbitrage occurs over time. As repayments are made to the collateral 
and then passed through to the CDO bonds, the excess interest is delivered, piece-by-
piece, to the equity holder. Thus, like other arbitrage trades, its success or failure 
depends upon the techniques used to simulate instantaneity and secure profits that are 
meted out over time. As I explained in chapter four, simulated instantaneity can occur 
through differential advantages in communication networks or techniques of price 	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stabilization. I also illustrated the concept of money machine arbitrage with the case of 
cigarette running from southern states to New York. In that case, the low taxes in 
southern states and high taxes in New York State are enduring structural differences 
that make the arbitrage profitable.  
The subprime mortgage CDO arbitrage practiced in the run up to the financial 
crisis was also a money machine in which structural inequalities created extreme and 
enduring price stabilization, allowing an arbitrage trade that continuously pumped out 
profits instead of closing over time due to the forces of supply and demand. In the case 
of subprime mortgage CDO arbitrage, the structural difference that constituted arbitrage 
profit was between the two interest rates. The interest rate stabilization that secured the 
CDO arbitrage profit as a continuous money machine was sedimented by the alchemy 
of CDO credit rating. The formulas used by credit rating agencies that rated CDOs as 
mostly AAA set up a structural difference between the interest rate received on the CDO 
collateral and the interest rate paid on the CDO bonds. In the Lehman Brothers example 
cited above, the average interest rate received on the CDO collateral was 180 bp, while 
the average rate paid to the rated tranches was 49 bp. The arbitrage between the two 
netted a profit of 104 bp after fees.336 
Although investment firms are not forthcoming with details of their arbitrage 
operations, there is evidence that the subprime mortgage CDO arbitrage trade netted 
billions in profits to arbitrageurs in the early 2000s. The Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association estimates that over $1 trillion worth of arbitrage CDOs were issued 	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between 2005 and 2007.337 An estimate of the arbitrage in these three years, based on 
the Lehman deal, would have netted around $11.5 billion in profit. In 2010, ProPublica 
detailed the activities of Magnetar Capital, a hedge fund that began aggressively buying 
up CDO equity in the spring of 2006, on the very edge of the credit crisis that would 
dissolve into the financial crisis.338 By one estimate, they held one third to one half of 
CDO equity tranches at that time, meaning that they were engaging in arbitrage by 
receiving the net excess spread on a huge proportion of CDO deals.339 According to the 
Wall Street Journal, this single fund made over $2 billion in 2007.340 
The subprime mortgage CDO arbitrage was an apparatus of capture delivering 
large profits to hedge funds and investment banks. But the reasons for its success are 
far from clear. In order for the money machine apparatus of capture to function, more 
and more arbitrage CDOs had to be created. This required a steady flow of subprime 
mortgage debt, the “alchemy” of credit ratings that could transform risky debt into safe 
investments, and investors to demand more and more AAA-rated CDO securities. 	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However, on its face, the trade is utterly irrational. Why would borrowers choose to pay 
exorbitant interest rates to purchase a home when they could rent? Why would credit 
ratings agencies give subprime MBS and CDOs such high ratings? Why would investors 
rush to purchase these bonds in such large amounts? The next section details the 
historical developments that provided these preconditions and explores the social 
relations among borrowers, banks, ratings agencies and investors that resulted.  
The Context 
The context in which the subprime mortgage CDO arbitrage emerged and 
became a successful apparatus of capture is constituted out of the articulation of three 
important developments that began in the mid-twentieth century: the rise of everyday 
finance, particularly of mortgage-funded homeownership; the emergence of a 
proliferating derivatives market; and the rise of securitization.  
Everyday Finance 
 In the middle of the twentieth century, everyday life became financialized in new 
ways, particularly with regards to saving and borrowing money. In the mid-1970s, the 
tradition of saving money in banks and thrifts was disrupted by the introduction of 
everyday investment products like money market accounts, mutual funds and individual 
retirement accounts such as the 401(k). These products gave savers access to higher 
interest rates during the “Great Inflation” of the late 1970s and early 1980s.341 Paul 
Langley explains that the move towards “everyday investment” was linked to a cultural 
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shift in attitudes towards risk.342 Deposit saving was driven by aversion to risk and the 
desire to keep money safe for future use, whereas everyday investment relies on the 
relationship between risk and reward wherein “those investors who are willing to take 
greater risks will be those who, on average, receive greater reward.”343  
The shift away from traditional saving towards individual engagement with 
financial markets through mutual funds and retirement accounts required individuals to 
take on risk in new ways, and also removed the burden of uncertain investing from 
traditional authorities such as the state and employers. The consequences for financial 
markets of increased individual investment in the last four decades are clear: more 
individual dollars risked on the markets increased both the fees that financial firms take 
for administering mutual funds and giving investment advice, and the volume of trade. 
As I already showed in chapter two, mutual funds can be the target of arbitrage in the 
form of market timing, meaning that individual investments feed directly into arbitrage 
capture. However, it was similar transformations in borrowing that impacted the specific 
apparatus of capture defined by the subprime mortgage CDO arbitrage. 
Debt is nothing new, and in fact in recent years scholars have argued that debt is 
at the foundation of monetary systems.344 For example, David Graeber argues that 
money emerged as way to settle debts in ancient times.345 Consumer debt in the form of 	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merchant credit and bank loans, including mortgages date back centuries.346 But the 
form and nature of consumer borrowing changed in significant ways in the twentieth 
century. In addition to steadily increasing rates of indebtedness, debt instruments have 
changed and proliferated with the introduction of credit cards, student loans, home 
equity loans, and more. Mortgages are a special example of the transformation of debt. 
Unlike other forms of borrowing that carry the negative stigma of imprudence and vice, 
mortgage-funded homeownership has been promoted within U.S. culture in the 
twentieth century, especially by the federal government, as a necessary tool of cultural 
mobility and financial gain.  
Prior to the Great Depression, mortgages where short term (5 to 10 years) and 
required large payments of principal at maturity.347 During the Depression, the inability 
of mortgage holders to refinance these short-term loans contributed to the downturn. 
Thus, the 30-year, fixed-rate mortgage was created (through a long process that 
culminated in 1948) as a way to forestall future crises.348 But even with the more 
attractive 30-year loan, the heights mortgage borrowing has reached in the U.S. is not 
the result of a natural appetite for debt or even entirely due to stagnating wages after 
the 1970s. Instead, borrowers have been actively created in the U.S. since the 
aftermath of the Great Depression. From 1934 to the present the U.S. government has 	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continuously created initiatives and institutions to help support mortgage-funded 
homeownership at the expense of lending regulations and underwriting standards. 
Some of these actions include the creation of organizations like the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) in 1934 and the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) in 1965, and the GSEs, Fannie Mae in 1938, the Government National Mortgage 
Association (Ginnie Mae) in 1968 and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(Freddie Mac) in 1970;349 but also initiatives like the Community Reinvestment Act of 
1977, President Clinton’s 1995 National Homeownership Strategy Initiative, and 
President George W. Bush’s 2002 American Dream Downpayment Initiative.350  
These deregulatory initiatives promoted mortgages and homeownership and 
stimulated Americans to become borrowers. In addition, government initiatives 
coalesced with growing suburban sprawl to redefine mortgages as a necessary 
stepping-stone in the path of the American Dream. The result was an enormous 
increase in mortgage borrowing. Between 1949 and 2001, outstanding mortgage debt 
rose from $31 billion to over $13 trillion dollars and from 20% to 73% of total household 
income.351  	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Mortgages weren’t just sanctioned tools of cultural mobility, but also, like forms of 
everyday investing, ways to take on risk for the purpose of individual financial gain. 
Between 1950 and 2007, real, inflation-adjusted housing prices in the U.S. nearly 
doubled, with much of the growth happening since the turn of the millennium.352 In 
addition, from the 1980s until the financial crisis, mortgages rates fell below the rate of 
appreciation in home values, meaning that mortgage-financed homeownership allowed 
borrowers to rapidly build equity in an amount directly proportional to the difference 
between the rate of interest paid on the mortgage and the appreciation of home values. 
This equity could be cashed in by borrowers selling their homes or taking out home 
equity loans. In this context, mortgages were actually investment tools that allowed 
borrowers to take on risk (that they could default and lose the home) in order to seek 
return (in the form of equity). Even riskier loans like adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), 
in which the rate of interest could be raised or lowered at specific intervals, and 
subprime loans with high interest rates, just extended this investment opportunity to 
lower income and less creditworthy borrowers.353 
The emergence of everyday finance contributed to the context in which CDO 
arbitrage took place by stimulating subprime mortgage borrowing and framing it as a 
tool of cultural mobility and financial gain. This borrowing was further reinforced by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/mortoutstand/frb_mdo_historical.cs
v.  
352 Neil Fligstein and Adam Goldstein, “The Roots of the Great Recession,” in The Great 
Recession, eds. David B. Grusky, Bruce Western and Christopher Wimer (New York: 
Russell Sage, 2011), 24.  
353 United States, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 106.  
 	   180 
investor demand for mortgage securities. But before discussing securitization, I must 
describe a development without which securitization could not have flourished: the 
proliferation of financial derivatives.  
Derivatives 
Although derivatives—financial contracts and assets whose value is derived from 
the value of some other financial asset—are not new, several developments in the 
1970s produced a fundamental change in and proliferation of derivative forms. First, 
although derivatives existed, chief among them contracts for future delivery (futures), 
options to buy stock issued by corporations (warrants) and options to buy and sell stock 
issued by private traders (options), they were frowned upon as instruments of 
speculation and the latter two, warrants and options, were notoriously difficult to price. 
Because the prices of stocks were unpredictable, especially in the short-term, valuations 
of warrants and options were subjective and did not lend themselves to robust markets 
for either. As I explained in the first chapter, that all changed when Black, Scholes and 
Merton produced their options pricing formula in 1973, the same year that the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange became the first regulated exchange for trading stock 
options.354 The formula successfully “undermined the long-standing cultural association 
between options and gambling” and helped produce consensus around the pricing of 
options, allowing for the development of a coherent and active market.355 
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Second, the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1971 created a new 
financial problem for which derivatives came to function as a revolutionary solution. The 
collapse of Bretton Woods moved the world from a system of fixed exchange rates 
pegged to the gold-convertible dollar to floating exchange rates.356 Producers and 
speculators alike could no longer count on their investments or trades paying off 
because of the risk that exchange rates would turn against them over time. This risk 
was addressed through the use of derivatives. As Lawrence Grossberg writes, “it is not 
coincidental that derivatives emerged—in their present form… after the collapse of 
Bretton Woods.”357  
Bryan and Rafferty convincingly argue that after Bretton Woods, “the central 
problem of the global financial system is commensuration: how, in the absence of a 
global value unit such as gold… can one form of capital be exchanged for another… at 
a rate that is predictable and sustainable.”358 Their answer is that financial derivatives 
anchor prices in the world of free-floating exchange rates. For example, a currency 
futures contract allows each party to know in advance what exchange rate they will be 
subject to at expiration. More broadly, “each derivative product is a package of 
conversion of one form of capital to another… taken together, they form a complex web 
of conversions, in which any ‘bit’ of capital, anywhere and with any time profile, can be 
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measured against any other ‘bit’ of capital.”359 In other words, derivatives solve the 
problem of a lack of a universal equivalent.360  
This function of derivatives is evident in several developments in futures and 
options exchanges in the 1970s. Currency futures were introduced on the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange in 1972.361 In 1975, the Chicago Board of Trade introduced the 
first interest rate futures contract on mortgage-backed bonds issued by Ginnie Mae.362 
Futures on Treasuries followed two years later and in the last 40 years, financial futures 
and options, both exchange traded and over-the-counter, have proliferated further.363 
This proliferation was in some ways enabled by the BSM pricing formula, but 
necessitated by the end of the Bretton Woods system. 
Finally, the enormous expansion in derivatives markets since the 1970s was 
enabled by technological change: the rise of electronic trading in stock and derivatives 
markets has allowed growth in those markets that couldn’t otherwise occur. As 
chronicled by Caitlin Zaloom in Out of the Pits, the electronic trading of derivatives that 
began in the 1990s increased the volume and speed of trading dramatically.364 Although 
the majority of derivatives are still traded over-the-counter, in one-off deals brokered via 	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older technologies like the telephone and computer messaging, the impact of electronic 
trading has been enormous.  
The expansion and proliferation of derivatives markets played an important role 
in setting up the context in which the subprime mortgage CDO arbitrage became a 
successful apparatus of capture, particularly through the development of swaps. Swaps 
are a class of over-the-counter derivatives that, as the name suggests, allows two 
parties to exchange a series of cash flows. The interest rate swap, which was first 
traded in the early 1980s, involves one party agreeing to pay another regular payments 
at a certain fixed rate of interest in exchange for payments at a floating rate. 365 Banks, 
for example, may use interest rate swaps to hedge the risk that interest rates will 
increase over time when the income from fixed rate loans they originated in the past 
does not. However, the principal amount on which the rates are calculated need not be 
held by either party.  
Credit default swaps (CDS) are a more recent invention of the 1990s that function 
more like insurance.366 One party “sells” the swap, promising that if a default on a 
particular debt occurs, he will provide the buyer of the swap with the value of that debt. 
The buyer in turn pays regular fees.367 As with interest rate swaps, the notional amount 
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or “reference asset” need not be held by either party.368 As I will demonstrate, CDS 
were crucial to the alchemy of credit ratings that facilitated the subprime mortgage CDO 
arbitrage.  
The combination of the theoretical developments based on the BSM options 
pricing formula, the use of derivatives in response to the breakdown of Bretton Woods, 
and the development of electronic trading has resulted in a vast expansion in 
derivatives. Derivatives markets have grown enormously since the 1970s. The options 
market alone grew from relative obscurity before BSM to today accounting for over $400 
trillion dollars in financial trading a year on exchanges. Over-the-counter derivatives are 
estimated at a value of $700 trillion dollars outstanding today.369 The notional amount of 
outstanding CDS grew 86-fold between 2001 and 2008 from $631 billion to $54 
trillion.370 Arbitrage is a process of comparison that places two financial securities into a 
relationship of equivalence and disparity. This process of arbitrage, as capture in 
financial capitalism, requires the existence of as many instruments as possible that can 
be favorably compared. In general, the proliferation of derivatives is important because 
in addition to allowing for hedging against floating exchange rates and gambling-like 	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speculation on the future movement of financial prices, the vast trading of derivatives 
provides an almost endless supply of financial products that can be compared to one 
another for the purposes of arbitrage. But it is the particular role played by CDS in the 
emergence of subprime MBS that is of greatest importance in the final development: 
securitization.   
Securitization 
Mortgage borrowing and credit default swaps are both connected to the 
emergence and growth of securitization, the final important contextual factor supporting 
the subprime mortgage CDO arbitrage. Securitization is the transformation of loan 
assets into investment securities; it is not limited to mortgages, although they remain the 
largest component of the market. Since the 1980s, many forms of debt including 
corporate bonds, credit cards, car loans, student loans and home equity loans together 
known as asset backed securities (ABS) have all become subject to securitization. 
However, securitization emerged as a major financial technique in 1970 when the U.S. 
Congress allowed the Ginnie Mae to purchase bundles of mortgage loans issued by 
savings and loans and then resell them to investors as securities, instruments that 
would pay a fixed payment over a period of time just like traditional bonds.371 These 
payments effectively passed the repayment of mortgages, both interest and principal, 
through to investors, removing the loans from the balance sheets of the savings and 
loans so that they could in turn lend more.  
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Ginnie Mae, and eventually Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae as well, guaranteed 
the payments of the mortgage-backed securities to investors. Even if loans defaulted or 
were prepaid ahead of schedule, these government-sponsored entities (GSEs) provide 
investors with explicit guarantees against the default of individual securities and 
investors generally assumed an implicit guarantee that the U.S. government would not 
let the GSEs go bankrupt or default. Thus, GSE securitizations became attractive 
investments. Because of the special relationship between GSEs and the U.S. U.S. 
government, investors viewed their MBS as being as safe Treasury bonds.372  
Over the period from the 1970s to the present, mortgage-backed securities 
issued by GSEs grew into a trillion dollar market, with banks, pension funds and central 
banks all buying these super safe investments. In the 1980s, GSE-guaranteed MBS 
were joined by the securitization of riskier loans by private banks.373 These banks 
securitized “non-conforming loans,” mortgages that didn’t “conform to the GSE’s loan 
size limits and underwriting guidelines, such as debt-to-income [a measure of whether 
the borrower has enough income to service the debt] and loan-to-value [a measure of 
whether the home is valuable enough to cover the loan in foreclosure] ratios.”374 
Subprime and adjustable rate mortgages got the same treatment as safe 30-year 
mortgages, being sold to investors as bonds.  
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However, without the guarantees of GSE securitizations, it was uncertain how 
risky these MBS were. As I outlined above, credit ratings agencies were tapped to 
assess the risk of private MBS. The ratings agencies used models to predict the 
likelihood of default for each pool of mortgages that was securitized and then predict the 
level of default each tranche could withstand.375 Default correlation was an important 
aspect of these risk calculations because it gave a measure of the danger to other 
mortgages in a pool if one mortgage defaulted. Mathematician David X. Li developed a 
Gaussian copula formula to calculate default correlation that relied on the prices of CDS, 
those rapidly proliferating insurance contracts on debts.376 The Guassian copula formula 
used CDS prices as a measure of default risk. Recall that CDS are insurance contracts 
that can be purchased by any investor who wishes to speculate on or hedge the 
likelihood of default of any financial security. If CDS prices are high, that suggests that 
investors believe the chance of default is also high and thus require higher payments to 
insure against it. Using CDS to measure default correlation risk meant using investors’ 
opinions, reflected by prices, instead of “hard” data. And investors’ opinions were 
influenced by the recent history of housing prices. In 2000, when Li published his 
formula, “credit default swaps had been in existence [for] less than a decade, a period 
when house prices soared.”377  
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The use of CDS in default correlation models led to the circumstance in which 
subprime MBS containing risky mortgages could produce a large AAA-rated tranche.378 
In addition, because the component loans in a subprime MBS were risky, they had 
higher interest rates than prime loans. This higher rate of return was passed through to 
investors, meaning that AAA MBS bonds received higher interest rates than many other 
governmental or corporate bonds with the same rating.379   
AAA-rated private MBS became extremely attractive investments. They were 
abundant and paid relatively high rates of interest and investors needed exactly that. As 
Benmelech and Dlugosz note, despite high "institutional demand for highly rated 
securities… the supply of highly rated single-name securities is fairly limited. For 
example, only five nonfinancial companies and a few sovereigns had AAA ratings as of 
2007.”380 The institutional demand for these securities derived in part from risk aversion 
among large investors like pension funds. It also has to do with so-called “regulatory 
capital arbitrage.”381 
Banks like to hold loans on their balance sheets. Loans are assets, future income 
streams that they can borrow against. If a bank can show that it will receive a certain 
amount of money in payments to a loan in the future, it can itself borrow lump sums up 
front from other banks or the central bank based on that collateral. However, under the 	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Basel Accords, whole loans, especially risky subprime loans, require banks to hold back 
a relatively large proportion of their cash (around 5%) to cover potential losses.382 Banks 
would rather have as little capital in reserve as possible so that they can lend and 
receive fees and interest on those funds. AAA-rated bonds are weighted by the Basel 
Accord system as less risky. Thus, by simply switching out a portfolio of whole, 
subprime loans for AAA-rated MBS (and recall that subprime deals usually yielded 
about 80% AAA bonds), a bank could reduce its regulatory capital, the amount of funds 
it had to retain to cover potential losses, by as much as 20%.383 Banks still had loan 
collateral on their books in the form of MBS, but they freed up a significant proportion of 
capital previously held for losses. This practice is known as regulatory arbitrage 
because it compares the regulatory treatment of one asset to that of another and in 
making the exchange frees up regulatory capital for profit making activities. However, 
this exchange is not an actual arbitrage trade as it only puts previously static funds into 
flow rather than capturing new value; but it provided an incentive to banks to securitize 
their subprime loans and then buy AAA-rated subprime MBS.  
 Thus, there was a robust appetite among investors and banks for MBS. This 
appetite in turn fueled the boom in mortgage borrowing. As investors demanded more 
securities, lenders relaxed mortgage-underwriting standards, leading to such “dubious 
loans” as the NINA loan (“no asset no income” loan for which a borrower didn’t have to 
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prove ownership of any assets or income).384 The growth of private MBS in the 1990s 
and early 2000s also fueled the resecuritization of mortgage-backed securities into 
CDOs. As the authors of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report explain, the AAA-rated MBS 
bonds were easy to sell because of their high rating and relatively higher yield than 
other bonds. But “despite their relatively high returns, tranches rated other than triple-A 
could be hard to sell” due to their higher exposure to default risk on the underlying 
loans. 385 CDOs were constructed precisely from these lower rated bonds.  
Benmelech and Dlugosz’s 2009 article in the Journal of Monetary Economics that 
examined the rating of CDOs observed that CDO collateral pools most often included 
bonds rated B+ and B, far riskier designations than AAA.386 The excess supply of low 
rated MBS from the trillions of dollars in subprime securitizations taking place in the 
early 2000s (between 2001 and 2006 more than $2.5 trillion worth of subprime loans 
were originated and close to three quarters were securitized into MBS) fed into the rise 
of CDOs.387 CDO creation also stimulated further mortgage lending. The authors of the 
FCIC argue that CDO managers were so aggressive in seeking out low rated MBS that 	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they bid up prices on the securities, incentivizing mortgage originators to lend even 
more (and thus increasing risky mortgages like the NINA).388 By 2004, half of the 
collateral in multi-sector CDOs was comprised of low rated MBS.389 
CDO deals then delivered again typically around 80% AAA-rated securities even 
though they were based on high-risk, high-yield collateral pools. The same investors 
eager for AAA-rated MBS purchased AAA-rated CDOs as well. The securitization of 
subprime mortgages, first into MBS and then again into CDOs, created a feedback loop 
in which demand for AAA-rated securities from banks and investors combined with 
demand for mortgage loans from homebuyers to stimulate more and more 
securitization. 
Securitization of mortgages by private banks was touted in the years prior to the 
financial crisis as an important risk-transfer mechanism that allowed investors hungry 
for risk and potential return to have access to subprime mortgages.390 Securitization 
was therefore thought to reduce the risk that a major decline in housing prices would 
have a major impact on any one part of the economy. If the risk of default was spread 
out to many different investors, from hedge funds to pensions, the impact of a significant 
adverse event, such as the bursting of the housing bubble, would also be spread out 
and therefore be less intense. However, capital requirements led banks to perform 	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“regulatory capital arbitrage” by making poor quality loans in order to garner fees, and 
then securitizing them and selling them off to other banks. Banks passed these 
securities back and forth amongst themselves, holding a larger concentration of AAA-
rated MBS than any other investor group.391 When housing prices started to decline and 
defaults began reaching AAA-rated tranches, banks were caught without capital to 
cover their loses, resulting in serious capital shortages and in the cases of Bear Sterns 
and Lehman Brothers, bankruptcy. 
Securitization was profitable for a number of parties. Investors received higher 
returns than other AAA-rated investments; lenders collected fees for originating loans; 
and banks earned fees for issuing the MBS and CDO bonds and freed up regulatory 
capital. Still, regulatory arbitrage, investor demand and fees for originating and 
securitizing loans were not the true animating forces at the center of the securitization 
feedback loop. Instead, it was arbitrage. Several observers noted that arbitrage 
transactions began to outpace balance sheet transactions around the turn of the 
millennium. According to Laurie S. Goodman in the Journal of Derivatives, “All of the 22 
synthetic CDOs392 rated by Moody’s in 1999 were bank balance sheet transactions. In 
2000, of the 48 synthetic deals rated by Moody’s… 16 had other motivations” i.e. they 	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were “arbitrage deals.”393 Likewise, Kothari also notes the “explosive growth in arbitrage 
CDO issuance… after 1995.”394 The timing of this growth corresponds with the greatest 
spike in subprime lending and housing prices, confirming that it was the arbitrage, not 
the appetite of borrowers or investors that drove the greatest boom in securitization in 
the lead up to the financial crisis. Arbitrage is the goal that animates finance, and this 
goal took over the mortgage securitization process in the early 2000s, ramping it into the 
overdriven machine that eventually collapsed in the financial crisis. 
The Axiomatic 
Describing the arbitrage in subprime mortgage CDOs as an apparatus of capture 
disqualifies the idea that arbitrage profit is a mathematical error as financial economics 
suggests. However, it is also not enough to point out that borrowers saddled with 
exorbitant interest rates and the investors who received the lower interest rates of super 
safe AAA-rated securities were both in some ways exploited by the arbitrageurs who 
captured the difference. Instead, labeling this trade as capture raises the question of 
what social relations and axioms enabled that capture and differentially delivers profits 
to arbitrageurs. Capture is produced and reinforced by the axiomatic, the set of social 
relations and regulative axioms that allow it to function through the contradictions of 
capitalism. To understand the functioning of financial capitalism, then, one must 
describe these social relations and axioms. Although the capture at the heart of the 
subprime crisis has remained hidden within the rhetorics of irresponsible borrowers, too-	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big-to-fail banks and financial deregulation, understanding the subprime mortgage CDO 
arbitrage is not the hardest task. As with the capture of surplus labor time in industrial 
capitalism, the calculation of the spread between what is bought and what is sold is 
relatively simple. The difficult task is teasing out the axioms that allow this capture to 
occur. It is to this final task that I now turn. 
Social Relations 
Before identifying specific axioms, I will describe the social relations that 
emerged out of the historical context described above. These social relations were built 
upon the axioms and so the axioms will be more obvious once these relations have 
been traced. I have described the symbiosis between borrowers, banks, investors and 
CDO originators throughout this chapter. Borrowers received relatively easy debt, 
characterized by little or no down payment and/or little or no documentation. Banks 
received fees for origination and securitization, and also reduced their regulatory capital 
by holding AAA-rated MBS and CDO securities. Other investors got highly rated, “super 
safe” investments with relatively high returns. And arbitrageurs got billions in profits.  
However, two social relations in and around the subprime CDO market stand out 
as crucial to the subprime mortgage CDO apparatus of capture. First, the relation 
between borrowers and CDO originators, although seemingly separated by many steps 
and intermediaries, was an important but complicated one. Popular accounts of the 
financial crisis often bemoaned the uneven relationship between “Main Street and Wall 
Street.”  In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, popular discourse revolved around 
outrage at the bank bailouts and the swift recovery of financial markets as compared to 
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ongoing defaults, declining housing prices and unemployment. However, the relation 
between high-powered banks and financial firms on the one hand and individual 
investors and borrowers on the other is not simple or straightforward, and the 
articulation of mortgage-borrowers into the securitization process is complicated as well. 
Borrowers provided the raw material for the production of MBS and CDOs. Their debt to 
banks became the collateral for multiple deals. In some ways, these borrowers served 
arbitrage capture the way that laborers serve surplus labor capture. The high interest 
debt payments of subprime borrowers fed the excess spread in CDO deals that accrued 
to equity holders as arbitrage.  
However, the relation is more complicated than this simple analogy suggests. 
Borrowers’ payments fed CDOs until the crisis, but their debt also fueled a form of 
consumption heretofore impossible for “Main Street” in the form of ever larger and more 
luxurious homes. This may appear to be a sort of bait and switch strategy of the 
capitalist class that lured borrowers into debt peonage so that their labor in the capitalist 
machine would be ensured and newly exploited. And yet the financial crisis resulted not 
in millions of American homeowners being shackled to their exorbitant debt, but the 
opposite, waves of default in which “underwater” borrowers walked away from their 
homes and their debt. By one estimate, “the percentage of subprime loans that 
defaulted after 12 months was 14.6 percent for loans made in 2005, 20.5 percent for 
loans made in 2006, and 21.9 percent for loans made in 2007.”395 This is not to say that 	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mortgage defaults were without penalty for the borrowers. Credit reports are required 
now not only for the everyday borrowing that is required for the provision of welfare in 
the contemporary conjuncture, but also for renting and applying for many jobs. And yet, 
the raw material for the mortgage securitization boom, the borrowers, did not continue to 
deliver arbitrage profits by whatever means necessary, but instead withdrew from the 
machine, leading to losses in the financial sector as well. 
The second crucial relation was between credit ratings agencies and other 
market participants. Credit ratings have been relied upon by financial regulators and 
investors since the 1930s, but the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) officially 
designated Moody’s, S&P and Fitch as nationally recognized statistical rating 
organizations in 1975.396 Financial market participants use credit ratings as a shortcut to 
risk analysis, assuming a certain level of risk inheres in securities with a certain rating. 
This assumption justifies the interest rates that investors will find acceptable. Low rated 
securities must compensate investors with high returns since their rating indicates they 
carry higher risk. High rated securities are low risk and thus may deliver lower returns. 
The extent of ratings agencies’ influence over financial participants decisions cannot be 
understated. According to Benmelech and Dlogsuz,  
at least 44 SEC rules and forms incorporated agency ratings as of June 2008. 
Minimum capital requirements at banks, insurance companies, and broker-
dealers, depend on the credit ratings of the assets on their balance sheets. 
Pension funds, a $10 trillion source of capital in the United States, also face 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
396 Matthew Richardson and Lawrence J. White, “The Ratings Agencies: Is Regulation 
the Answer?,” in Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System, eds. Viral 
V. Acharya and Matthew Richardson (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2009). 
 	   197 
ratings-based regulations… This matrix of regulation creates institutional demand 
for highly rated securities.397 
The ubiquity of agency credit ratings in the assessment of and communication about 
financial securities produced a material and cultural dependence on them; ratings 
became a common sense signifier of risk. And risk is a taken-for-granted correlate of 
acceptable return. 
The importance of credit ratings agencies was already well established in 
financial markets before the fastest growth in subprime CDOs, but this importance, 
combined with the models the agencies used to rate CDOs, actually created the relation 
of equivalence and difference that allowed capture in the subprime mortgage CDO 
arbitrage. The Gaussian copula formula utilized by credit ratings agencies did not run 
scenarios of nationwide defaults on mortgages because, since the creation of the 
modern mortgage after the Great Depression, no such event had occurred. Instead of 
anticipating and simulating this possibility and rating CDOs with that scenario in mind, 
ratings agencies used the Gaussian copula, which measured default risk using historical 
CDS prices. These prices represented the opinions of investors on the likelihood of 
default. In the environment of rapidly increasing housing prices, default looked highly 
unlikely. Even if a homeowner lost her job, she could sell her home at a profit to the next 
buyer with a NINA mortgage. Thus, ratings agencies based their ratings of CDOs not on 
the possibility of default in the future, but the lack of default in the recent past. In a 
regulatory environment in which each new president was making homeownership easier 
and easier, this was a safe assumption to make. The Guassian copula allowed ratings 	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agencies to rate 80% of a CDO with a collateral pool with an average rating of B as 
AAA, just as safe as Microsoft bonds or U.S. Treasuries. 
Some have cited “ratings shopping” as the cause of the high ratings given to 
CDOs.398  Issuers of MBS and CDOs pay credit rating agencies to rate their deals. 
Richardson and White explain that this “issuer pays” model creates incentives for 
issuers to shop for the best rating among the three major agencies (S&P, Moody’s and 
Fitch).399 Credit ratings agencies have been blamed for offering high ratings to attract 
business and thus saddling investors with risky securities.  
The financial crisis seems to have born out this suspicion with the massive 
downgrading of MBS and CDOs from AAA to lower ratings (resulting in the write-downs 
that caused a downward spiral to bankruptcy or bailout for so many banks and financial 
firms). However, the suggestion of avarice among raters obscures their more basic role 
in the financial axiomatic as custodians of the relationship between risk and return. The 
dependence of financial market participants on credit ratings agencies meant that the 
credit ratings given to CDO securities not only endorsed their safety, but justified the 
difference in the interest rates between the collateral and the issued securities. 
Investors assumed an unproblematic correspondence between a credit rating agency’s 
assigned rating of a CDO tranche and its riskiness, which led those investors to accept 
lower returns for AAA-rated CDO securities. The lower returns compared to the high 	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interest paid to the collateral constituted the spread and the arbitrage profit captured by 
equity holders. 
Axioms 
Axioms are taken-for-granted statements that direct flows of value towards and 
through the process of capture. According to Grossberg et al., axioms accomplish this 
task by regulating not the flows themselves, but social mattering and obligation.400 
Obligation is stripped away in the processes of decoding, unitization and flow, leaving a 
purely mathematical equation of comparison and capture. But this evacuation of social 
meaning is dangerous. Capitalism can only continue to function if social obligation is 
strategically reintroduced. Axioms reintroduce flows of social obligation in ways that 
enable rather than thwart capture. Axioms manage the inherent contradictions of 
capitalism. In industrial capitalism, capture requires the evacuation of social mattering 
such that workers are transformed from social individuals into flows of abstract labor. 
But workers cannot be fully transformed into automata as they must continue to 
reproduce themselves and consume. Thus, axioms “dealing with the working class, 
employment, union organization, social institutions” were all necessary for, not opposed 
to, capture.401  
A similar contradiction pervades the subprime mortgage CDO apparatus of 
capture. The apparatus of capture required a continuously growing stream of debt that 
could be decoded, unitized and put into flow as raw material for comparison and 	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capture. The mass of individuals who had to provision themselves with housing offered 
such an opportunity, but the social and cultural mattering surrounding housing following 
the Great Depression did not support mortgage borrowing on such a large scale. 
Mortgages were dangerous and expensive and the social meaning of indebtedness 
made repayment a strong obligation. Economic prudence dictated that taking out loans 
that one could not repay was a moral failure and a social betrayal. 
The subprime CDO arbitrage could only occur if the contradiction between the 
need for ballooning high-risk debt and the social obligation to repay were managed. 
More and more risky debt was the raw material for capture, but default would destroy 
the entire machine, causing losses to the equity tranche that would immediately wipe 
out profits and sour investors on MBS and CDOs in the future. An axiom that maximized 
debt and minimized default was the key to the success of the CDO arbitrage. And just 
such an axiom was instantiated over the crucial period beginning in the 1970s. The 
axiom that “the provision of security must be achieved by risk”, which drove the 
development of everyday finance described above, was one of the most important 
axioms enabling the subprime mortgage CDO arbitrage. To explain this axiom, I must 
revisit the role of the U.S. government in promoting mortgage-funded homeownership. 
Deleuze and Guattari pointed out that the state plays an important role in the 
manufacture of axioms, and so it is unsurprising that the U.S. government did much to 
promote the social mattering of mortgage-funded homeownership. Buying a home with 
debt in the U.S. became easier and cheaper with each new government initiative, but it 
still required taking the risk that one would be able to maintain income and payback the 
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loan over the long 30-year term. That risk was not worth taking for many, especially 
poor potential borrowers; the cost of homeownership was simply too high and the social 
obligation to repay too strong. The injunction to secure one’s everyday needs and future 
through risk stripped this obligation and replaced it with the calculation of risk and 
return.  
The axiom to risk for security was not an ideological charge, but from the 1970s 
on became a foundational principle of American life as a part of what may be termed the 
neoliberal project. The welfare state was gradually reduced through reductions in 
federal poverty programs including housing assistance at the same time that individuals 
were invited to secure their own welfare through investing and borrowing.402 The risk of 
borrowing was necessary in light of the dearth of affordable housing initiatives and the 
mortgage incentives provided by the state. But it was also the gateway to security 
through investment in an appreciating asset. As housing prices began to climb more 
rapidly in the 1990s, mortgage borrowing was touted as a way to not only provide for 
everyday housing for more and more, and poorer and poorer, borrowers, but also as a 
way to supplement stagnating wages by building quick equity. Default was no longer a 
betrayal of social obligation, but a risk calculation that, in light of rising home prices and 
lax lending regulation was worth taking.  
The axiom to risk for the provision everyday life managed the contradiction 
between the requirement of debt for securitization and the social obligation to repay 
debt by reintroducing obligation in another form. The social bonds of obligation were 	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destroyed by the production of decoded, unitized mortgage debt. The amount of risky 
debt needed for securitization meant that many mortgages could no longer represent an 
obligation to pay the community bank for assistance in becoming the owner of a family 
home, but were instead robo-signed debt instruments used for home buying as 
investment for borrowers as well as the capture of exceptional profits for arbitrageurs. 
The social mattering of a home as shelter and dwelling was to some extent evacuated. 
But securitization was not only enabled but also threatened precisely by this evacuation. 
Mortgage debt soared, but mass mortgage defaults would, as they did during the 
financial crisis, bring the entire securitization machine down. Something had to obligate 
borrowers to repay. The axiom of risk for security managed this threat by reintroducing 
another form of obligation: that you must put your money to work. 
Under the axiom to risk for security, renting was no longer living within one’s 
means but throwing money away. Taking out and properly servicing a mortgage meant 
allowing one’s money to contribute to the growth of equity. Repayment was necessary 
in order to protect one’s credit score and to thus be able to risk for profit again in the 
future. Speaking about the moral consequences of the rise of securitization in finance, 
Randy Martin argues that market logic was replaced by the logic of risk and the figure of 
reason is no longer the entrepreneur but the arbitrageur. The difference between the 
two, he suggests, relates directly to the concept of property: “The entrepreneur respects 
the boundary between property and speculation. The arbitrageur can no longer.”403 The 
axiom to risk for security calls borrowers to see their homes as leveraged (i.e. bought 	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with borrowed money in the form of mortgages), speculative investments. Like 
arbitrageurs, homebuyers must not be in it for the property, but for the return. Failure to 
speculate was not just stupid, but irresponsible. And default was similarly illogical as a 
tarnished credit history would foreclose future borrowing-for-gain opportunities. This 
axiom eventually failed, at least partially and for a short period of time, under the 
pressure of truly impossible to repay subprime loans at the beginning of the crisis. But 
there is another axiom that faired far better. 
The axiom to risk for security worked on the edges of the financial system, 
managing the circuits of debt that tied everyday borrowers to financial capture. It can be 
understood as a correlate of a much more fundamental axiom that is evident in the 
social relations of credit ratings agencies to other financial market participants. As I 
have explained, credit ratings are accepted as common sense signifiers of risk in the 
financial system. Investors accept the ratings as a basis for acceptable return and 
regulators accept them as an objective measure of risk, backed as they are by 
sophisticated mathematical models. These models proved inadequate to the task of 
truly measuring default risk, but they were not axioms. In fact, the models were built on 
an axiom that made the impossible task of predicting risk an intelligible way to establish 
return, the axiom of “risk and return.” 
Consider a mortgage-backed security. Return is a function of the payments to the 
underlying collateral minus fees. It doesn’t have to be calculated, but is an objective 
fact. The MBS is based on a pool of loans that will receive a certain amount of 
payments. There is a subtle form of social obligation present in the way a MBS passes 
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these payments through. Investors are getting what they pay for with an MBS. Arbitrage 
CDOs, on the other hand, are only possible because of a contradiction between the 
return based on the payments to the underlying collateral, a return that should be 
passed on to investors, and the return that is offered to investors based on the credit 
rating of the resultant CDO tranche. The only way for the arbitrage profits to be 
constituted is for the obligation to pass profits through to be evacuated and a different 
return to be calculated. The axiom of risk and return provides the basis for that 
calculation and thus manages the contradiction. As suggested in the previous chapter, 
the price, or in this case the interest rate paid on CDOs, is determined by context 
entirely hijacked by the axiomatic, primarily the axiom of risk and return.  
The axiom of risk and return dictates that profits derive not from the objective 
returns of an investment, but to a measure of its risk. This axiom supports arbitrage as 
the form of financial capture. Arbitrage requires a relation of equivalence between two 
securities that have different prices. Equivalence is, as I argued in chapter two, created. 
Singularities must be brought into a relation of equivalence by deterritorialization and 
decoding/unitization that strips away the unique mattering of these singularities and 
replaces it with a uniform code that marks them as the same. In contemporary finance, 
this code is risk. If two securities have the same risk profiles, whether measured as 
variance, implied volatility or credit rating, they must deliver the same returns. If their 
returns differ, arbitrage allows capture of that difference.  
 The entire edifice of financial economics is built upon this one notion first posed 
by economist Frank Knight in the 1920s. According to Knight, “Profit arises out of the 
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inherent, absolute unpredictability of things.”404 In the discourse of financial economics, 
risk refers to the potential for a market participant to incur a monetary consequence 
from the uncertain unfolding of events, such as an increase or decrease in the value of 
a share of stock. Risk and return are correlated; the higher the risk, the higher the 
return. Within financial discourses, risk is not all bad. Risk is something to be managed, 
with techniques like diversification and hedging, but not banished entirely, as it is 
necessary for return. 
The axiom of risk and return is built into all the major theories of financial 
economics. Risk is not an observable variable, as it is a characteristic of the unfolding of 
an uncertain future. The financial theories described in chapter one all approximate risk 
with observable phenomena. Mean-variance valuation describes the relationship 
between the historical mean as a measure of return and historical variance as a 
measure of risk. The Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM) relates the return that can be 
expected on any stock to a systematic risk factor, beta, which is calculated using 
historical variance as the measure of risk. Relative valuation is exemplified in the Black-
Scholes-Merton options pricing formula that established the necessary relationship 
between stock prices, option prices, and risk in the present, without appeal to past 
variance. But the BSM is not generally used to price options, but rather to back out a 
measure of risk after inputting all the other variables. “Implied volatility,” the risk variable 
output of the BSM is considered one of the most important measures of financial 
activity.  	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However, financial models cannot actually predict future states of the world as 
the history of financial markets has demonstrated time and again. Nassim Taleb has 
described those events so wildly outside of financial models’ predictions as Black 
Swans.405 Financial economists speak of “fat tails” as a way to account for events that 
are practically impossible in “normal” pricing models.406 The stock market crash on 
Black Monday in 1987 is one such event. Economists like to point out that it was a “20 
sigma event” meaning that its probability lies 20 standard deviations away from the 
center of the price distribution.407 In other words, typical financial models would predict a 
crash of that magnitude to occur less than once in the history of existence. The 
Guassian copula formula failed to predict the true risk of wide scale default because like 
all financial models of risk, it attempts to measure an immeasurable phenomenon. Risk 
is a concept that underpins all financial activity, but it is also fundamentally arbitrary.  
The relation of risk and return replaces the social obligation to give investors their 
due with the obligation to deliver “risk-adjusted returns,” profits that are appropriate for 
the risk attributed to the investments. Neither historical variance nor present volatility of 
returns can predict the future. So the axiom of risk and return actually replaces the 
obligation to give investors their due with the obligation to deliver return in accordance 
with an arbitrary calculation of an impossible-to-know future. While many have 	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commented on the supposed avarice and duplicity of ratings agencies that gave AAA 
ratings to deals obviously backed by much riskier collateral, it is the axiom of risk and 
return and the arbitrariness of risk calculations that even made such an action possible. 
The risk and return axiom is so fundamental to finance that, while credit rating agencies’ 
risk assessment models have been critiqued and challenged following the financial 
crisis, the notion that risk and return are in fact related and that this relation is the basis 
of profitability has not.  
The axiom of risk and return is a primary statement, a deep foundation of 
financial capitalism and multiple apparatuses of capture, including the subprime 
mortgage CDO arbitrage. Challenging the idea that risk and return are directly 
proportional is nonsensical in the system of finance; it is a challenge that leaves the 
system undefined and unintelligible. This is the power of the axiom; even more than 
hegemonic ideology, it is so taken for granted that critiquing it does not draw ire, but 
only confusion.  
Conclusion: The Crash 
The failure of the subprime CDO machine was connected in several ways to the 
financial crisis that began in 2007 and continues to resonate in many ways today. The 
defaults that caused the initial credit crisis in financial markets and the wave of write-
downs and bankruptcies among financial firms also erased the arbitrage profits of 
arbitrage CDOs. After the crisis, new issuance of CDOs fell from a height of $520 billion 
in 2006 to just $4 billion in 2009.408 The proverbial jig was up. The crisis constituted a 	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vast shock to the functioning of capitalism, not unlike the Great Depression, which 
Deleuze and Guattari credit with remaking the axiomatic of industrial capitalism.409 But 
in the years since the crisis waned, it appears that financial capitalism has fared far 
better than industrial capitalism did in the years after the Depression. Profits to the 
financial sector have soared back to their highest levels ever. Many of the instruments 
that played important roles in the subprime mortgage CDO arbitrage and contributed to 
the crisis, from CDS to CDOs have come back into common usage. For example, 
despite the failure of the Guassian copula formula to foretell the housing bubble’s burst, 
CDS are still considered a good shorthand measure of the risk of bonds.410 CDOs are 
also back, growing from their 2009 levels back to over $100 billion dollars of new 
issuance in 2014, although this growth no longer includes CDOs with subprime 
mortgage collateral.411  
Axiomatics are sites of struggle over capitalism. Because axioms manage flows 
by reintroducing obligation, “there is always something—something affective—that is 
not captured by the axiomatic… a lived experience of obligation is always threatening to 
disrupt and even overwhelm the axiomatic, and this defines the axiomatic as a site of 
constant struggle and transformation.”412 The financial crisis can be understood as a 	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moment of disruption. The axiom to risk for security and the axiom of risk and return 
worked together to enable capture through arbitrage of subprime mortgage CDOs, but 
they also promoted the very thing that threatened the apparatus of capture the most: 
default. The level of debt needed for capture also overwhelmed the ability of borrowers 
to repay. Repayment was contingent on increasing housing prices, and when they 
began to fall, the old social obligation to honor debts was not there to buffer the crash as 
it had been stripped away by the new axiom that privileged the obligation to put money 
to work.  
This disruption of the axiomatic presented a moment of rupture in which the 
axioms could be struggled over. A now well-worn debate erupted in the aftermath of the 
bursting of the housing bubble, laying blame first on subprime borrowers but then more 
and more on the mortgage originators, bankers and hedge fund traders as details of the 
mortgage securitization machine emerged. Anger was directed at the bailout of banks 
and banks’ foreclosure practices (such as the robo-signing scandal) and moral outrage 
characterized the blaming of each new villain (the film Inside Job suggests that a 
powerful cabal of regulators, banks and traders conspired to perpetrate the crisis).413  
However, accusing individuals or even an entire system of greed isn’t exactly a 
revolutionary action. The question of whether any response to the crisis actually 
challenged the axiomatic of financial capitalism remains open. By way of conclusion, I’d 
like to suggest that while the first axiom to risk for security was at least addressed by the 
debate surrounding the crisis, the second axiom of risk and return remained hidden and 	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was further entrenched by responses to the crisis. Future challengers to the dominant 
practices and consequences of financial capitalism would do well to focus attention on 
that axiom.  
One part of the debate surrounding the financial crisis that addressed the axiom 
to risk for security was the discourse about the perils of indebtedness and 
admonishments that the crisis was caused by people “living beyond their means.”414 
Following mass defaults on mortgages, the popular discourse surrounding the crisis 
blamed ballooning consumer debt in the decades before the crisis on the propensity of 
Americans to live beyond their means. The discourse quickly took hold and, until 
attention turned to the risky practices and bailout of the big banks, seemed like a good 
explanation of rising defaults on large swanky “McMansion” homes.415 The “living 
beyond their means” hypothesis likely found purchase because it resonated with a much 
older discourse that Lendol Calder calls “the myth of lost economic virtue.”416 Taking 
hold in the early years of the twentieth century, the “myth” suggests that debt is a new 
development that has corrupted the core American value of thrift. According to Calder, 
despite the ancient history of debt, each new generation saw the growth in consumer 
debt as a revolutionary loss of economic virtue and a slide into moral decline.  	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The “living beyond their means” discourse smoothly transitioned from an 
explanation of mass default and foreclosures to a justification of fiscal austerity in the 
U.S. and European countries involved in the sovereign debt crisis. Why is Greece in 
trouble? The BBC answered flatly, “Greece was living beyond its means even before it 
joined the euro.”417 Public expenditures on wages, pensions and healthcare were 
viewed in the same way as “McMansions”, as immoral luxury expenditures. The “living 
beyond their means” explanation of the crisis was not completely dismissed when 
details of the role of lending practices and risky financial practices gained more 
exposure, but its incisiveness has waned as borrowing has begun to rise to pre-crisis 
levels.418 
The “living beyond their means” moment in the post-crisis debate actually struck 
out at the heart of the axiom to risk for security. A successful call to reject debt would 
hinder debt-based apparatuses of capture, including the subprime CDO capture, but 
also other forms of arbitrage that rely on the production of more and more debt 
securities of other kinds, from student loans to credit cards, for comparison. This is the 
premise of the Strike Debt initiative that came out of Occupy Wall Street. Without 
addressing the precise mechanisms by which debt is a source of profit, Strike Debt calls 
for cutting the circuits that connect everyday borrowing to financial markets:  
Debt is a tie that binds the 99%. With stagnant wages, systemic unemployment, 
and public service cuts, we are forced to go into debt for the basic things in life — 
and thus surrender our futures to the banks. Debt is [sic] major source of profit 	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and power for Wall Street that works to keep us isolated, ashamed, and afraid. 
Using direct action, research, education, and the arts, we are coming together to 
challenge this illegitimate system while imagining and creating alternatives. We 
want an economy in which our debts are to our friends, families, and 
communities — and not to the 1%.419 
While this call to action correctly diagnoses the role of debt in many financial 
apparatuses of capture, and the evacuation of the social obligation to repay in favor of 
the axiom to risk for security, it is at its base a deeply conservative proposal. Debt 
rejection calls for a return to the social obligation that is stripped away in the process of 
capture, but in so doing mistakes the myth of lost economic virtue for truth. Debt 
rejection is just that, a refusal to propose a new axiom that would transform capitalism. 
Strike Debt’s most successful campaign, Rolling Jubilee, which infiltrates the network of 
debt collectors to buy discounted debt and thereby “liberate debtors” works within the 
existing axiomatic to provide relief to some debtors, but does nothing to change the 
context that allows financial capture to function as it does.420   
Activists applaud Strike Debt and Rolling Jubilee for doing something. The axiom 
to risk for security has at least come under scrutiny since the financial crisis, while the 
axiom of risk and return, a more fundamental and deeply entrenched principle of 
financial capitalism, has not. The ratings agencies that function as the guardians of this 
axiom came under a great deal of scrutiny for rating CDOs so highly. However, the 
relation between risk and return has not even been addressed. In fact, the Dodd Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 further entrenches the risk 	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and return axiom by adding new layers of regulation on ratings agencies which will 
make their credit rating judgments appear more rigorous and trustworthy.421  
Financial capitalism is characterized by a form of capture, arbitrage, and a 
complex axiomatic that makes that capture possible. While the capture, since it appears 
as exploitation, is the most visible part of the capitalist machine, it is also the simplest. A 
simple calculation of equivalence, difference and excess sums up the process of 
capture. The axiomatic, however, is more important and difficult to assess. Axioms are 
not statements of meaning, but primary formulas that found the system of financial 
capitalism. The acceptance by financial market participants and critics alike of the axiom 
of risk and return is evident in the unproblematic adoption of the language of risk into 
critical assessments of finance. And in the aftermath of the greatest financial crisis since 
the Great Depression, no challenge to this axiom has been broached. Struggles against 
financial capture cannot lose sight of the form that capture takes in arbitrage. But they 
must, more importantly, challenge the notion of risk as a correlate of return.  
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 CONCLUSION: THE EMPEROR IS NAKED 
The aim of this dissertation is to call for and contribute to a cultural studies of 
finance: an attempt to construct a new understanding of what finance is and what 
finance does from a critical perspective that challenges financial economists’ esoteric 
narratives and seeks to contextualize financial value through explorations of its social 
and cultural foundations rather than accept it as a “purely” economic category. In some 
ways, the research presented here falls short of that goal by neglecting culture as the 
quotidian practices and relationships that make up the “whole way of life” of finance.422 
Nor is the analysis oriented towards uncovering, defining or describing in ethnographic 
terms what might be called “arbitrage culture,” the practices, habits and desires of 
traders (whether in financial markets or auction houses, eBay, Craigslist or other 
contexts) who carry out arbitrage. I touch on the relationships that make up arbitrage 
culture in the fourth chapter, where I review the recent history of arbitrage and draw 
attention to popular criticism and distrust of its practitioners. But I do not give a close 
account of the culture of arbitrage trading, opting instead to cover broader aspects of 
American culture surrounding home buying and conventions of financial risk 
measurement in my analysis of the financial axiomatic, the system of founding 
statements and social relations that produce and sustain the apparatus of capture of 	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arbitrage. An account of arbitrage culture would add necessary depth and new insights 
to the analysis of the axiomatic, bearing out the axioms and social relations that sustain 
arbitrage capture.  
Examples of this kind of analysis exist. For example, in “Tools of the Trade: The 
Socio-technology of Arbitrage in a Wall Street Trading Room,” Beunza and Stark explain 
that the physical orientation of the trading room floor and social interactions between 
traders are geared towards “generating equivalences” between stocks trading at 
different prices so that arbitrage can be carried out. In light of the centrality of risk 
discovered in this dissertation, it would be helpful to see how traders utilize the category 
of risk in the construction of those equivalences.423 Robert Wosnitzer’s dissertation, 
Desk, Firm, God, Country: Proprietary Trading and the Speculative Ethos of 
Financialism, suggests that Weber’s Protestant ethic doesn’t define financialized 
capitalism so well as a “speculative ethos” that animates financial activity.424 For 
Wosnitzer, this ethos emerges out of the “work of arbitrage” as the way that the trader 
can experience success.425 The will to succeed through arbitrage may be another 
important part of the axiomatic. I believe that examining “arbitrage culture” as opposed 
to the broader analysis of the axiomatic I opt for in this dissertation is a necessary and 
important part of a cultural studies of finance. This dissertation, however, follows a 
different path.   	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What it does accomplish, though, is answering the appeals for a new type of 
analysis of economics made by Lawrence Grossberg and Philip Mirowski, who call upon 
scholars to not take economists at their word and instead investigate the workings of 
finance critically.426 The dissertation meets this challenge by focusing on the trading 
strategy of arbitrage, a central concept in financial economics and a central mechanism 
of profit making in financial markets. I reject the ambiguous and mystifying definition of 
arbitrage provided by financial economists, but I do not dismiss financial economics. 
Instead, I examine the way that arbitrage functions as the conceptual linchpin of 
financial economics, bringing the contradictions of that system of thought into relief. I 
pose the question, “where does arbitrage profit come from?,” and attempt to formulate 
an answer. Financial economics conceives of arbitrage as the mechanism that polices 
the system of financial prices, promoting fairness and autonomy. This focus on the 
tendency of (some) arbitrage trades to equilibrate prices neglects popular critiques that 
have been leveled against arbitrage for more than a century that it is cheating or gaming 
the system. It also means that financial economics doesn’t theorize arbitrage profit at 
all.  
Building on some recent work in the Marxist tradition, I address this aporia by 
looking at arbitrage as a form of surplus value appropriation. I push this possibility 
forward by reimagining arbitrage as a form of capture within a new framework for 
understanding value. Within this framework, value is understood as originating from 
collective processes for establishing what matters. Value is then transformed into more 	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concrete forms that ultimately can be captured. My reformulation of arbitrage as capture 
focuses directly on profit and explains that it is exploitative in a way similar to capitalist 
surplus labor time appropriation. I further argue that arbitrage profits accrue to those 
traders who have advantageous differential access to the networks (including high 
speed trading platforms) and tools (including price-stabilizing derivatives contracts) 
necessary for carrying out the capture process. Arbitrage is not a fair mechanism for 
equilibrating prices, but rather a battle among arbitrageurs to secure profits. In fact, the 
best kind of arbitrage from the perspective of arbitrageurs is money machine arbitrage, 
trading that relies on structural inequalities in price that are maintained over time 
allowing for continuously produced profit. Arbitrage in subprime mortgage-backed 
CDOs, which I examine in more detail, was one such money machine. This is not a 
conclusion, but the beginning of an analysis that must reconstruct the system of 
foundational statements and social relations that create the conditions of differential 
access that enable capture. It is only an examination of this system, which I call the 
axiomatic, that can yield understanding of the exploitation of arbitrage.  
Therefore, my reconstruction of arbitrage culminates with an analysis that 
examines the axiomatic of the financial apparatus of capture through a particular case: 
the arbitrage trade in subprime CDOs at the center of the housing bubble preceding the 
2007-09 financial crisis. The analysis demonstrates that the arbitrage in subprime 
mortgage-backed CDOs relied on a foundation of axioms and social relations related to 
the relationship between risk and return, both in the way that borrowers were “required” 
to put their money to work purchasing risky mortgages (rather than saving or living 
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“within their means”) and the way that CDO originators relied on a differential between 
the calculated riskiness of subprime-mortgage backed securities (MBS) and their CDOs 
to continuously capture arbitrage profits.  
It also demonstrates that the axiomatic is the assemblage that makes or breaks 
any apparatus of capture. Arbitrage is central to finance because of the strength of the 
axiomatic that asserts and protects its functioning as natural and appropriate. Central to 
the financial apparatus of capture, it turns out, is the notion of risk. In the CDO arbitrage, 
risk was the category that produced arbitrage as a reasonable and appropriate function: 
citizens needed to take on risky mortgages (rather than saving and renting) to achieve a 
good life, thus providing the raw material (subprime MBS) for the arbitrage; and the 
difference in the calculated riskiness of the CDOs and their component mortgage-
backed securities literally produced the difference in price that was captured as profit. 
The centrality of risk is one of the most important contributions of the dissertation and is 
a topic to which I will return below. 
My analysis of the axiomatic deploys the study of culture for the specific purpose 
of understanding the success and failure of capture, in this case, the CDO arbitrage. 
The case study does not present an account of arbitrage culture per se, but it does 
analyze particular, limited cultural milieus to better understand how the CDO arbitrage 
was able to succeed in producing the profits it did and why it failed insofar as it was a 
significant factor in the financial crisis. Through this analysis, I contribute to a cultural 
studies of finance by reconstructing an understanding of arbitrage that dispatches the 
narrow models of financial economists and puts it into social and cultural context in 
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order to critically examine its role in capitalism. I am ultimately able to formulate an 
answer to the question of where arbitrage profit comes from. Arbitrage profit is value 
emanating from collective social processes, which is transformed into capitalist value 
and monopolistically appropriated by arbitrageurs. This way of answering the question 
of arbitrage profit overcomes the weaknesses of both financial economics and most 
Marxist interpretations of finance. It shifts the definition of arbitrage away from the 
assumption that it is always equilibrates prices unless it faces some technical 
“limitations” and firmly establishes the centrality of profit. But it is the analysis of the 
axiomatic that pushes the rethinking of arbitrage in this dissertation onto the most 
innovative ground. Capture is only possible and sustainable if an axiomatic can stitch it 
together and successfully defend its functioning through against ideological challenges. 
In the case of the CDO arbitrage, many aspects of financial economics and market 
practice, especially around risk—institutional reliance on credit ratings agencies and 
complex default correlation risk models—contributed to the axiomatic that made the 
arbitrage possible.  
The axiomatic provides a way of answering perhaps the most important question 
about capitalism: why do the vast majority of people continue to accept their own 
exploitation within the system despite their understanding of that exploitation. The 
axiomatic is the system of social relations and statements that secure exploitation. But 
even for that narrow context, I don’t provide a full accounting of the axioms and social 
relations and so therefore cannot fully answer this question in relation to finance. 
However, the fraction of the axiomatic I do reconstruct suggests that part of the answer 
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revolves around what I believe will become a central issue for cultural studies of finance: 
the notion of risk. 
Risk is central within financial economics broadly and to the financial economic 
definition of arbitrage more narrowly. Starting with the publication of von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in 1944, the notion that people 
make economic decisions by assigning subjective probabilities to possible outcomes 
became enshrined in every major financial theory, including Markowitz’s portfolio theory, 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Black-Scholes-Merton options pricing 
formula.427 Risk reached its apotheosis in the financial economic conception of 
arbitrage. Enshrined in the “Law of One Price,” the relationship between risk and 
arbitrage makes judgments of the former a precondition for the latter. The Law of One 
Price requires that assets, which have the same risk and payoff, must also have the 
same prices. They are judged to be financially equivalent from these two aspects and 
thus their prices must reflect that equivalence. If they are trading at different prices, the 
Law of One Price states that arbitrage will inevitably occur because arbitrageurs will 
want to gain the available profit from buying the cheap and selling the dear. The 
arbitrage will, it is assumed, force the prices of the two assets into parity. Risk and 
return are directly related, so risk is the measure that makes or breaks a potential 
arbitrage trade. Different prices can only be justified by different risk profiles. If risk is the 
same between assets with the same payoff where prices differ, arbitrage can take 
place.  	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The Law of One Price justifies the financial economic definition of arbitrage as 
“riskless.” Buying the low priced asset and selling the high priced one doesn’t result in 
any net increase or decrease in risk since the risk profiles of the two assets must by 
definition be identical for the arbitrage to take place. There is an exchange of equivalent 
securities that have different prices, so risk exactly cancels itself out while the difference 
in prices yields a “riskless” profit. However, as already noted, this definition is woefully 
inadequate to describing actually occurring arbitrage. On the face of it, the idea that 
anything is ever truly riskless is absurd. The unfolding of time is uncertain. Any action 
can result in unforeseen consequences. The purest arbitrage trades cannot sustain the 
moniker of risklessness. In chapter four, I suggest instead that arbitrage, understood as 
a form of capture, can either succeed or fail and can only be called “riskless,” or seem 
as if it were guaranteed in advance, ex post facto. It is more important to understand the 
factors that contribute to the success or failure of arbitrage than to classify arbitrage as 
riskless or not. I offer the concept of time contingency as a way of circumventing risk 
and suggest that successful arbitrage relies on specific techniques for managing the 
contingency of unfolding time. 
It is evident that risk is a problematic category, and this is due in part to the 
slippages in the meaning of the term as it gained more importance within financial 
economics over time. In von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 1944 book, expected utility 
included a subjective judgment about probabilities of possible outcomes. But as this 
notion was implemented in finance, it quickly took on a more objective bent. Markowitz’s 
portfolio theory derived in the 1950s used historical standard deviation of returns to 
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represent risk, lending an air of universal calculability to the term. The Black-Scholes-
Merton (BSM) options pricing formula, first designed to input the price of the underlying 
stock, the strike price of the option, the time to expiration, the risk free interest rate and 
“volatility” or risk, has, since its original publication, been turned on its head so that it 
delivers an “implied volatility” term. Actual existing options prices are plugged in with 
other variables and the one term that is truly “unobservable”, the volatility term, 
becomes the output of the equation. BSM thus delivers an on-the-spot risk 
measurement from current stock and options prices as if the stock market itself 
measures risk. The importance of measures of the riskiness of assets was 
institutionalized in 1975 with the national recognition of Moody’s, S&P and Fitch.428 The 
ratings produced by these firms have become bedrock, taken-for-granted facts of 
financial activity, as SEC rules, BASEL Accord rules, and pension fund regulations all 
rely upon them. In short, what began as a concept describing individual subjective 
guesses about future events has been reified into an objective thing that can be 
measured and represented on a simple scale from AAA to D. Risk is now real.  
The objectivity of risk as been accepted not only by economists and financial 
traders, but also by critics of finance who take up the term as if it signifies exactly what it 
purports to describe, a quantifiable measure of uncertainty that is directly proportional to 
return.429 The particular way of measuring or calculating risk might be critiqued as 	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incorrect (especially in hindsight) but that risk is calculable and necessary for 
understanding return is not challenged.  
But there is something rotten with risk. First, as I argue in the penultimate chapter 
of this dissertation, risk is the attempt to quantify an unknowable future. What will 
happen in the future, even in mechanical and biological systems, much less social ones 
like financial markets, cannot really be predicted by what has happened in the past. The 
future is contingent, emerging, always becoming a new present, not the repetition of a 
past present. It may be possible to establish a pattern of the relationship between the 
past and presents that have subsequently occurred, but that pattern could, with the 
emergence of each new present, be disrupted. Reifying those patterns into objective 
facts misses the fundamental nature of the relationship between the past and the future. 
There is something paradoxical about assigning a stable value, for instance AAA, as a 
measure of future uncertainty. It is a certainty of uncertainty, a mathematical double 
entendre: this is the measure of the immeasurable.  
This epistemological paradox serves, however, an important purpose. Risk isn’t 
just the paradoxical measure of the immeasurable; it is also, as I demonstrate in the last 
chapter, a key to several axioms that underpin and support the monopolistic capture of 
value by some at the expense of others. The axiom to risk for security (in which 
homebuyers learned to assume that taking on risky mortgages was the price of future 
wealth appreciation) and more importantly the axiom of risk and return (in which the 
price differential between MBS and CDOs was cemented by ratings agencies’ measures 	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of risk) were the infrastructure on which the money machine CDO arbitrage was built. 
This arbitrage, which delivered billions in profits to certain traders at the expense of 
pension funds and mortgage borrowers, relied on the stable measures of risk in credit 
ratings to function. It wasn’t that those ratings were wrong, which many commentators 
on the crisis have argued, but that they did the work of proving that actually 
immeasurable risk was measured to be AAA in the vast majority of MBS and CDO 
tranches. Without the assumption that risk could be measured in this way, and that this 
measure thereby justified a particular return, no arbitrage would have been possible. 
Risk functions for finance at the intersection of epistemological paradox and 
justification of capture. It is the fudge factor, a measure of the immeasureable and 
therefore the term that, under the guise of rational calculation, can be manipulated 
through the complicated and consequential machinations of the axiomatic to justify 
capture. Risk is the emperor’s new clothes and capture the result of his subjects’ 
enduring acceptance of his resplendentness.   
Cultural studies of finance must become the child who declares the nakedness of 
the emperor. Just as Stuart Hall analyzed the arbitrariness of the label “mugging” in 
order to reveal the deeper relations of race, class, migration and policing in England, 
cultural studies of finance must examine the relations that lie beneath reified “risk.” Like 
“mugging,” “risk” may be an arbitrary label, but it has definite, political and economic 
effects. It is, in this very moment, sustaining processes of financial capture in ways that 
have been neglected by critical analysts of capitalism and finance alike. One main 
contribution of this dissertation is to call attention to the central role of arbitrage in 
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finance; but more importantly, it exposes the need for further analysis of the financial 
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